IN THIS NEWSLETTER: How the US spent $11 billion shooting down missiles for Israel since October 2023.
*Latest newsletter for VIPs: US fired 19 years’ worth of Patriot interceptors in 7 months
The US fired an estimated 609 ballistic missile interceptors to defend Israeli territory from October 2023 through September 2026, based on my analysis of Pentagon budget documents, media reports, and open-source intelligence.
This does not include the interceptors the US fired to protect its own military assets while waging war on Israel’s behalf, including the 30 Patriot interceptors US troops used on June 23, 2025, to shoot down 13 missiles fired at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar (Iran’s telegraphed retaliation for the US attacks on June 21), and virtually all of the approximately 1,800 Patriot interceptors the US fired in the first seven months of the Iran War.
The ballistic missile defense interceptors the US has deployed in the Middle East over the last three years include the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), SM-6 (the SM-2’s replacement, which has also been fired in the region since October 2023), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot. The SM-3 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles during the middle portion of their flight (when they’re in outer space), while the rest are designed for terminal-phase interceptions (after the ballistic missile reenters the atmosphere). THAAD, as its name suggests, is designed for higher-altitude engagements in the terminal phase. The others operate at lower altitudes. Interceptor cost increases with operating altitude. Below are the aforementioned interceptors, ordered from highest cost — and operating altitude — to lowest.
The US has used its most expensive interceptors to defend Israel against counterattacks from Iran and elsewhere in the region. Of the estimated 609 interceptors the US has fired in defense of Israeli territory since October 2023, 31% were the $31 million SM-3 and 62% were the $12 million THAAD. All told, the US spent $11 billion shooting down missiles for Israel from October 2023 through September 2026.
SM-3: 186 (31%)
THAAD: 378 (62%)
SM-6/2: 43 (7%)
Patriot: 2 (<1%)
The US has fired more interceptors to defend Israel than Israel has. Data on Israeli interceptor use are limited, but based on a considerable amount of research (see the methodology section below), there doesn’t appear to be a plausible scenario in which Israel has expended more ballistic missile interceptors defending its territory than the US has. I estimate that for every Israeli interceptor fired, the US has fired 1.5 to 2 interceptors to shield Israel from the consequences of its actions.
^Alt text for screen readers: US has fired over 600 missile interceptors defending Israel since October 2023. Estimated number and cost of US interceptors used to defend Israeli territory, by date. Table has four columns: Date, Interceptor(s), Fired, Cost (in dollars). Data are as follows: Oct 19, 2023; SM-2; 6; 34.7M. Apr 13, 2024; SM-3, Patriot; 10; 200.6M. Apr 13–Oct 1, 2024; SM-6; 17; 105.3M. Oct 1, 2024; SM-3; 12; 359.8M. Dec 26, 2024–May 22, 2025; THAAD; 16; 204.4M. Jun 13–24, 2025; THAAD, SM-3; 235; 4.8B. Feb 28–May 21, 2026; THAAD, SM-3, SM-6; 310; 5.2B. Jun 7, 2026; THAAD, SM-3; 3; 55M. Total: 609 interceptors, $11 billion. Not an exhaustive list. Estimated interceptor quantities include only those fired to defend Israeli territory, not those fired to defend US forces waging war on Israel’s behalf. Data: Pentagon procurement data, internal reprogrammings; open-source intelligence; media reports.
The US also provides $500 million in missile defense aid to Israel every year, but that’s a topic for another newsletter.
October 19, 2023: Pentagon officials stated that the USS Carney, operating in the northern Red Sea, intercepted three cruise missiles (and several drones) headed for Israel that were fired from Yemen. Media reported that SM-2 interceptors were used in the engagement.
I estimate that six SM-2s were used to down the three missiles. This aligns with the historical interceptor-to-missile ratio for Red Sea engagements in 2023 and 2024. In January 2025, head of US Naval Surface Forces, Vice Admn. Brendan McClane, said, “We’ve done the analysis...and we’re at about two rounds per incoming missile.” The replacement cost of this engagement is the estimated number of interceptors fired times the unit cost of the SM-6 (because the SM-2 is replaced by the SM-6, they share a replacement cost).
