不要在安全许可申请表上填写的内容
What not to write on your security clearance form (1988)

原始链接: https://milk.com/wall-o-shame/security_clearance.html

1943年,12岁的莱斯·厄内斯特和一位朋友根据一本密码学书籍的原理创建了一个简单的密码,用于秘密通信。厄内斯特在电车上丢失了密码本——一份打字稿——以及他的眼镜。一位担忧的公民认为这是间谍材料,尤其是在反日情绪高涨的时期,于是将其交给了联邦调查局。 联邦调查局启动了为期六周的调查,耗费了大量资源,最终确定厄内斯特只是一个有爱好的男孩。虽然眼镜被归还了,但密码本被保留了下来。多年后,当他申请海军电子实验室的工作安全审查时,厄内斯特如实地披露了这起事件。 安全官员阅读了他的申请后,指示厄内斯特在*不*提及联邦调查局调查的情况下重新提交申请,并警告说这会危及他的审查。厄内斯特照做了,通过隐瞒真相成功获得了安全审查。他后来得知,有策略地隐瞒信息可以加快审查流程,这凸显了系统内部的复杂性和潜在的隐瞒可能性。

黑客新闻 新 | 过去 | 评论 | 提问 | 展示 | 工作 | 提交 登录 不要在你的安全许可表格上写什么 (milk.com) 37 分,wizardforhire 21 分钟前 | 隐藏 | 过去 | 收藏 | 3 评论 帮助 sargun 6 分钟前 | 下一个 [–] 我发现政府在这些无果而终的调查上花费了多少钱有点好笑。我们永远无法确切知道有多少被浪费了。回复 alwa 10 分钟前 | 上一个 | 下一个 [–] (1988) 而且非常可爱 来自一位老牌计算机科学家 [0],关于12岁时的恶作剧,这可能对我们中的一些人来说很熟悉:)[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Les_Earnest 回复 bombcar 4 分钟前 | 上一个 [–] 显然,真正的间谍是鲍勃。回复 指南 | 常见问题 | 列表 | API | 安全 | 法律 | 申请YC | 联系 搜索:
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原文
What Not To Write On Your Security Clearance Form as reported in the [REDACTED] list and RISKS

Date: 01 Apr 88 1620 PST
From: Les Earnest <LES...@S...>
Subject: The "previous account" referred to in RISKS-6.51

Reading a book got me into early trouble--I had an FBI record by age twelve. This bizarre incident caused a problem much later when I needed a security clearance. I learned that I could obtain one only by concealing my sordid past.

A friend named Bob and I read the book ``Secret and Urgent,'' by Fletcher Pratt [Blue Ribbon Books; Garden City, NY; 1942] which was an early popular account of codes and ciphers. Pratt showed how to use letter frequencies to break ciphers and reported that the most frequently occurring letters in typical English text are e-t-a-o-n-r-i, in that order. (The letter frequency order of the story you are now reading is e-t-a-i-o-n-r. The higher frequency of ``i'' probably reflects the fact that _I_ use the first person singular a lot.) Pratt's book also treated more advanced cryptographic schemes.

Bob and I decided that we needed to have a secure way to communicate with each other, so we put together a rather elaborate jargon code based on the principles described in the book. I don't remember exactly why we thought we needed it--we spent much of our time outside of school together, so there was ample time to talk privately. Still, you never could tell when you might need to send a secret message!

We made two copies of the code key (a description of how to encrypt and decrypt our messages) in the form of a single typewritten sheet. We each took a copy and carried it on our persons at all times when we were wearing clothes.

I actually didn't wear clothes much. I spent nearly all my time outside school wearing just a baggy pair of maroon swimming trunks. That wasn't considered too weird in San Diego.

I had recently been given glasses to wear but generally kept them in a hard case in the pocket of the trousers that I wore to school. I figured that this was a good place to hide my copy of the code key, so I carefully folded it to one-eighth of its original size and stuck it at the bottom of the case, under my glasses.

Every chance I got, I went body surfing at Old Mission Beach. I usually went by streetcar and, since I had to transfer Downtown, I wore clothes. Unfortunately, while I was riding the trolley home from the beach one Saturday, the case carrying my glasses slipped out of my pocket unnoticed. I reported the loss to my mother that night. She chastised me and later called the streetcar company. They said that the glasses hadn't been turned in.

After a few weeks of waiting in vain for the glasses to turn up, we began to lose hope. My mother didn't rush getting replacement glasses in view of the fact that I hadn't worn them much and they cost about $8, a large sum at that time. (To me, $8 represented 40 round trips to the beach by streetcar, or 80 admission fees to the movies.)

Unknown to us, the case had been found by a patriotic citizen who opened it, discovered the code key, recognized that it must belong to a Japanese spy and turned it over to the FBI This was in 1943, just after citizens of Japanese descent had been forced off their property and taken away to concentration camps. I remember hearing that a local grocer was secretly a Colonel in the Japanese Army and had hidden his uniform in the back of his store. A lot of people actually believed these things.

About six weeks later, when I happened to be off on another escapade, my mother was visited by a man who identified himself as an investigator from the FBI (She was a school administrator, but happened to be at home working on her Ph.D. dissertation.) She noticed that there were two more men waiting in a car outside. The agent asked a number of questions about me, including my occupation. He reportedly was quite disappointed when he learned that I was only 12 years old.

He eventually revealed why I was being investigated, showed my mother the glasses and the code key and asked her if she knew where it came from. She didn't, of course. She asked if we could get the glasses back and he agreed.

My mother told the investigator how glad she was to get them back, considering that they cost $8. He did a slow burn, then said ``Lady, this case has cost the government thousands of dollars. It has been the top priority in our office for the last six weeks. We traced the glasses to your son from the prescription by examining the files of nearly every optometrist in San Diego.'' It apparently didn't occur to them that if I were a real Japanese spy, I might have brought the glasses with me from headquarters.

The FBI agent gave back the glasses but kept the code key ``for our records.'' They apparently were not fully convinced that they were dealing just with kids.

Since our communication scheme had been compromised, Bob and I devised a new key. I started carrying it in my wallet, which I thought was more secure. I don't remember ever exchanging any cryptographic messages. I was always ready, though.

A few years later when I was in college, I got a summer job at the Naval Electronics Lab, which required a security clearance. One of the questions on the application form was ``Have you ever been investigated by the FBI?'' Naturally, I checked ``Yes.'' The next question was, ``If so, describe the circumstances.'' There was very little space on the form, so I answered simply and honestly, ``I was suspected of being a Japanese spy.''

When I handed the form in to the security officer, he scanned it quickly, looked me over slowly, then said, ``Explain this''--pointing at the FBI question. I described what had happened. He got very agitated, picked up my form, tore it in pieces, and threw it in the waste basket.

He then got out a blank form and handed it to me, saying ``Here, fill it out again and don't mention that. If you do, I'll make sure that you never get a security clearance.''

I did as he directed and was shortly granted the clearance. I never again disclosed that incident on security clearance forms.

On another occasion much later, I learned by chance that putting certain provocative information on a security clearance form can greatly speed up the clearance process. But that is another story.

Les Earnest


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