Practically every person in the Middle East has been affected by the chain of events put into motion by Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Tens of thousands of people, mostly Gazans, have been killed, millions have been displaced, and billions of dollars in damage has been inflicted. It’s not surprising, then, that the perspective of tens of millions of people has shifted.

Polling by Arab Barometer, a survey project that we co-lead with others, conducted in the months after October 7 showed a sea change in public opinion. As ordinary people in the region witnessed Israel’s devastating war in Gaza, they turned sharply against Israel and the country’s biggest ally, the United States. And surveys we conducted in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, and Tunisia from August to November 2025—after the 12-day war last June but before the latest round of fighting with Iran—make clear that the changes observed in the aftermath of October 7 have stuck. People in the region have lost nearly all confidence in a U.S.-led regional order. Instead, on the whole, they now regard China, Iran, and Russia more favorably than the United States and, often, Europe. More than ever, Washington and many of its key allies are seen as one-sided, morally compromised, and selectively committed to international law compared with this axis of autocracies. When asked which country protects freedoms, contributes to regional security, and supports the Palestinian cause, respondents chose China, Iran, and Russia more often than the United States or some of its partners.

That does not mean that Arab publics uniformly support the policies of Beijing, Tehran, or Moscow. Arab publics, for example, still see Iran’s regional influence and nuclear program as threatening. The region’s center of political trust is shifting not because China, Iran, or Russia have built a universally attractive model. Instead, it has shifted because the standing of the United States, and to some extent Europe, has plummeted.

The war with Iran is unlikely to help these perceptions. The conflict, after all, was started by the United States and Israel. As part of it, Israel has renewed its assault in Lebanon, and countries in the Persian Gulf have been battered by missiles and drones. Since it started, little progress has been made toward rebuilding Gaza. If anything, Arab publics might be angrier at the United States than they were when we polled them in the fall of 2025.

If Washington and European capitals continue to lose favor with the people of the region, their relationships with the governments of the region may change, as well. Although most Arab leaders are authoritarians, they remain concerned by the prospect of mass protests and thus constrained by public opinion. For them, working with the United States in the open is becoming a growing risk. If it wants to retain its Arab partners, Washington must therefore find a quick end to the war in Iran and work toward a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Otherwise, the United States risks permanently ceding the Arab world to its adversaries.

BAD REPUTATION

The United States’ reputation tanked when the war in Gaza began, and it has not improved in the time since. In fact, Washington is less popular than it has been in years. In most countries surveyed, few people look upon U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policies favorably—24 percent in Iraq, 21 percent in Lebanon, 14 percent in Tunisia, and 12 percent in Jordan and the Palestinian territories. Only in Morocco and Syria did a substantial number of respondents—63 percent and 61 percent respectively—seem to like what Trump is doing in the region, and that is probably because Trump recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara (a disputed territory) and has supported Syria’s new government, which came to power by overthrowing a bloody and unpopular dictator.

Trump, of course, did help put an end to the war in Gaza by negotiating the October cease-fire. But his administration is less liked than that of his predecessor, Joe Biden. Today, under Trump’s leadership, most of the Middle East is under attack. It is not surprising, then, that 66 percent of respondents in Egypt, 59 percent in Jordan, 53 percent in the Palestinian territories, 51 percent in Iraq and Tunisia, and 47 percent in Lebanon think that Trump’s foreign policies toward the Arab region are worse than Biden’s—and his administration polled poorly. Only, again, in Morocco (27 percent) and Syria (seven percent) is this not the plurality view.

The European Union received somewhat better marks than did the United States, ranging from 70 percent in Syria and Morocco to 34 percent in the Palestinian territories, Iraq, and Egypt. But the reputations of individual European countries are varied and have much to do with their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Spain and Ireland, for example, are looked at more favorably for their support of the Palestinians, whereas Germany is less popular, presumably because of its history of backing Israel.

By contrast, China’s favorability in 2025 stands much higher overall, ranging from 37 percent in Syria to 69 percent in Tunisia. Russia, although less popular than China, still outperforms the United States and its allies in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Tunisia. Iran’s favorability is lower and more uneven. It is highest in Tunisia, at 55 percent, and lowest in Syria, at five percent—where Iran long supported the brutal rule of former President Bashar al-Assad. But in general, Iran is on the upswing. In the last five years, its level of support has increased in Iraq by 20 points and in the Palestinian territories by 12 points. Its favorability numbers have overtaken the United States in a majority of the countries we surveyed.

Approval across the Arab world for the leaders of China, Iran, and Russia has also shot up. Support for Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s policy toward the Middle East and North Africa has increased by 26 points in Tunisia, 25 points in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, 19 points in Morocco, and five points in Iraq over the last five years. His approval rating in these countries is now 61 percent, 51 percent, 43 percent, 58 percent, and 53 percent, respectively. Despite his invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support has risen in Morocco by 33 points, Jordan by 20 points, Tunisia by 17 points, and in the Palestinian territories by 14 points. More than 40 percent support him in Tunisia and Iraq. An outright majority of Moroccans—57 percent—have favorable views.