April 13, 2024: U.S. officials said the Iranian attack on Israel consisted of more than 300 munitions, including 100 ballistic missiles, 30 cruise missiles, and 150 drones. According to an April 14, 2024, CENTCOM statement, US forces “successfully engaged and destroyed more than 80 one-way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles and at least six ballistic missiles intended to strike Israel from Iran and Yemen.”
One ballistic missile “assessed to be en route to Israel” was shot down by a US Army Patriot missile battery in Erbil, Iraq. I estimate that two Patriot interceptors were fired in this engagement. While it’s possible in theory that only one Patriot interceptor was used, in practice it’s much more likely that more than one were fired, for two reasons. First, standard US Army ballistic missile defense tactics are to fire a salvo of at least two interceptors at any one missile threat. Second, at least two interceptors per missile matches historical precedent; see, for example, the 30 Patriot interceptors fired from Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, against 13 incoming Iranian missiles in June 2025.
The remaining missiles that were shot down were felled by the USS Arleigh Burke and Carney in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder. I estimate that eight SM-3s were fired in this engagement. Although media outlets reported that four to seven SM-3s were fired on April 13, 2024, those figures don’t align with the Pentagon’s own budget documents. An internal reprogramming document dated September 6, 2024, shows that Pentagon transferred $198,662,000 from a fund established by division A of Public Law 118-50, Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 (the fund, “Israel Replacement Transfer Fund,” refers to a $4.4 billion sum in the Israel aid bill “appropriated to the Department of Defense and made available for transfer to respond to the situation in Israel, and for replacement, through new procurement or repair of existing unserviceable equipment, of defense articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, and for reimbursement for defense services of the Department of Defense and military education and training, provided to the government of Israel or identified and notified to Congress for provision to the government of Israel or to foreign countries that have provided support to Israel at the request of the United States.”) to Pentagon procurement accounts “for the replacement of defense articles expended in support of Israel through U.S. combat operations executed at the request of and in coordination with Israel and for the defense of Israeli territory, personnel, or assets during the April 13, 2024, attack by Iran.”
Of that amount, $190,000,000 was “for the replacement of Standard Missile (SM)-3” rounds that were “expended in support of Israel.” Pentagon budget documents show that the SM-3 unit cost for (fiscal year) 2024 supplemental funding was $23,750,000 ($23,491,000 per round + $259,000 per required canister) , meaning that the September 6, 2024, reprogramming of funds was enough to buy exactly eight SM-3s ($190,000,000 / $23,750,000 = 8).
All told, procurement documents show that nine replacement SM-3 interceptors were bought in 2024 with funding from the Israel aid bill. A separate reprogramming document, also dated September 6, 2024, included $23,750,000 for “the replacement of one (1) Standard Missile-3…and associated canisters” that “requires replacement to replenish U.S. Navy inventory.” The reason this ninth interceptor isn’t included along with the other eight is that the reprogramming document of which it is a part — despite it addressing “the increased, unfunded costs incurred by DoD within the U.S. Central Command region in responding to the situation in Israel or to hostile actions in the region as a direct result of the situation in Israel” — “specifically excludes requirements related to actions taken in defense of Israel during the April 13, 2024, attack by Iran.”
April 13–October 1, 2024: A November 7, 2024, reprogramming document transferred $657,584,000 from the 2024 Israel aid bill to various Pentagon accounts for “the replacement of defense articles expended in support of Israel through U.S. combat operations executed at the request of and in coordination with Israel and for the defense of Israeli territory, personnel, or assets during the April 13, 2024, and October 1, 2024, attacks by Iran.” It included $105,252,000 “for the replacement of Standard Missiles expended in support of Israel.” (In Pentagon procurement documents, “Standard Missile” as a standalone defense article refers to the SM-6.) This amount funds 17 replacement SM-6 interceptors, based on the $6,068,375 unit cost of SM-6s purchased with Israel supplemental funding in 2025 (I use the 2025 unit cost for this November 2024 reprogramming because federal fiscal years begin in October; fiscal year 2025 ran from October 1, 2024, to September 30, 2025).
