Poland will become indispensable to Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary’s global trade upon the completion of this project, thus securing their place within its “sphere of influence” and reducing the likelihood that German-backed Ukraine “poaches” them as part of their rivalry for regional leadership.
“Notes From Poland” reported that “Poland has begun construction of a 10 billion zloty (€2.3 billion) deepwater port and container terminal in the city of Świnoujście, near the German border…The facility will also be designed for both civilian and defence use…Deputy infrastructure minister Arkadiusz Marchewka said the terminal would serve not only Poland but also markets including eastern Germany, and the landlocked Czech Republic, Slovakia, Austria and Hungary, reports Business Insider Polska.”
This megaproject is part of Poland’s regional power play in which it envisages becoming the leader of Central & Eastern Europe (CEE) through diplomatic, security, and connectivity means, the first two of which were elaborated upon here while the third concerns the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI). The last-mentioned involves dual-use connectivity infrastructure such as that which Poland is now building in Świnoujście, which also hosts an LNG terminal that could supply Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary.
They and Poland are coincidentally the states that new Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Magyar proposed merging into a sub-regional integration bloc that would combine the Visegrad Group (Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary) with the Slavkov format (Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria). While they’ve yet to implement his idea, Polish influence over those four will grow upon the completion of Poland’s new 3SI-connected Świnoujście megaport, which will facilitate the expansion of their global trade.
It also goes without saying that their import of American LNG via the Świnoujście terminal would do the same, with both Polish initiatives serving to show just how important that country is poised to become to CEE in the evolving post-conflict order. Another poignant observation is that Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia all refused to finance the EU’s new €90 billion loan to Ukraine, over half of Austrians want their government to stop financing it too, and Poles are rapidly souring on Ukraine as well.
With all this in mind, Poland already basically leads an unofficial bloc in CEE comprised of countries whose societies and governments alike (Austria’s being the notable exception as regards the latter) are known abroad for their increasing criticism of Ukraine, which most recently ruined its ties with Poland. Zelensky’s state-level glorification of the Volhynia Genocide’s OUN-UPA culprits sparked so much backlash that even the country’s ruling Ukrainophilic liberal coalition was forced to harden its approach.
“Poland Finally Realizes The Geostrategic Challenge Posed By Ukraine” as its German-backed competitor for leadership over CEE. In particular, “Ukraine’s Planned Drone Plants In The Baltics Are Part Of A Plot To Outflank Poland”. Even if Poland “loses” the Baltics to Ukraine, and recalling that Ukraine already beat it in the Balkans (for now) as proven by six regional leaders recently paying political pilgrimage there, Poland could still count Czechia, Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary within its “sphere of influence”.
Joint German-Ukrainian leadership over the Baltics and the Balkans would still overshadow that achievement, and Poland would then face challenges to its political sovereignty and strategic autonomy, but it would still have a fighting chance at avoiding full-blown domination.
Therefore, the grand strategic significance of the Świnoujście megaport is that it’ll prevent Poland’s isolation in the aforesaid scenario by making it indispensable to its landlocked allies, after which it might try to “regain” the Baltics one day.