By Michael Every of Rabobank
Our central assumption for the Iran war had been that by end the third week of April at latest, the Iranian regime faction willing to make a deal in line with Trump’s tweets would have asserted itself over those who won’t, Hormuz would slowly reopen, and energy markets gradually normalise.
As neither the Iranian nor US negotiating teams traveled to Pakistan for the second round of peace talks yesterday, that cannot happen. Our new geopolitical base case is of an extended closure of Hormuz (in the range of 2-4 weeks). However, the likelihood of escalation to achieve that de-escalation is very high, which risks more energy supply damage.
Trump just unilaterally and indefinitely extended the ceasefire, “based on the fact that the Government of Iran is seriously fractured,” which the Iranians didn’t request, but Pakistan did. In the Middle East, making a threat and not following through smacks of weakness, and will be noted (again) by Tehran’s hardliners. He added US attacks would be held off “until such time as their leadership and representatives can come up with a unified proposal.” That’s as a Saudi tweet claimed Ghalibaf and Pezeskhian, willing to negotiate with Trump, have been arrested by the IRGC.
If true, that points to a unified Iranian position of defiance. That would then require a US response - either an attack or a 1956 Suez Crisis retreat. Of course, Iran may be incapable of a unified answer until its factions turn on each other (which is likely part of the US strategy) - that would also suggest the need for a US attack, to ‘shake the box’. Or this ceasefire extension can be a US deception as its forces continue to fly or sail into the region.
Meanwhile, the US economic blockade of Iran and the de facto Iranian blockade of Hormuz remain in place: critical energy and goods are not going to flow for longer, with exponentially rising economic damage. Indeed, the US says it will ramp up Operation ‘Economic Fury’ at sea and via sanctions. Iran claims it will break its blockade by force, if it persists, which would of course lead us straight to an escalation again.
Importantly, the threat of an extended throttling of Hormuz will increase the global pressure to act. On one hand, US allies might do something, though this seems unlikely. On the other, China may have to given it has already stated it wants Hormuz to reopen.
Looked at like this, there is nothing for markets to savor about a ‘chicken TACO Tuesday’. Indeed, screen oil prices only softened a little in response to the US ceasefire extension, and the price of physical oil and products in Asia will continue to rise unless Hormuz reopens.
Yet it’s undeniable the extended ceasefire also points towards a true TACO, which we’ve long made clear would be a geopolitical earthquake on par with the 1956 Suez Crisis. Were that to occur, it might be bearish for energy but could leave Iran in charge of Hormuz, which is less so; or Israel in charge of removing Iran from Hormuz, so far less so. Moreover, it would be it would be bearish for lots of assets markets don’t yet envision.
This is as Trump says a proposed currency swap with the UAE -- which is pegged to the dollar-- is under consideration, with some suggestions China will step in if not. That such an economy might need a dollar facility says a lot about the new world (dis)order that is emerging.
In parallel to Iran, Israel and Hezbollah’s ceasefire is holding on by its fingernails. Lebanon’s PM says his government will not let Hezbollah “intimidate us” – which lack of government actions shows it clearly does; and top US senators are calling to halt aid to Lebanon’s army over its failed Hezbollah disarmament efforts.
Things are also fluid --but not flowing-- on other geopolitical fronts. Zelenskyy stated the Druzhba oil pipeline will be ready to ship Russian oil again – as Russia halted Kazakhstan's oil flows to Germany via it, worsening its energy crisis.
The €90bn EU loan to Ukraine may now proceed, with Kyiv expected to spend the bulk of it on US Patriots, UK Storm Shadows and its own drones – which will be used to hit Russian oil refineries based on the recent heuristic. Yet Ukraine is reportedly proposing naming part of the disputed Donbas region to ‘Donnyland’ in Trump’s honor, not Von der Leyen-land.
At the same time the EU is trying to ease new tensions with Turkey, which also hosts energy pipelines leading to it, after VDL used a media interview to name the EU neighbour alongside Russia and China as threats to Europe requiring Brussels to ‘Complete the continent.” To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, “To lose one key NATO ally may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness.”
Meanwhile, as the Middle East and Russian energy complexes are mired in war, a key trader warns of a looming global food shock due to a squeeze on fertilizers; the EU is looking to revive joint gas buying as energy fears mount, which critics say will make little difference; Brussels said we should keep flying despite a looming fuel shortage as “Fears of widespread cancellations are overblown” – as Lufthansa axed 20,000 ‘unprofitable’ flights to save jet fuel; and EU lawmakers urged the Parliament to halt its monthly trip to Strasbourg over energy costs.
So, to central banks. See our US strategist Philip Marey’s take on Fed Chair nominee Warsh’s Senate confirmation hearing here, but note he had a tough time, reflecting how much political economy has shifted in the past few years. (Recall “Maestro’ Greenspan, anyone?)
Senator Warren called Warsh President Trump’s “sock puppet.” Then there were a series of questions over Warsh’s wealth, and the extent to which it was tied to Trump, Druckenmiller, China, or Epstein. That’s before we got to actual central banking, which was also disputed.
Warsh had to underline that he backs Fed independence. Yet he thinks interest rates rather than the balance sheet should be the dominant tool of monetary policy, because the distributional effects of the latter favoured the rich, while the more pervasive effects of the former reached everybody. That statement undoes most of the post-GFC central bank strategy.
Warsh also said he wants to work with the Treasury Secretary to see how the Fed can reduce the balance sheet and get out of fiscal policy. That’s as the Pentagon budget is about to increase by 40% and the Treasury is extending its reach into other areas as part of US economic statecraft.
Moreover, while there was some Q&A around the impact of the Iran war on inflation, there was no revealed view on how the Fed can keep CPI low if physical supply constraints matter, from oil to AI to the military; nor what to do if those constraints extend into the geopolitical realm, both in terms of freely-perceived problems and politesse-free solutions. Saying ‘That’s not my job,’ is not how economic statecraft works.
There was also a short discussion of crypto, which Warsh backed: and US dollar stablecoins are potential US economic statecraft, as we have previously explained. Yet there were no questions about political swaplines, perhaps because the Treasury is also muscling in on that territory of late(?)