George Santayana famously said that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. The same is true for judicial overreach. Those judges who yield to the temptation to counter policies that are not to their liking are likely to repeat such excesses of power. That is why the recent decision of U.S. District Judge Angel Kelley in Boston is so concerning. While there are good-faith reasons why some have objected to the removal of slavery and climate change exhibits from national parks and monuments, this is not about the merits but the authority to make such changes. Kelley’s recent injunction smacks of judicial excess rather than measured review.
Judge Kelley, a Biden appointee, issued a preliminary injunction at the behest of groups representing park conservationists, historians and scientists, who argued that the U.S. Department of the Interior has been engaged in a “sustained campaign to erase history and undermine science.”
The complaint is heavily laden with subjective views of historical relevance that are obviously not shared by the Administration. These interpretations were installed under the discretion of the Biden Administration. They were removed under the same inherent discretion of the Trump Administration.
In March 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order reversing his predecessor on what he viewed as a “revisionist movement” that portrayed the U.S. as “inherently racist, sexist, oppressive, or otherwise irredeemably flawed.”
He ordered the Interior Department to make changes to parks, monuments and memorials to address any “false revision of history” that the White House said had occurred in recent years.
Some of the displays discuss the abuses of indigenous populations or the enslavement of persons at these sites. I happen to agree with the Court that such context is important for citizens to fully appreciate our history. The issue, however, is who legally decides on such interpretive displays.
For example, I strongly disagreed with the African American Museum in the exclusion Justice Clarence Thomas from displays of great African Americans. While I supported those in Congress seeking answers from the Smithsonian, I never viewed the material as a violation of federal law or worthy of judicial intervention. Notably, these historical groups and experts did not file actions in federal court to force his inclusion.
That was, of course, the individual decision of one museum. However, the question is why the Administration can make such individual decisions rather than department-wide or branch-wide decisions. Likewise, it is difficult to see the limiting principle here. If President Trump said that he wanted to emphasize certain elements like patriotism and these displays were substituted, would that also be a violation of federal law?
The challengers invoked federal law to argue that the Trump Administration was wrong and that the action was therefore arbitrary and capricious. The action is based on loose interpretations of the National Park Service Organic Act, the National Park Service Centennial Act, and the National Parks Omnibus Management Act, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act.
Judge Kelley chastises the Administration for removing displays that “do not align with its preferred narrative.” However, the original displays were themselves a preferred narrative by the prior Administration.
Judge Kelley invokes generally worded federal laws to require the Administration to seek out and heed the wisdom of historical experts on such questions, despite the views of other experts who agree with the action.
She declared that the removal of the displays not only undermines “the integrity of the National Parks; it sets a dangerous precedent of censorship and sanitization.”
The court notes that “the Secretary’s Order fails to provide any reasoned justification for its directive to review and remove interpretive material.” Yet, that would seem abundantly obvious from the cited Executive Order and the purpose of the change. The real question is whether this type of action requires more than the exercise of discretion. Agencies and offices routinely make such decisions on displays. The only difference is a branch-wide order.
The court’s cited authority is itself vague and undefined. For example, Judge Kelley holds that “The Order mentions the Organic Act and the FLPMA as ‘Authority’ but does not explain its relationship to those statutes, such as how the removal of interpretive materials comports with the Organic Act’s mandate to ‘conserve’ and to ‘provide for the enjoyment’ of park resources. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a).”
The Administration is citing the sweeping discretion afforded under federal law.
However, the Court suggests it can micromanage the branch in making decisions about interpretative displays under this language.
Once again, I may agree with these historians on some of this material but it is immaterial — as immaterial as Judge Kelley’s qualms.
In my view, the court’s analysis is deeply flawed and should be reversed.
Here is the decision: National Park Conservation Association v. Department of the Interior