There is not enough media reporting to determine how many of the 17 SM-6s should be attributed to each attack. It’s more likely that most if not all were fired during the April 13, 2024, engagement than the one on October 1, 2024 (discussed below). Additionally, a September 6, 2024, reprogramming document for replenishing munitions expended in defense of Israel on April 13, 2024, provides a strong hint that the SM-3s fired during that engagement did not perform well, requiring the use of additional interceptors, such as the SM-6. Specifically, the $13,000,000 provision for “addressing performance anomalies observed in support of DoD’s response to the situation in Israel. Update is required to ensure future successful intercept of threats…This is an emergency budget requirement.”
October 1, 2024: US officials stated that Iran launched about 200 ballistic missiles (no drones) at Israel in a retaliatory attack, and that the USS Cole and the Bulkeley fired “approximately a dozen” interceptors. No other US military assets were involved in the defense of Israel during the counterattack, according to US officials. The two ships reportedly fired at least 12 SM-3s during the attack. I assumed exactly 12 for this analysis.
December 26, 2024–May 22, 2025: A May 22, 2025, reprogramming document transferred $204,368,000 from the Israel aid bill to a procurement account “for the replacement of THAAD Interceptors expended in support of Israel,” specifically, “expended in support of Israel through U.S. combat operations executed at the request of and in coordination with Israel and for the defense of Israeli territory, personnel, or assets during attacks by Iran and…Iran proxies.” Based on the fiscal year 2025 recurring unit cost ($12,773,000), the transferred amount is enough to replace exactly 16 THAAD interceptors.
Before integrating 16 THAAD interceptors into my estimate, I analyzed media reports and open source intelligence to see if this figure is plausible. It is. The first reported use of the THAAD the Biden administration deployed to Israel in October 2024 was on December 26, 2024. It was used extensively over the next five months, including at least once in early-to-mid-January, on March 27, March 30, and April 13 (after the US had transferred a second THAAD battery to Israel on April 6). On April 15, it was reported that the US THAAD had intercepted at least seven ballistic missiles headed for Israel. Additional THAAD engagements reportedly occurred on May 4, May 9, and May 14, 2025.
This amounts to eight instances of THAAD use, or an average of two interceptors fired per engagement. This makes sense: in some instances, US THAAD battery operators may have attempted to shoot down more than one incoming missile or fired more than one interceptor at one target. Moreover, a two-to-one interceptor-to-missile ratio is also about what you would expect based on US Army firing practices and historical data. Additionally, the eight recorded instances are likely not an exhaustive list.
June 13–24, 2025: During the 12 day war, the US reportedly fired about 80 SM-3 and more than 150 THAAD interceptors defending Israel against Iranian counterattacks. I assumed 80 SM-3 and 155 THAAD interceptors for this estimate. I calculated replacement costs based on each munition’s fiscal year 2026 discretionary recurring unit flyaway cost.
The US fired 30 Patriot interceptors during the 12 day war (June 23, 2025), but because they weren’t expended in the direct defense of Israeli territory (the missiles were fired at Al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar), they are not included in this estimate.
February 28–May 21, 2026: The Washington Post reported on May 21, 2026, that the US had fired more than 200 THAAD and more than 100 SM-3 and SM-6 interceptors to defend Israel against Iranian counterattacks since the start of the Iran War on February 28, 2026. For this estimate, I assumed 205 THAAD, 85 SM-3, and 20 SM-6 interceptors. The reason the share of SM-series interceptors is titled in the SM-3’s favor (approximately 80–20%) is based on the preponderance of SM-3s to SM-6s fired during the June 2025 war (reportedly 100% to 0%, i.e., SM-3s were used exclusively during the 12 day war).
June 7, 2026: Media reported that at least one US Navy ship and one Army unit fired interceptors at Iranian missiles headed for Israel. The US reportedly shot down one of the 11 incoming missiles.
I conservatively estimate that the US Navy fired one midcourse interceptor (SM-3) from the Eastern Mediterranean and that the US Army based in Israel fired two terminal-phase interceptors (THAAD).
This is not an exhaustive list.
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