Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is surveying the commercial advertising technology market for tools capable of supplying location data and large-scale analytics to federal investigators, according to a recent Request for Information (RFI).
Framed as market research rather than a procurement, the RFI seeks information from companies offering “Ad Tech compliant and location data services” that could support criminal, civil, and administrative investigations across ICE’s mission set.
The RFI, issued by ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), emphasizes that the government is not soliciting proposals or committing to a future contract, but it does signal active interest in selecting vendors for live demonstrations of operational platforms and data services, a step that typically precedes pilot deployments or integration into existing investigative environments.
ICE says it is attempting to better understand how commercial big data providers and advertising technology firms might directly support investigative activities, while remaining sensitive to “regulatory constraints and privacy expectations.”
The agency noted that its components are handling increasing volumes of criminal, civil, and administrative information from both internal and external sources and are assessing whether commercial off-the-shelf platforms comparable to large investigative data and legal analytics providers can help manage and exploit that data at scale.
At the center of the inquiry is a category of information traditionally associated with digital advertising rather than law enforcement: location data, device identifiers, IP intelligence, and behavioral signals derived from everyday consumer activity.
Advertising technology, commonly referred to as ad tech, is the sprawling ecosystem of software, data brokers, analytics platforms, and intermediaries that power targeted advertising on the modern Internet.
Ad tech companies collect and process information about where devices are located, how users move between physical and digital spaces, which apps are installed on their phones, and how devices can be linked across websites, applications, and networks.
While the industry typically frames this activity as anonymous or pseudonymous, the underlying data is often persistent, granular, and capable of tracking individuals over time.
Location data is a particularly valuable component of that ecosystem. Mobile applications routinely share latitude and longitude coordinates with advertising partners through embedded software development kits.
Even when precise GPS data is not available, companies infer location through IP addresses, Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth beacons, and cell tower connections. That information is then aggregated, analyzed, and sold to advertisers seeking to measure foot traffic, target audiences, or assess the effectiveness of campaigns.
ICE’s RFI suggests that the agency is exploring whether those same mechanisms can be repurposed as investigative tools.
The document asks vendors to describe platforms and data services that can support investigative needs while remaining “Ad Tech compliant,” a phrase that reflects industry norms rather than statutory law enforcement standards.
ICE appears to be looking into tapping into the commercial data ecosystem rather than building bespoke surveillance tools from scratch, a strategy that allows agencies to access rich data streams without directly collecting the information themselves.
ICE’s interest is not limited to raw data. The RFI repeatedly references “operational platforms,” signaling a desire for systems that can ingest, correlate, analyze, and visualize information from multiple sources.
In practice, that means software environments capable of fusing location data with other records, such as criminal histories, financial data, travel records, social media activity, or administrative files, to generate investigative leads or support ongoing cases.
The agency frames its inquiry as exploratory and cautious. It notes that the government is seeking to understand the “current state” of ad tech and location data services available to federal investigative entities, particularly considering regulatory constraints and privacy expectations.
That language reflects growing scrutiny of commercial data practices by courts, regulators, and civil liberties advocates, especially when such data is accessed by federal agencies like ICE.
In recent years, federal agencies have increasingly relied on commercially available data to sidestep traditional legal barriers.
Because ad tech data is collected by private companies under consumer-facing privacy policies, agencies have argued that purchasing or accessing that data does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Critics counter that this approach allows the government to obtain highly sensitive information, including detailed location histories, without warrants, probable cause, or meaningful oversight.
The U.S. Supreme Court has signaled skepticism of such practices in cases recognizing the sensitivity of long-term location tracking, even when data is held by third parties.
At the same time, regulators have brought enforcement actions against data brokers accused of selling sensitive location information without adequate safeguards.
Against that backdrop, ICE’s assertion that it is considering privacy expectations appears designed to reassure both policymakers and potential vendors that the agency is aware of the controversy surrounding commercial surveillance data.
Yet the RFI itself provides little detail about how those concerns would be operationalized. It does not reference warrants, court orders, or judicial authorization.
Nor does it explain how ICE would distinguish between data associated with U.S. persons and noncitizens, how long information would be retained, or whether data obtained for one investigative purpose could be reused for others.
That ambiguity is particularly significant given HSI’s broad mandate. Unlike agencies focused solely on criminal enforcement, HSI conducts civil and administrative investigations alongside criminal cases.
Location data or ad tech-derived insights could therefore be used in contexts ranging from immigration enforcement to customs violations to sanctions and export control investigations, often under lower legal thresholds than those required in criminal proceedings.
ICE’s emphasis on “Ad Tech compliant” services also underscore a fundamental tension. Compliance in the advertising industry typically refers to adherence to self-regulatory frameworks, contractual obligations, and privacy policies that permit extensive data collection so long as certain disclosures are made.
Those standards are not designed to constrain government use, nor do they substitute for constitutional or statutory protections governing law enforcement surveillance.
Companies marketing “privacy-friendly” location or IP intelligence tools often argue that they avoid directly identifying individuals. But researchers and regulators have repeatedly demonstrated that supposedly anonymized or aggregated data can be reidentified when combined with other datasets.
In an investigative context, reidentification is not a bug but a feature, enabling analysts to link digital signals back to real-world subjects.
Biometric Update earlier reported that a Government Accountability Office audit had found that publicly accessible data – from social media posts to commercial geolocation records – can be aggregated into detailed “digital profiles” that expose U.S. personnel, military operations, and senior leaders to targeting, coercion, and disruption.
In January 2025, Gravy Analytics, a prominent location data broker, disclosed that a significant data breach had potentially exposed through de-anonymization the precise location information of millions of individuals.
The RFI’s focus on live demonstrations suggests that ICE is interested in mature, deployable capabilities rather than theoretical offerings. Vendors selected to present would be expected to show how their platforms operate in practice, how data is accessed and analyzed, and how investigative outputs are generated.
While the agency stresses that it is not committing to a future solicitation, such demonstrations often inform subsequent procurements, task orders, or pilot programs conducted under existing contracts.
ICE has used similar market research approaches in the past to normalize new surveillance capabilities before formal adoption.
Social media monitoring tools, mobile biometric systems, and large-scale analytics platforms were all introduced through incremental steps that began with RFIs and demonstrations rather than headline-grabbing contracts.
For privacy advocates, the latest filing fits a familiar pattern. Commercial surveillance markets evolve rapidly, driven by advertising and marketing demand. Government agencies then adopt those tools after the fact, often before lawmakers have fully grappled with the implications.
Oversight mechanisms, however, lag technical capability, leaving key questions unanswered until after systems are already in use.
ICE’s RFI does not indicate when demonstrations might occur or whether a solicitation will follow. It does make clear, though, that the agency sees the ad tech ecosystem as a potential investigative resource worth serious consideration.
As debates over commercial data, surveillance, and constitutional protections continue, the filing offers a window into how federal law enforcement is adapting to – and seeking to leverage – a data economy built for advertising rather than accountability.
For now, ICE is asking industry to explain how ad tech-derived location and analytics services can be made suitable for investigative use while respecting privacy expectations.
What remains unclear is who will define those expectations, how they will be enforced, and whether existing legal frameworks are equipped to govern a surveillance model that blurs the line between consumer marketing and government intelligence.
Article Topics
data brokers | device fingerprinting | ICE | law enforcement | location data | RFI | surveillance | U.S. Government