Proton Mail 披露用户数据导致西班牙被捕
Proton Mail discloses user data leading to arrest in Spain

原始链接: https://restoreprivacy.com/protonmail-discloses-user-data-leading-to-arrest-in-spain/

Proton Mail 是一家总部位于瑞士的安全电子邮件提供商,以其严格的隐私承诺(包括端到端加密和无日志政策)而闻名,但由于在与西班牙当局发生的有争议的法律问题中所扮演的角色而面临批评。 据报道,该问题始于 Proton 交出了一个与可疑 Proton Mail 帐户相关的已恢复电子邮件地址,该帐户据信属于一个名为“Xuxo Rondinaire”的人,据称该人利用警方内部知识来援助分离主义组织“民主海啸”。 收到 Proton 的电子邮件地址后,西班牙当局向 Apple 寻求帮助,以揭露与该地址相关的更多详细信息,最终识别出该人的身份。 这一事件凸显了围绕加密通信平台内国家安全利益和隐私之间的平衡正在进行的争论。 批评者认为,此案说明了加密服务在面对反恐立法下的强大国家主张时的局限性,引发了有关此类措施的适当反应和合理性的合理问题。 作为我们谈话的一部分,我建议在使用隐私工具时养成良好的操作安全 (OPSEC) 习惯。 为了增强您的在线隐私:避免链接恢复电子邮件,使用辅助、一次性电子邮件或虚拟电话号码,使用可靠的虚拟专用网络 (VPN),考虑匿名购买,并及时了解您首选服务提供商的法律要求。 尽管 Proton 最初没有讨论具体案例,但他们后来承认了所描述场景的发生,同时强调他们默认致力于隐私而不是默认匿名。 他们强调,恢复地址和其他非必要功能(例如在注册期间验证电子邮件)不会永久与个人帐户绑定。 然而,他们承认,添加恢复电子邮件在技术上仍然是可选的,但如果恐怖主义在瑞士变得非法,则可能会受到瑞士法院命令的管辖。

本文讨论使用安全电子邮件和虚拟专用网络 (VPN) 服务逃避执法和情报机构的局限性。 作者强调,虽然这些工具提供了一定程度的保护,但它们不能完全保证隐私或匿名。 IP 地址虽然不是身份,但可以泄露用户的大致位置。 据报道,政府和互联网服务提供商 (ISP) 保存过去 IP 地址分配的记录,以便将 IP 地址解析为特定个人。 即使是看似私人的电子邮件服务,例如 ProtonMail,也会存储 IP 地址,并根据法律要求将其提供给当局。 此外,像 Tor 这样的匿名服务也有弱点,例如作为 Tor 用户的暴露,并且通常依赖于使用类似服务的其他人是无辜的假设。 作者建议,如果需要高度的隐私和匿名,则应采用替代方法,可能涉及可疑的代理服务器并避免电子邮件地址和电话号码之间的任何关联。 然而,这些方法带来了额外的挑战和风险。 最终,文本强调隐私和匿名是相互关联的概念,但又有区别:隐私侧重于限制可见数据,而匿名则涉及确保收集的数据与个人无关。 此外,该段落还提到了使用强加密和维护私钥控制的重要性,并提到了有关 ProtonMail 系统内子密钥处理的持续讨论。
相关文章

原文
ProtonMail Discloses User Data Leading to Arrest in Spain

Update: Proton has confirmed the key details of this case and provided RestorePrivacy with a comment.

Proton Mail has come under scrutiny for its role in a legal request involving the Spanish authorities and a member of the Catalan independence organization, Democratic Tsunami.

Proton Mail is a secure email service based in Switzerland, renowned for its commitment to privacy through end-to-end encryption and a strict no-logs policy. In 2021, Proton Mail faced controversy when it complied with a legal request that led to the arrest of a French climate activist. Under Swiss law, Proton Mail was compelled to collect and provide information on the individual’s IP address to Swiss authorities, who then shared it with French police.

