Submitted by Michael Every of Rabobank

While mediators are pushing to get Iran and the US back into negotiations on Friday, the US still says it wants to see unified response from Iran which hands over its enriched uranium. But what will change between now and Friday? Two things, perhaps, and both pointing towards an expected escalation before any deal.

• First, Axios quotes US officials that there is an unofficial 3-5 day window for Iran to get the correct unified proposal together before bombing restarts; the Israelis report Sunday is the real deadline.
• Second, despite the ‘ceasefire’, there is lots of firing and no cessation in blockading in Hormuz and further afield. Within the Strait, Iran fired on ships and outright seized two, while there are suspicions it used speedboats to mine the key waterway more extensively. Outside Hormuz, CENTCOM denied reports that its blockade is leaking and intercepted three Iranian oil tankers near India, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, as US Senator Graham warned the Iran oil blockade “could become global soon.” Against that backdrop, the US Navy Secretary is leaving his post and Navy Undersecretary Hung Cao, a notably MAGA figure, will for now replace him.

In the broader Middle East, the US is now using Ukrainian counter-drone tech and support teams, underlining how rapidly things can change when tech and war get together. Certainties, production methods, and tactics and strategies can all flip faster than those at the top of large organisations realise. 

Lebanon is said to be seeking a one-month truce extension of its current ceasefire with Israel as Hezbollah again targeted IDF troops with drones, drawing fire back, with casualties. The US embassy in Beirut is urging its citizens to leave the country amid security risks.

The US has suspended dollar shipments to Iraq and frozen security cooperation programs with its military to try to force Baghdad to act against Iranian militias active in the country. On the other hand, US Treasury Secretary Bessent claims several Gulf and Asian allies, not just the UAE, have requested dollar swap lines. That’s further extends the list of potential recipients outside the cloistered ‘economic policy era’ circle of the UK, Europe, and Japan, etc., as part of a new US ‘economic statecraft era’ aimed at anchoring the global role of the US dollar on US, not global, terms. Indeed, while FX markets still look at EUR/USD, GBP/USD, and USD/JPY as benchmarks, they are arguably far less important in the emerging physical economy of a new world order based on resources, industrial production, and AI.

Finally, a Trump envoy is seeking to replace Iran with Italy in the looming 2026 FIFA World Cup, which isn’t likely to shift Tehran from its strategy of playing for extra time and winning on penalties.

The ‘Minecraft’ story above is crucial to note. The marine drones now being employed are relatively untested compared to older minesweeping techniques, but estimates using previous benchmarks run from weeks to months to clear Hormuz, depending on how many mines are present. That could add to an energy normalization timeline which already risks seeping into Q4. (See our latest analysis from Joe Delaura and Florence Schmit here, but note that it says in red, bold font: “Futures markets are still materially under-pricing the real supply risk facing both crude oil and natural gas.”)

The Iran war is also driving up Panama Canal lane prices to a record high of up to five times the pre-war level, mainly as Asian LNG importers bid for access. 

Indeed, showing warcraft doesn’t only appear in the energy (then food) components of CPI, the World of Warcraft online platform just increased its UK 12-month subscription rate by 7%, its Georgian by 19.1%, its Kazakh by 37.5%, and made Turkish subscribers pay in euro. At the same time, the US monthly rate for an annual contract has remained unchanged at $12.99 since 2004. Ironically, that captures the Great Game being played out globally better than the market analysts uncomfortably talking about wars do.

EU-Turkey relations have separately nosedived following impolitic comments just before an EU summit today in… Cyprus. Its key itinerary covers plans for the energy crisis, “defensive autonomy”, and strategic links between Europe, the Middle East, and India. 

• Brussels reportedly has a plan for what it now (correctly) calls the “world’s biggest energy crisis”, but the focus is apparently on “coordination”: in doing what? 
• Cyprus wants an EU collective defense plan after being attacked by an Iranian drone. That’s defence autonomy; but it would imply the bloc getting dragged into a war it insists is not its. Then again, what use is collective defence if there is a ‘Yes, but not this war’ opt-out? 
• Re: strategic links, the key plan is the IMEC corridor linking India to Europe via the Middle East (as Saudi Arabia talks of building a railway to Europe through Syria and Turkey). However, that involves not just ending the Iran war but defeating Tehran, which has blocked IMEC. Europe’s stand-off approach therefore gives it no voice on the emerging geopolitical architecture.   

In terms of that defense autonomy, Trump is reportedly considering a tiered system for NATO to reward allies who rearm and are willing to fight, and punish those who don’t and won’t (and won’t allow the US to use the bases they have built on their territory). It might imply a shift of US forces, and focus, from west to east Europe, and perhaps from Spain to Morocco.

The USTR is also pushing allies to pay more for critical minerals to decouple from China’s monopoly, which, as long argued, will also require tariffs and subsidies. Obviously, that’s inflationary. Yet the only alternative is accepting Chinese dominance in the sector. Reportedly, many US allies seem to prefer that option… which points to a US trade split with those allies.

Meanwhile, the US is reportedly demanding concessions from Canada before USMCA trade talks start as a form of “entry fee.” These include opening dairy markets beyond USMCA commitments, eliminating the digital services tax that affects US tech giants, and accepting expanded US border enforcement jurisdiction on Canadian soil. Such US demands reduce the negotiation from one of equals to a realpolitik reflecting the economic weight each has, as well as treading on direct issues of sovereignty. Indeed, one wonders if/when the US will raise the issue of a common external tariff for the USMCA, de facto set by the US, which seems the logical economic statecraft move. For Canadians, this is all shocking and unprecedented. 

Yet the same realpolitik and sovereignty dynamics were evident in UK–EU negotiations during Brexit and are again now as the UK flirts with a European realignment. Canada can reject these US demands or even risk walking away from the USMCA. As with the UK, it would then have to work out where it fits in globally instead. Ottawa is already looking for alternative options for the 75% of its goods that go to deeply integrated US supply chains. However, while the world likes its raw materials (if the infrastructure to deliver them can be built), industrial goods providing good jobs in Canada may prove a trickier question. Notably, US auto tariffs are already threatening the kind of downturn which that key Canadian industry last saw post-GFC. In short, the outcome of this US economic statecraft exercise remains unclear – but the potential economic impact is not.

Minecraft; Warcraft; Statecraft. You’ll notice I couldn’t craft any “rate cuts?” in either.