报告:航天工业缺乏重建战时损失卫星所需的人手
Space industry lacks workers needed to rebuild satellites lost in war: report

原始链接: https://www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/2026/09/04/space-industry-lacks-workers-needed-to-rebuild-satellites-lost-in-war-report-says/

兰德公司(RAND Corporation)近期发布的报告《打破玻璃,缺失之手》(Breaking Glass, Missing Hands)指出,美国目前缺乏在重大冲突中迅速补充军事太空资产所需的劳动力。为了在与中国或俄罗斯等对手的竞争中保持优势,美国计划将重建周期缩短至 12 到 24 个月,但当前的工业劳动力缺口使得这一目标难以实现。 该研究确定了三个劳动力层级的严重短缺:工程师、熟练技术人员以及红外和光学探测等领域的专业专家。航天部门在与高薪行业的揽才竞争中处于劣势,而冗长的安全审查程序和对专业培训的需求进一步拖慢了入职进度。 目前,该行业仍采用“从零激增”模式,即在合同间隙期,相关技能会因缺乏实践而退化。兰德公司得出结论,目前的太空工业基础并未构建为能够应对紧急动员的状态。为缓解这些风险,报告建议在奖学金、劳动力输送计划方面进行长期投资,并将激增规划要求纳入未来的国防合同中。报告最终将这些劳动力缺口定义为关键的供应链脆弱性,需要空军及更广泛的国防领导层进行紧急政策干预。

《防务新闻》最近的一篇报道指出,航天工业缺乏在战时迅速更换卫星所需的劳动力,这引发了人们的担忧。 Hacker News 上的讨论显示,人们对此问题的看法两极分化。一些参与者认为“劳动力短缺”是一个伪命题,认为行业停滞源于工资水平停滞、官僚繁文缛节以及关键基础设施的外包。另一些人则强调,卫星的脆弱性构成了一种独特的战略挑战,因为现代武器摧毁资产的速度远超和平时期的工业基地所能补充的速度。 一些评论者将这场辩论置于更广泛的地缘政治背景下,指出在非核冲突中,替换卫星的能力对于可靠的军事威慑至关重要。然而,怀疑论者质疑维持“备用”工业产能的可行性,指出如果没有全面进入战时状态,像二战时期那样的大规模动员在历史上是难以维持的。归根结底,这场对话凸显了人们对国内工业专业知识衰退的普遍焦虑,以及在反卫星技术日益普及的时代保护太空资产所面临的挑战。
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原文

The United States does not have enough engineers, technicians and assemblers to rebuild military space assets destroyed in a war with China or Russia, according to a RAND report published Aug. 31.

The study, “Breaking Glass, Missing Hands,” asks how quickly the country could replace satellites and supporting systems lost early in a protracted conflict. It sets the benchmark for reconstitution, the term for restoring lost capability, at 12 to 24 months, a pace much more demanding than the decade or so the report says it typically takes to replace an aging satellite.

The study examines whether the space defense industrial base could meet that timeline between 2027 and 2032. The authors argue that existing workforce gaps could take years to close, putting a 12-to-24-month timeline out of reach.

Gen. Michael Guetlein, now the Golden Dome director, sponsored the study while serving as vice chief of space operations. RAND Project AIR FORCE conducted it as part of a fiscal 2024 project titled “In Emergency, Break Glass,” with Alexandra Gerber as lead author.

Researchers analyzed federal labor and education statistics from October 2024 through March 2025, and interviewed industry representatives and education administrators from May through July 2025.

The report divides the space-supporting workforce into three categories.

The first is engineers who design and test space systems. Nearly 3 million Americans work as engineers in jobs requiring a bachelor’s degree or higher, but only about 3% of them work in industries RAND counted as supporting space: satellite communications, semiconductors and nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing that produces optical glass. RAND calls that grouping a subset of the space industrial base. Aerospace manufacturing was not included.

RAND estimates that those three counted industries account for only about 7,000 of 208,000 annual engineering job openings, noting that the space sector has little leverage against employers in the artificial intelligence, software and data analytics sectors that pay more and offer more flexible work environments.

The second category is “skilled touch labor,” the technicians and assemblers who physically build spacecraft. Using 2023 Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, researchers estimated about 30,000 annual openings for technicians, while only about 11,000 people earn the necessary qualifications each year.

For assemblers, including cleanroom technicians, they found about 244,000 annual openings with just 13,000 credentialed workers each year, a gap of 19 to 1. The space industry accounts for a small share of that demand, but it competes for the same pool as semiconductor manufacturers.

The third category takes the longest to build: specialists who advance infrared and electro-optical detection, and engineers who design systems to survive natural and man-made radiation. Qualified candidates hold master’s or doctoral degrees, and the expertise can take 15 years or more to develop.

Few schools offer advanced degrees in laser and optical engineering, and most specialists come up through electrical or computer engineering programs instead. Of recent doctorates in those fields, 70% went to foreign nationals, the report says, shrinking the pool eligible for classified work.

Security clearances slow hiring even further. In fiscal 2024, initial Secret investigations averaged more than 87 days while Top Secret cases took nearly six months, according to a Trusted Workforce 2.0 progress report RAND cites.

Separately, interviewees said even fully credentialed workers can take up to a year to become productive, and the report notes that cleanrooms and secure work areas cap how fast plants can absorb new hires.

Those interviewed described the central problem as “surging from zero.” Without steady production between contracts, specialized skills atrophy and experienced workers leave, taking with them the institutional knowledge needed to scale. RAND says writing surge-planning requirements into future contracts would help companies prepare to expand before a crisis.

Researchers found no consensus that emergency mobilization would work. Defense Production Act authorities could pull workers from other industries, but interviewees questioned whether that is feasible given security clearances, certifications and domain expertise.

RAND recommends roughly $5 million a year for scholarships, internships and academic outreach, plus an $800,000 study on whether workers from other fields could be retrained for surge production.

The report also suggests advocating for the expansion of the National Imperative for Industrial Skills program and evaluating the Navy’s Talent Pipeline Program as a model for the trades.

Another proposal would let Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates satisfy service obligations by working at qualifying space firms, and would extend the same option to SMART scholarship recipients now committed to civilian Defense Department jobs.

RAND assigns the policy lead to the assistant secretary of the Air Force for space acquisition and integration, arguing workforce capacity is a supply-chain and production risk, not an internal Space Force staffing issue.

Interviewees pointed to hiring pipelines and faster clearances, rarely mentioning robotics, process automation or AI as a way to cut the labor hours per satellite. RAND did not independently assess whether automation is feasible, but flags that absence as a gap in reconstitution planning.

Most space producers run at volumes too low to justify the investment in automation, though RAND argues a reconstitution surge could change that math.

Michael Scanlon is a defense journalist covering air and space warfare. A former U.S. Air Force A-10 crew chief, he has supported land and sea programs for the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

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