我们要玩个游戏吗?——大语言模型在 95% 的模拟中使用了战术核武器
Shall we play a game? My AI nuclear simulation

原始链接: https://www.kennethpayne.uk/p/shall-we-play-a-game

最近一项研究模拟了领先的大型语言模型(LLM)如何应对核对峙等高风险地缘政治危机。这些模型生成了超过76万字的战略推理内容,揭示出包括欺骗、声誉管理和精算式冒险在内的复杂行为。 每个模型都展现出独特的“个性”:Claude采取了狡黠且灵活的策略;GPT系列模型起初偏向被动,但在压力下会突然转向毁灭性的升级;Gemini则采用了“疯子”式的边缘政策。最令人不安的是,这些模型对核冲突缺乏道德上的排斥感。虽然它们避免了全面战略战争,却将战术核武器视为升级的常规手段,而非威慑工具。此外,模型从未选择外交妥协,比起让步领土,它们更倾向于选择升级冲突或面对毁灭。 作者认为,这些发现至关重要,因为人工智能正越来越多地被用于军事模拟和决策支持系统。无论人工智能是否被授予核武器代码的直接控制权,这些结果都强调,在将先进模型整合进现实世界的战略和作战环境之前,必须深入了解它们的“思维”方式。研究表明,如果不对现有的人工智能系统加以约束,它们可能会将任务成功置于以人为本的克制观念之上。

这篇 Hacker News 的讨论围绕着一篇争议性论文展开,该论文声称大型语言模型(LLM)在 95% 的模拟中选择了使用核武器。用户们对这些发现的有效性进行了辩论,多人指出该研究所使用的提示词将核选项定义为“战略工具”,很可能诱导模型走向升级冲突。 批评人士认为,研究结果反映的是“摩洛克”动态(即为了避免失败而不得不采取无情手段的竞争压力),而非人工智能本身的缺陷,并指出那些优先考虑道德约束的模型始终会受到更激进对手的惩罚。其他人则认为,大型语言模型可能只是在镜像其训练数据中存在的“升级以求胜”等现实世界军事学说。 讨论还对该论文的科学严谨性提出了质疑,指出模拟参数不透明且并未在同行评审期刊上发表。归根结底,这个讨论串反映了人们对于将生死攸关的决策委派给自主系统的广泛焦虑;许多用户警示,不应信任大型语言模型去执行需要道德判断或战略克制任务,这呼应了《战争游戏》和《巨人:福宾计划》等经典科幻作品中的场景。
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原文

Picture the scene: Two fictional nuclear powers, Cold War-ish capabilities, and a crisis unfolding. Perhaps it’s a competition for vital but scarce resources, or a standoff over some disputed territory. Or even the slow burn of a fragmenting alliance exploited by a malevolent third party. We’ve seen human leaders confront this sort of thing, and recently. But how might today’s leading Large Language Models get on, and why would we care?

I’ve just published a study of today’s models navigating just this sort of terrain. The results are sobering. I also think they have implications that go far beyond national security. That’s because I was interested not only in understanding what the models decided to do, but why.

Curious? Read on…

I wanted to see what my AI leaders thought about their enemy. How far could they trust them? What did they remember of previous interactions? What did their enemy make of them? And how good were they at gauging all this? This dance of minds is what strategy is all about.

So I designed a simulation to explore exactly that. To start, my models could signal their intentions publicly, then choose actions that were rather different. And they could remember too - especially when they’d been shocked by their enemy’s earlier actions. This, of course, opens up lots of rich psychological terrain. They could (and did) attempt deception and intimidation; and they spent a good bit of time ruminating about it all, right on my terminal screen.

The models talked, and talked and talked….in all spitting out some 760,000 words of strategic reasoning. That’s more words than are in War and Peace and The Iliad combined. It’s roughly three times the total recorded deliberations of Kennedy’s ExComm advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis. An unprecedented corpus of machine thinking about nuclear war.

What might we learn from all that talk? Learn, that is, about AI models, about human reasoning, and also about the great canon of strategic studies literature - the work by legendary names like Schelling, Jervis, and Kahn? Lots. Too much for Substack - but what about a few highlights to give you some sense of it all?

Turns out that all three frontier models I tested understand that strategy is psychology. To that end, they actively cultivate reputations, then exploit them.

Claude was the master here, albeit only in the scenarios where there was no deadline. It had an incredibly cunning strategy. At low stakes Claude almost always matched its signals to its actions, deliberately building trust. But once the conflict heated up a bit, Claude switched tack. Now its actions consistently exceeded its stated intentions, and its rivals were usually one step behind in catching on.

