机器速度战争:当无人机比人类更快地做出决定
Machine-Speed Warfare: When Drones Decide Faster Than Humans

原始链接: https://www.zerohedge.com/military/machine-speed-warfare-when-drones-decide-faster-humans

## 机器速度战争的黎明 最近乌克兰的一次“蜘蛛网”行动,利用117架廉价无人机(总价低于12万美元)瘫痪了10架俄罗斯轰炸机,这体现了战争的根本性转变。精确武器成本的急剧下降——一架1000美元的无人机现在可以摧毁一辆500万美元的坦克——正在推动战争向*规模*化发展,并不可避免地走向*自主*化。 随着无人机数量激增(乌克兰的目标是每年生产400万架),人类的微观管理变得不可能,迫使决策权交给控制目标识别、碰撞规避和路线规划的软件。这创造了“机器速度战争”,类似于高频交易,算法在人类干预之外运行,快速学习和适应。 这种速度是一把双刃剑。虽然可能带来优势,但由于机器缺乏犹豫以及可能出现错误累积,它也存在升级风险。关键在于设计*稳健*的系统——优先考虑安全、验证和缓和——而不是优先考虑速度而牺牲控制的*松散*系统。乌克兰的成功,尽管传统上处于劣势,证明了克制和精确的有效性。 最终的风险是“闪电战”——由对自动化行动的误解引发的意外升级,可能由伪装无人机或简单故障引发。这场竞赛不仅仅是技术竞赛,更是关于构建快速、开放和*纪律*严明的系统,这些系统具有明确的交战规则和健全的危机处理机制。

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原文

Authored by Tamuz Itai via The Epoch Times,

On June 1, 2025, 117 quadcopters—total cost under $120,000—flew from hidden launchers inside Russia and crippled 10 strategic bombers across five air bases in a single morning.

Operation Spiderweb, as Ukraine called it.

It was a public demonstration of a new form of conflict: When the price of precision falls far enough, scale becomes inevitable, and scale forces autonomy. That autonomy, in turn, moves the battlefield faster than human minds can reliably follow. We seem to be entering the era of machine-speed warfare.

Quiet Arrival

For decades, militaries and the defense industrial base followed a rule: Better always meant more expensive. A modern fighter costs $100–120 million; its predecessor cost half that. The pattern held from tanks to submarines. Drones broke the pattern. A competent kamikaze drone now costs $400–$1,000 and can reliably kill a $5–10 million tank. A long-range one-way drone costs perhaps $30,000 and can sink a frigate. The cost curve of creating a precision threat has collapsed; the cost of defending against it has not.

Once the economics flip, quantity becomes quality all of its own. Ukraine says it already has the ability to produce drones at a rate of 4 million per year. Russia, Iran, and China are racing to match or surpass those numbers. When you are fielding not dozens but thousands of armed aircraft simultaneously, no human staff can micromanage them. You must delegate.

Delegation quickly becomes autonomy. Collision avoidance, target recognition, route replanning, reaction to jamming—these decisions migrate from human operators to software running on the drone itself. The more drones you have, the less you can afford to keep a human in the loop for every micro-decision. The battlefield begins to run at machine time.

High-Frequency Warfare

The closest civilian analogy is high-frequency trading, where humans merely set strategy, risk limits, and circuit-breakers. After that, algorithms trade at microsecond speeds with no realistic possibility of human intervention. Modern drone swarms are evolving into the military equivalent. Ukraine already retrains its targeting models weekly using fresh combat footage; Russia and China are likely doing the same. An 8 percent improvement in a computer-vision model on Tuesday can translate into battlefield dominance by Thursday.

That speed is terrifying. Machines do not get tired, do not hesitate, and do not ask whether escalation is politically wise. They simply execute. In a noisy, deceptive environment, small errors can compound rapidly. The cost in our case is not just money, but lives.

Control Theory

In a nutshell, the core idea is: a system measures something, decides what that measurement means, and reacts. Then it measures again and adjusts. Take, for example, a thermostat.

Every drone is a feedback control system: measure → decide → act → measure again. The enemy’s entire job is to break that loop—jam the measurement, spoof the decision, or block the action. When hundreds of such loops are running in parallel, all under deliberate attack, the default state is instability unless the loops were deliberately designed to be extraordinarily robust.

This is why purely technological answers are probably insufficient. Advantage also lies in strategy and doctrine—in the rules, restraints, and architectures nations choose to build into their systems from the beginning.

Robust Versus Loose

Not all autonomous systems are created equal. Some states and actors design robust systems: conservative rules of engagement baked into code, multiple verification layers before lethal action, and strong de-escalation biases under uncertainty. Others design loose systems: faster reaction times, higher tolerance for collateral damage, and a willingness to treat ambiguity as an opportunity rather than a red flag.

On current evidence, robust systems are winning the cost-exchange war. Ukraine, fighting with strict rules of engagement and heavy reliance on human oversight, has consistently achieved better loss ratios than Russia despite being vastly outnumbered in almost every traditional category. Restraint, paradoxically, forces greater precision, faster learning cycles, and more effective active defenses—all of which can compound into strategic advantage.

Loose systems look terrifying on paper, but in practice they bleed money, invite sanctions, and generate atrocity footage that fuels the other side’s alliances and recruitment. Every war crime committed by a loose actor is a strategic gift to the robust one.

The Flash-War Risk

Tom Clancy understood the danger of misinterpretation under time pressure. In “The Sum of All Fears” (1991), the plot hinges on a false-flag nuclear attack, masterminded by a third party, designed to make the United States and the Soviet Union blame each other and stumble into war. Today, we do not need a nuclear weapon to create the same cascade. Two hundred spoofed drones launched from a fishing boat, carrying the electronic signature of a great power, could do it in 20 minutes.

The battlefield is already producing miniature versions of this story dozens of times per day: A drone drifts across a sensitive line because of wind or jamming, an opposing swarm interprets it as a probe, automated defenses react, and within seconds both sides have taken irreversible actions that no political leader ordered. By the time a human sees the trend, the adversary’s intent seems to be clear, and escalation unavoidable.

The Real Race

The technological race is real, but it is not the only race. Free countries cannot and should not copy the loose model. But they can build systems that are simultaneously fast, open, and disciplined. That means, for instance:

  • treating drones as consumable ammunition, not exquisite platforms

  • supporting innovation and startups

  • shortening feedback loops to weeks, not decades

  • encoding clear, shared rules of engagement into software from day one

  • investing heavily in active defenses (lasers, jammers, and cheap interceptors

  • creating pre-agreed crisis mechanisms—digital hotlines, shared telemetry standards, forensic rapid-response teams

Ukraine has shown that a motivated society can out-innovate a much larger adversary even when heavily outnumbered. The $800 quadcopter has already rewritten the rules of war. The next question is whether we can rewrite our systems fast enough to win and keep the machines on a leash.

Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.

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