The recent case involving the Spanish police this time, highlights privacy concerns and the limits of encrypted communication services under national security pretexts, and brings a long-debated subject to the forefront once again.

The core of the controversy stems from Proton Mail providing the Spanish police with the recovery email address associated with the Proton Mail account of an individual using the pseudonym ‘Xuxo Rondinaire.’ This individual is suspected of being a member of the Mossos d’Esquadra (Catalonia’s police force) and of using their internal knowledge to assist the Democratic Tsunami movement.

Upon receiving the recovery email from Proton Mail, Spanish authorities further requested Apple to provide additional details linked to that email, leading to the identification of the individual.

This case is particularly noteworthy because it involves a series of requests across different jurisdictions and companies, highlighting the complex interplay between technology firms, user privacy, and law enforcement.

The requests were made under the guise of anti-terrorism laws, despite the primary activities of the Democratic Tsunami involving protests and roadblocks, which raises questions about the proportionality and justification of such measures.

Like before, Proton Mail’s compliance with these requests is bound by Swiss law, which mandates cooperation with international legal demands that are formalized through proper channels (Swiss court system).

Last year, when we noted that Proton Mail complied with nearly 6,000 data requests in 2022, Proton provided us with an explanation that inbox contents remain secure.

Please note that in all cases email content, attachments, files etc are always encrypted and cannot be read.

Proton statement to RestorePrivacy last year

Looking at Proton’s transparency report, we find that Proton Mail complied with 5,971 data requests last year alone, up slightly from the year before.

With so many data requests going on in the background, it is all the more important to safeguard the data you share with various services.

The importance of good OPSEC

This situation serves as a critical reminder of the importance of maintaining stringent OPSEC (operational security). One should always be aware of the potential vulnerabilities that come with linking recovery information or secondary services (like Apple accounts) that may not have the same privacy safeguards as a primary encrypted email service.

For users concerned about privacy, particularly those involved in sensitive or political activities, OPSEC should be a top concern when using privacy tools. It’s advisable to:

  • Avoid linking recovery emails or phone numbers that can directly tie back to personal identities or primary business activities.
  • Consider using secondary, disposable emails or virtual phone numbers that offer an additional layer of anonymity.
  • Use a good VPN service to hide your IP address whenever possible. (Failure to do this is what compromised a Proton Mail user in France who was arrested after after police obtained IP logs.)
  • Consider purchasing services using an anonymous payment method.
  • Stay informed about the legal obligations and policies of communication service providers, especially regarding their compliance with international law enforcement requests.

While Proton Mail and similar services offer substantial protections and end-to-end encryption on their email platform, they are not immune to legal and governmental pressures. Users must navigate these waters carefully, balancing the need for security with the potential legal obligations of their service providers.

RestorePrivacy has reached out to Proton Mail for a comment on the case and their exact involvement, but a statement wasn’t immediately available. at the time of publication.

Update: Statement from Proton and additional commentary

Proton has now confirmed the key details of this case and provided RestorePrivacy with the following comment:

We are aware of the Spanish terrorism case involving alleged threats to the King of Spain, but as a general rule we do not comment on specific cases. Proton has minimal user information, as illustrated by the fact that in this case data obtained from Apple was used to identify the terrorism suspect. Proton provides privacy by default and not anonymity by default because anonymity requires certain user actions to ensure proper OpSec, such as not adding your Apple account as an optional recovery method. Note, Proton does not require adding a recovery address as this information can in theory be turned over under Swiss court order, as terrorism is against the law in Switzerland.

Spokesperson for Proton

In an email to RestorePrivacy, Proton also pointed out that adding a recovery email is optional. While this is true, we have also observed Proton Mail requiring a verification email address for account creation. As tested today, Proton required a verification email when signing up through a VPN service and also Tor.

In the verification box, Proton states that the email address “will only be used for this one-time verification.” Unlike a recovery email, this verification email presumably does not stay connected to the account.

This article was updated on May 7, 2024 with the statement form Proton Mail and further discussion on the verification methods.

联系我们 contact @ memedata.com