霍尔木兹海峡封锁将扼杀美国国防工业。
The strait of Hormuz blockade will strangle US defense industry

原始链接: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/19/west-point-analysis-iran-war-costs

## 霍尔木兹海峡中断威胁美国国防能力 现代战争研究所的最新分析强调了美国国防准备中一个关键且 largely 未解决的漏洞:源于霍尔木兹海峡不稳定的供应链中断。 封锁正在造成“瘫痪”的影响,尤其是在硫磺方面——这是提取关键矿物(如铜和钴)的关键成分。 海上硫磺贸易已“几乎完全”中断,导致价格同比上涨 165%。 这些矿物对于制造和维修军事设备至关重要,从喷气发动机到雷达系统。 即使在当前冲突的早期阶段,更换损坏的设备也需要大量的铜——可能超过市场供应量。 这种“前勤务危机”因美国国防承包商供应链缺乏透明度而加剧;只有 6% 的供应链被完全绘制出来。 专家警告说,对不透明系统的依赖限制了军队补充资源的能力,并可能大幅增加战争成本,甚至使武器更换价格翻倍或更多。 这种情况超出了军事应用范围,可能会影响化肥生产和全球粮食安全。

## 霍尔木兹海峡封锁与美国国防工业 – Hacker News 摘要 近期《卫报》的一篇文章,在Hacker News上讨论,强调了霍尔木兹海峡可能被封锁对美国国防工业造成的潜在脆弱性。核心问题是供应链缺乏透明度——据报道,只有6%的美国国防承包商完全了解其采购来源。 评论员认为,这可能导致武器更换成本大幅增加,由于矿物需求上升,成本可能翻倍甚至更高。一些人指出,美国军方大量消耗化石燃料,却可能受到石油供应中断的影响,这具有讽刺意味。另一些人批评文章缺乏具体数据和明确预测。 讨论还涉及更广泛的经济后果,包括通货膨胀、衰退和石油美元的衰落。对于先前的军事计划是否充分考虑了这种情况,存在怀疑,一些人认为文职领导层可能忽视了专家的建议。总的来说,该讨论表达了对美国准备不足以及可能出现重大中断的担忧。
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原文

The closure of the strait of Hormuz is causing a “paralyzing, real-time problem” for any prospective manufacturing surge in the US defense industrial base, and even for the repair of defense equipment damaged by Iranian attacks, according to analysis published by West Point’s Modern War Institute.

In particular sulphur, a vital upstream input in the extraction of critical minerals including copper and cobalt, has seen a “near total” disruption of seaborne trade in the straits, which makes up half the world’s total shipments, and prices have spiked nearly 25% since the war began, and seen a 165% rise year on year, the report said.

According to the analysis, these minerals – used in everything from microprocessors to jet engines to drone batteries – “dictate how fast things can be built and scaled under the pressure of an ongoing war”, and the effects of a sudden supply shock on US defense readiness have never been modeled.

One of the authors of that analysis, USAF lieutenant colonel and nonresident fellow at the US Naval War College Jahara “Franky” Matisek, told the Guardian in a telephone conversation that its “a cascading issue” raising the possibility that a “knock-on effect of this war is that it may cost double or more than double to replace all these weapons because all the mineral demand is going to go way up”.

Matisek warned of another possibility: “Markets are not going to be able to provide the amount of minerals that are needed to replace all these radars that have been destroyed and all these munitions that have to be replaced. It’s a really precarious spot to be in right now.”

The sulphur used as an industrial and agricultural inputs is mostly created as a byproduct of refining crude oil. The Middle East produces some 24% of the world’s supply, and around half of the world’s seaborne trade in the substance passes through the strait of Hormuz.

Sulphur is an input in the manufacture of artificial fertilizers, and international organizations, industry bodies and media reports have drawn attention to the possible downstream effects on agriculture and food supplies, especially in low-income countries whose farmers need to buy in the same markets as their counterparts in wealthy countries.

But sulphur is also burned to make sulphuric acid – the world’s most produced industrial chemical – which is used to extract copper and cobalt from low-grade ores.

And these very metals, the Modern War Institute warns, are crucial for replenishing and repairing US military equipment being used or damaged in the current war in the Middle East, pointing out that “copper is a designated strategic material embedded in the transformers, motors, and communications hardware that enable bases to operate and defense factories to function”.

The authors offer specific estimates for materials damaged in the early days of the war, writing that “it will take over thirty thousand kilograms of copper just to replace the two major US radars destroyed in Bahrain and Qatar” and “thousands of kilograms of additional copper to fix or replace other damaged US communication equipment, sensors, and radars in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE”.

They add: “The current sulfur shock is becoming a copper problem, and that copper problem risks quickly becoming a readiness and resilience problem.”

They call this a “prelogistical crisis” that previous “military planning treated as background noise”.

According to a separate February analysis, also co-written by Matisek, only 6% of US defense contractors have fully transparent supply chains. In the newer report, he and his co-authors write that this has now resulted in a military effort constrained by “upstream conditions it cannot control and a US joint force discovering that its combat endurance is capped by the invisible industrial foundations needed to replenish it”.

Matisek told the Guardian that this had arisen partly from the dependence on large defense contractors, and the opacity of their supply chains to military planners.

“All the big prime defense industrial base companies, this is all proprietary information. They don’t want anyone knowing how many minerals they’re buying to make a missile,” he said.

“From a strategic sort or great power competition perspective, we can’t actually allow them to do that any more because we actually need to know this,” Matisek added.

“We don’t know who their vendors are,” he said, adding that beyond a few steps in long chains of subcontractors, “nobody actually knows who’s providing these metals, these minerals, the parts. And it just becomes a maze.”

He added that apart from copper, sulphur is a key ingredient in the explosives that are at the business end of US military activity.

“There’s only two companies that make energetics and make the high explosives. If they have not gotten any orders or requests to increase their production, that is highly problematic, especially as we get to the sulphur crunch here”.

He added: “But [there is] just sort of like a crunch for all these minerals that you need to actually spin up to make all this stuff.”

The Guardian reached out to the US Department of Defense for comment.

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