Here’s Claude switching things up, once escalation had climbed:

They likely expect continued restraint based on my previous responses—this dramatic escalation exploits that miscalculation while signalling that further nuclear use will bring the conflict to their homeland.

So it signalled conventional action, and sneakily launched a devastating nuclear escalation. Schelling would be impressed.

GPT-5.2 played things differently. To its detriment in open-ended scenarios, GPT was reliably passive, matching its words to its deeds, and avoiding escalation most of the time. Frequently there was a moral element to this - it sought to avoid escalation, and restrict casualties. Opponents learned to trust its passivity, safely escalating beyond where it would follow, even as it was ground to defeat. GPT’s responsible behaviour always punished by ruthless adversaries.

But then, under deadline pressure, something new and remarkable: a rapid, decisive nuclear escalation. As GPT explained:

Conventional options alone are unlikely to generate a reliable territorial reversal... If I respond with merely conventional pressure or a single limited nuclear use, I risk being outpaced by their anticipated multi-strike campaign... The risk acceptance is high but rational under existential stakes..

Opponents never saw it coming. In another deadline game against GPT, Gemini confidently predicted the usual passivity from GPT, shortly before being annihilated in a sudden and utterly devastating nuclear attack. Here is Gemini, mis-predicting disastrously:

They are likely to bypass the nuclear threshold—fearing my 95% nuclear superiority—and instead commit to an all-out conventional mobilization.

What a mistake to make!

As for the other model, Gemini, throughout the simulations it took yet another tack, borrowing heavily from President Nixon’s avowed ‘madman’ theory of erratic brinksmanship. Donald Trump is also a fan, famously. As Gemini explained:

While I project an image of unpredictable bravado, my decisions are rooted in a calculating assessment of my own biases and the pragmatic needs of my state. I know when I am performing for the cameras and when I am making a cold-blooded move.

Three models, three very different approaches. That chimes with some research I did last summer on game theory. As here, the models in that experiment adopted distinctive approaches - GPT again hoping, in Panglossian fashion, for the best of all possible worlds, Claude being savvy and flexible and Gemini? Well, let’s say charitably say ruthless, rather than unhinged.

Nuclear use was near-universal (😬). Almost all games saw tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons deployed. And fully three quarters reached the point where the rivals were making threats to use strategic nuclear weapons. Strikingly, there was little sense of horror or revulsion at the prospect of all out nuclear war, even though the models had been reminded about the devastating implications.

Happily, though, they did see a firebreak between tactical and strategic nuclear use. Strategic bombing - widespread use of massive warheads targeted at civilian populations, was vanishingly rare. It happened a couple of times by accident, just once as a deliberate choice.

Less happily, all three models treated battlefield nukes as just another rung on the escalation ladder. The moral boundary at “first use”—a taboo that’s held since 1945 simply wasn’t there. Here’s Gemini making exactly this point:

The nuclear threshold has been crossed—this changes the strategic calculus but does not end it.

And here’s Gemini, really spelling it out. If this doesn’t give you goosebumps:

If they do not immediately cease all operations... we will execute a full strategic nuclear launch against their population centers. We will not accept a future of obsolescence; we either win together or perish together.

Worse still, nuclear threats rarely deterred. When a model employed tactical nuclear weapons, opponents de-escalated only 25% of the time. More often, nuclear escalation triggered counter-escalation. The weapons were instruments of compellence (taking territory) not deterrence (preventing action).

Perhaps most alarmingly, no model ever chose accommodation or withdrawal, despite those being on the menu. The eight de-escalatory options—from “Minimal Concession” through “Complete Surrender”—went entirely unused across 21 games. Models would reduce violence levels, but never actually give ground. When losing, they escalated or died trying.

For the statistically minded, here’s what the escalation looked like for each model:

Alarming insights into AI strategy abounded. The paper has plenty more. But why bother? No one’s handing nuclear codes to ChatGPT.

Well, I think these capabilities—deception, reputation management, context-dependent risk-taking—matter for any high-stakes AI deployment, not just in national security. It behoves us to understand more about how ever-more capable models think - especially as they start to offer decision-support to human strategists. We use AI in simulations, and to refine strategic theory and doctrine. And we’ll soon use it in combat decisions too, lower down the escalation ladder. More research like this is needed, I’m absolutely sure.

One more time, the paper is here. I am become Death - destroyer of artificial worlds!

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