核武器在太空爆炸后的第二天
The Day After A Nuke Goes Off In Space

原始链接: https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/day-after-nuke-goes-space

俄罗斯最近研制出一种核武器反卫星武器。 美国政府旨在通过谈判限制俄罗斯获得太空核武器。 然而,考虑到外交失败的风险,现在就应该开始准备。 反卫星核武器可能会极大地改变当前的核动态,导致环境高度不稳定。 为了应对这一威胁,美国需要迅速采取行动,做好应对太空核威胁的准备。 武装冲突可能会导致卫星被摧毁,从而使美国无法对俄罗斯进行报复,除非俄罗斯攻击地面目标。 GPS、通信和情报依赖于卫星,使得常规战争在这种条件下变得困难甚至不可能。 尽管有关俄罗斯武器的具体细节尚不清楚,但它可能会损害俄罗斯自己的卫星以及其他国家的卫星。 这种情况使美国无法在太空进行有效报复,从而需要进行地面攻击。 鉴于使用核武器的复杂性和道德影响,非核表面攻击变得越来越具有挑战性。 保持对此类武器部署的各种反应以保持力量平衡仍然至关重要。 由于未来的袭击可能涉及攻击人口中心,因此有必要仔细讨论仅出于防御目的使用核武器的合法性。 最终,为无卫星作战做好准备,特别是通过提高常规战斗机和轰炸机应对非核表面攻击的能力,成为确保反卫星核攻击后常规战争仍然可行的关键。 涉及拒止太空场景的军事演习对于在缺乏卫星服务的环境中测试作战策略至关重要。 训练和模拟此类情况有助于说明在增强军队战备状态的同时保持对美国对手的威慑力的重要性。 应坚持进行外交谈判以限制核武器在太空的扩散,但注意力也必须集中于为可能的失败做好准备。 美国海军、空军和太空军应合作开展兵棋推演,分析太空背景下的替代战术。 从模拟中吸取的经验教训应该为现实中的军事演习提供参考,以提高在卫星连接受限的情况下的作战效率。

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原文

Authored by Luke Widenhouse via RealClearDefense,

In February, it was revealed that Russia has been developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon. The Biden administration's response has focused mainly on arms control efforts aimed at preventing Russia from acquiring a space-based nuclear weapon in the first place. These efforts are important, but they are also insufficient. Steps must be taken now to prepare for the possibility that diplomacy fails. Nuclear anti-satellite weapons have the potential to fundamentally alter existing nuclear paradigms, creating a much more destabilizing environment than exists today. The U.S. must take action now to ensure it is ready to deal with the challenges posed by nuclear weapons in space. By preparing now, before nukes are put in orbit, the U.S. can better work to prevent such a day from ever happening at all.

U.S. deterrence strategy has long centered on its ability to tailor both conventional and nuclear response options to a wide range of different contingencies, as well as deliberate ambiguity surrounding when it would use nuclear weapons. Both these concepts would be thrown out the window if a nuclear anti-satellite weapon were detonated today. While the exact capabilities of Russia's space weapon are unknown, it is likely to pose as much a threat to its own satellites as it is those of the United States.

In May, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb testified that Russia's weapon would be "indiscriminate," and "pose a threat to all satellites operated by countries and companies around the globe." The U.S. would therefore likely be left without the ability to retaliate against Russia in space if it detonated its weapon. The only option would be to strike targets on the ground. At present, conventional U.S. forces rely heavily on access to satellite-provided GPS, intelligence, and communications. A conventional strike in this environment would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. A nuclear strike would be more feasible (though also challenging). A serious conversation should address whether a surface nuclear strike would be an appropriate response to a nuclear attack that does not directly kill people on Earth.

However, it is still critical that the president retain a variety of options to respond to the use of such a weapon. Thus, central to deterrence in a world of nuclear anti-satellite weapons will be the ability of conventional military forces to operate without access to satellites.

If satellites went down in the aftermath of the detonation of a nuclear space weapon, the ability of long-range strike fighter aircraft and bombers to carry out non-nuclear surface attacks against enemy targets would be crucial to maintaining the option of a conventional response to such an action. There have been some efforts to improve the ability of U.S. forces to fight in an environment without access to space, but these have been limited compared to activities aimed at maintaining such access. The latter efforts are important, but they will likely not be options once a nuclear anti-satellite weapon goes off.

The Navy and Air Force, with support from the Space Force, should wargame different "denied space" contingencies aimed at learning how to operate in an environment without access to satellites. The lessons from these wargames should then be applied and continued in actual live military exercises. These exercises would be aimed both at training pilots, aircrews, and commanders to conduct operations in a denied space environment but would also demonstrate to Russia and other potential U.S. adversaries that it will always have the option of retaliating with varying degrees of force to any type of nuclear aggression.

The U.S. should continue pursuing arms control efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in space. However, it must also be prepared for the possibility that these efforts fail. By preparing conventional strike fighter assets to conduct operations in a denied space environment, the U.S. will be adequately ready for a world where nuclear weapons are orbiting the Earth.

Luke Widenhouse is a research assistant at the Yorktown Institute and rising senior at St. John’s College in Annapolis, MD. 

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