Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

This could make it easier for Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel even in the absence of Palestinian independence and thus restore the political viability of this geo-economic megaproject.

The announcement that the US will sell F-35s to Saudi Arabia is a monumental development. Israel is the only country in West Asia to field these cutting-edge fighter jets so its “qualitative military edge” could be eroded as a result, ergo why the IDF officially objected to this. 

Axios reported that Israel wants the sale conditional on Saudi Arabia normalizing their relations, ideally through the Abraham Accords, or at least the US guaranteeing that the F-35s won’t be deployed in Saudi Arabia’s western regions near Israel.

It remains unclear whether the US will comply with these requests, but what’s much clearer is that Saudi Arabia will occupy a greater role in the US’ regional strategy, which brings the Kingdom back into the US’ orbit after it diversified its partnerships in recent years by expanding ties with Russia and China. Saudi Arabia was already moving towards a rapprochement with the US after the last four years of troubled ties under Biden, however, as proven by its reluctance to formally join BRICS after being invited in 2023.

The latest Gaza War that broke out shortly afterwards, which evolved into the first West Asian War between Israel and the Iranian-led Resistance Axis and ended in the latter’s defeat, derailed progress on the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” (IMEC) from that year’s G20. IMEC’s geo-economic scope importantly necessitates the normalization of Israeli-Saudi ties for facilitating this, which the US might now try to broker after ending the Gaza War that disrupted this previously fast-moving process.

Saudi Arabia’s commitment to invest nearly $1 trillion in the US economy, up from the $600 billion that it agreed to during Trump’s visit in May, can be interpreted as a bribe for obtaining the best terms possible. Trump might therefore try to coerce Bibi into at least making superficial concessions on Palestinian sovereignty in the West Bank so that Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) doesn’t “lose face” by agreeing to the normalization of their countries’ relations without Palestine first becoming independent.

At the same time, selling F-35s to Saudi Arabia and bestowing it “Major Non-NATO Ally” status might suffice for MBS abandoning even the minimal aforesaid implied demand, especially since IMEC is indispensable to his Kingdom’s post-oil future and associated “Vision 2030” development program. If the US brokers an Israeli-Saudi deal that leads to swift progress being made on implementing IMEC, then it can push IMEC as a replacement for India’s North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) with Iran and Russia.

The US already revoked India’s Chabahar sanctions waiver before reinstating it, correspondingly as a form of pressure amidst their trade talks and then as a goodwill gesture therein as they made progress, but it arguably aims to redirect India from the NSTC to IMEC as a means of containing Russia. After all, the NSTC enables India to help Russia counterbalance the expansion of Turkish influence in Central Asia via TRIPP, so an indefinite waiver is extremely unlikely even in the event of an Indo-US trade deal.

It would be easier for India to accept this geo-economic concession, which might be reciprocated by tariff concessions on the US’ part, if IMEC is once again viable and could thus replace the NSTC. For that to happen, the US must first mediate the normalization of Israeli-Saudi ties, which it might now prioritize after brokering an end to the Gaza War and reaching its latest series of agreements with the Kingdom. The US’ F-35 deal with Saudi Arabia might therefore be part of Trump’s ultimate plan to revive IMEC.