网络安全培训项目无法阻止网络钓鱼诈骗。
Cybersecurity training programs don't prevent phishing scams

原始链接: https://today.ucsd.edu/story/cybersecurity-training-programs-dont-prevent-employees-from-falling-for-phishing-scams

对 19,500 名加州大学圣地亚哥分校医疗保健员工进行的大规模研究显示,传统的反钓鱼培训效果出乎意料地有限。研究人员,包括格兰特·霍(现任芝加哥大学),进行了一项为期八个月的随机对照试验,发送了十种不同的钓鱼“诱饵”。他们发现,培训仅使点击恶意链接的比例减少了 2%,尽管投入了大量时间和资源。 有趣的是,易受攻击性随着时间的推移而*增加*——从第一个月的 10% 点击率到第八个月的 50% 以上。电子邮件内容也严重影响了成功率,策略更新比密码重置请求更有效。 该研究表明,组织应优先考虑技术解决方案,而不是员工培训。研究人员建议实施双因素身份验证和域名限制的密码管理器,以获得更好的网络安全投资回报。该研究由多个来源资助,包括加州大学校长办公室和国家科学基金会。

一个黑客新闻的讨论强调了当前网络安全培训项目在防止网络钓鱼攻击方面的无效性。用户认为,网络钓鱼成功并非因为人们容易*上当受骗*,而是由于疲劳和每天需要点击 URL 的大量电子邮件——即使是受过教育的用户也会犯错。 一个核心问题是接收电子邮件、点击链接和输入凭据的标准流程,这本身就创造了一种漏洞。一位评论员指出,成功的内部应对措施包括立即与同事分享网络钓鱼尝试。 多位用户对培训感到沮丧,因为培训与现实世界的电子邮件环境(如 URL 混淆软件)相冲突,而且通常只是一项合规性练习。一位用户完全过滤掉了培训电子邮件。总体情绪是,电子邮件处理链接和身份验证方式的根本性改变,才是真正对抗网络钓鱼的关键。
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原文
Portrait of study coauthor Grant Ho

Grant Ho is another coauthor and did the work as a postdoctoral student in computer science at UC San Diego. He is now a faculty member at the University of Chicago.

A study of 19,500 employees over eight months

To date, this is the largest study of the effectiveness of anti-phishing training, covering 19,500 employees at UC San Diego Health. In addition, it’s one of only two studies that used a randomized control trial method to determine whether employees would receive training, and what kind of phishing emails–or lures–they would receive.

After sending 10 different types of phishing emails over the course of eight months, the researchers found that embedded phishing training only reduced the likelihood of clicking on a phishing link by 2%. This is particularly striking given the expense in time and effort that these trainings require, the researchers note.

Researchers also found that more employees fell for the phishing emails as time went on. In the first month of the study, only 10% of employees clicked on a phishing link. By the eighth month, more than half had clicked on at least one phishing link.

In addition, researchers found that some phishing emails were considerably more effective than others. For example, only 1.82% of recipients clicked on a phishing link to update their Outlook password. But 30.8% clicked on a link that purported to be an update to UC San Diego Health’s vacation policy.

Given the results of the study, researchers recommend that organizations refocus their efforts to combat phishing on technical countermeasures. Specifically, two measures would have better return on investment: two-factor authentication for hardware and applications, as well as password managers that only work on correct domains, the researchers write.

This work was supported in part by funding from the University of California Office of the President “Be Smart About Safety” program–an effort focused on identifying best practices for reducing the frequency and severity of systemwide insurance losses. It was also supported in part by U.S. National Science Foundation grant CNS-2152644, the UCSD CSE Postdoctoral Fellows program, the Irwin Mark and Joan Klein Jacobs Chair in Information and Computer Science, the CSE Professorship in Internet Privacy and/or Internet Data Security, a generous gift from Google, and operational support from the UCSD Center for Networked Systems.

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