Flock 希望构建一个全方位监控且无处可逃的世界
Flock Wants a Closely Surveilled World with No Exit

原始链接: https://www.newyorker.com/culture/infinite-scroll/flock-wants-a-closely-surveilled-world-with-no-exit

在美国,隐私在历史上一直是一个可塑的概念,缺乏明确的宪法保障。虽然第四修正案的保护范围已扩展至数字领域,但隐私的法律定义往往因政治和资本利益而改变,经常从一种公共权利演变为一种受限的特权。 “9·11”事件后的时代巩固了这一转变,两党的恐惧情绪推动了监控手段的大规模且不可逆的扩张。政府机构与硅谷合作,采取了“人人皆嫌疑”的心态,从而导致了无处不在的数字监控。这种监控基础设施如今大多在暗处运作,被现代技术的便利性所掩盖。 如今,个人面临着一种“心理麻木”状态,即无法退出数字生活的现实,迫使人们无奈地接受持续的跟踪。由于数字平台对职业和个人生存至关重要,社会实际上已用隐私换取了参与权。我们处在一个岌岌可危的境地,为了在现代世界中生存,不得不无视自己正被政府和企业实体挖掘与编纂信息的事实。

这篇 Hacker News 讨论聚焦于关于 Flock Safety 监控网络的争议。该网络利用自动车牌识别(ALPR)和人工智能驱动的摄像系统进行监控。 批评者认为,这种技术的广泛自动化性质创造了一个“监控国家”,极易引发滥用,例如警察跟踪、政治压制,以及对抗议活动或生殖保健等受保护活动的监控。许多参与讨论者强调,与传统的调查方法相比,将监控外包给私营企业会导致监管和问责的严重缺失。法律界人士也指出,从理论上讲,利用这些私人系统进行大规模、自动化的搜索,应根据美国宪法第四修正案的要求获得搜查令。 相反,一些支持者认为该技术是侦破暴力犯罪和减少反社会行为的有效工具。对此持怀疑态度的人则指出,英国和荷兰等其他国家早已存在类似的监控系统,并质疑为何美国的反应如此强烈。 最终,参与者之间达成了一种根深蒂固的怀疑共识,这反映了人们普遍担忧:该技术追踪个人行踪的能力及其被系统性滥用的潜能,对个人隐私和公民自由构成了生存威胁。
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原文

Privacy has long been a contested subject in American law. The Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right to privacy—the word itself never appears in the text—and courts have spent decades debating whether such a right can be derived from its provisions and, if so, whom and what it protects. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable government searches and seizures is considered the foundation of American privacy law, and courts have, over time, extended protections to one’s cellphone and to reproductive and sexual behavior. But the concept of privacy, like that of freedom or of justice, is a supple one. The legal definition of the concept has shrunk or ballooned to meet the needs of political and capitalist forces, proving how malleable the notion could be when needed. As Jeannie Suk Gersen wrote for The New Yorker, in 2022, “The right to privacy should have been understood from the start as a prerogative of the people, establishing a zone where the state cannot readily trespass,” but, instead, became “a prerogative of the privileged, intent on keeping the general public at bay.” This tension—privacy as a right or as a privilege—has been intensified by national-security powers and by revolutions in digital technology. Writing for n+1, in 2013, Jill Priluck noted that “the expanded privacy rights of the 20th century have with the transition to digital data become obsolete in many situations.” She referred to Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in the case United States v. Jones, from 2012, which held that the Fourth Amendment applied to G.P.S. surveillance. “New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy,” Alito warned. “Many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”

Trade-off, security, safety—this was the language of the post-9/11 surveillance boom, and, lucky us, it never left. The journalist Richard Beck, in his book “Homeland: The War on Terror in American Life,” from 2024, summarizes the ends to which the fear of terrorism drove an unimpeded and irreversible increase in mass surveillance within the U.S. When the Patriot Act was introduced to Congress, a month after 9/11, a “remarkable spirit of bipartisan unity” allowed for “the biggest expansion of law enforcement detention and surveillance powers in history.” Even so, some Democratic senators, such as Pat Leahy, though they broadly supported the bill, were concerned that it granted the intelligence agencies too much power, and lacked sufficient transparency measures and judicial oversight. As the bill reached a logjam in Congress, Attorney General John Ashcroft began publicly to put pressure on the senators holding it up. “We think that there is a very serious threat of additional problems now,” he said during an appearance on “Face the Nation.” Later, he told CNN that he was deeply concerned about the rather slow pace at which we seem to be making this come true for America. . . . Talk won’t prevent terrorism; tools can help prevent terrorism.” The tools Ashcroft was referring to were being developed in tandem with Silicon Valley executives—biometric data, facial-recognition software, omnipresent CCTV cameras, electronic-communication surveillance. “The kinds of surveillance the government wanted to implement dovetailed nicely” with Silicon Valley’s own goals, Beck observed, noting how these surveillance systems required unfettered digital access to everyone, not just perceived foreign antagonizers or known criminals. Anyone could be a terrorist, the thinking went, and so everyone must be monitored.

Mass surveillance can be difficult to comprehend or think plainly about, ensconced as we are in the digital cocoon of contemporary life. How are we to understand the scope, nature, and threat of systems we cannot see or touch? When we use social media, or accept online privacy-policy updates and agreements, it can be unclear how, exactly, we are being violated. Are we not consenting to these services? Are we not uploading images of ourselves and freely conversing with friends and colleagues, knowing the potential risks of being tracked by our government and tech overlords? How are we to engage with these digital platforms without feeling paranoid, or dissociating from the fact that we are potentially being watched by law-enforcement agencies and large corporations? Zuboff, in her book, described this quandary as “a psychic numbing that inures us to the realities of being tracked, parsed, mined, and codified.” In other words, we must convince ourselves that the digital communication and information systems we use are harmless and, indeed, beneficial, in order to keep using them. Opting out of online life has become nearly impossible given how crucial these tools have become in many professional, academic, and personal contexts. We’ve accepted the compromises of the internet mostly out of submission; there is no visible or viable path for existing in the modern world without in some way resigning ourselves to the realities of surveillance.

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