ENEMY OF MY ENEMY

Perhaps the most striking result, however, is the surge in support for the foreign policies of former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed by U.S.-Israeli strikes in February. For years, Tehran has funded destabilizing proxies in Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen and unsettled the region with its nuclear program. As a result, his international approach typically polled very poorly. But recently, the view of Khamenei has shifted from overwhelmingly negative to mixed in many countries. The share of people with a negative view of Khamenei’s foreign policy is 87 percent in Syria, 63 percent in Lebanon, 60 percent in Jordan, 56 percent in Morocco, 47 percent in the Palestinian territories, 45 percent in Iraq, and 31 percent in Tunisia. The share of people who saw his foreign policy as favorable is 49 percent in Tunisia, 48 percent in Iraq, 36 percent in the Palestinian territories, 35 percent in Morocco, 29 percent in Lebanon, 19 percent in Jordan, and three percent in Syria. Moreover, Khamenei’s personal standing rose dramatically over the past five years. Comparing surveys carried out in 2021–22 to those taken in 2025, his approval rating has increased by 29 points in Tunisia, 20 points in Iraq and the Palestinian territories, 12 points in Morocco, 11 points in Jordan, and five points in Lebanon. In no country where trend data is available did it decline.

That does not mean people across the Arab world are blind to the challenges Iran presents. Large majorities in several countries still describe the country’s nuclear program as a critical threat, ranging from 55 percent in the Palestinian territories to 85 percent in Syria. Iran’s political influence in the region is also widely viewed as a major issue, including by majorities in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. But bigger majorities in those same countries judge Israel’s ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories as a critical threat to their national security. Iran is thus redeemed, in large part, by its opposition to Israel and commitment to the Palestinian cause.

The United States, in contrast, is disliked for its relationship to the conflict. Arab publics overwhelmingly see it as siding with Israel over the Palestinians, including by 86 percent of respondents in Egypt and Jordan, 84 percent in the Palestinian territories, 78 percent in Lebanon, 71 percent in Syria, 69 percent in Tunisia, and 58 percent in Iraq. The European Union is not perceived as quite so supportive of Israel, but Arab publics still largely believe it sides with the country. Arab views of specific European countries, however, are more varied. Germany, for example, is perceived to be more committed to defending Israel than the Palestinians by wide margins in Jordan (35 percent versus 16 percent, respectively), Lebanon (45 percent versus 12 percent), the Palestinian territories (43 percent versus 11 percent), and Syria (36 percent versus 17 percent).

Meanwhile, Arab publics generally saw Spain as less one-sided. Roughly an equal percentage of Moroccans and Iraqis saw the country as more committed to defending the Palestinians (27 percent) than as more committed to Israel (29 percent). Among Syrians, it was 21 percent versus 24 percent. Other populations, however, viewed the Spanish as more committed to the Palestinians than to Israel: 31 percent versus 20 percent in Jordan, 39 percent versus 17 percent in the Palestinian territories, 34 percent versus 16 percent in Lebanon, 27 percent versus 15 percent in Egypt, and 42 percent versus 12 percent in Tunisia.

People in the Arab world widely believe the United Nations is biased in favor of Israel. Eleven percent of respondents in the Palestinian territories and Egypt, 14 percent in Tunisia and Jordan, 17 percent in Syria, 20 percent in Iraq and Morocco, and 25 percent in Lebanon say the UN is more committed to defending the Palestinians than Israel. By contrast, about 40 to 50 percent of respondents throughout the region say the UN is more committed to defending Israel. The message is plain: for many Arab citizens, the problem is no longer just U.S. double standards. It is the bankruptcy of the entire international legal and humanitarian system.

POLL SLIDE

Not surprisingly, the least popular country among Arab publics is Israel itself. In all the states we surveyed, at most five percent have a very or somewhat favorable view of Israel except in Morocco, where 13 percent of people do. Little wonder, then, that Arab publics distrust any actor that has aligned itself with Israel in the war in Gaza, which they see as lawless and annihilative.

Arab publics are not immovable in their views on Israel. Consider, for example, attitudes toward establishing formal relations with Israel. Right now, in no country does more than a quarter of people across the region say they support their government normalizing ties with Israel. (In Egypt and Jordan, for instance, four percent of people do.) But when asked if they support normalization if Israel recognizes a Palestinian state, support jumps by 27 points in Syria, 26 points in the Palestinian territories, 23 points in Jordan, 19 points in Iraq, 18 points in Morocco, and 17 points in Lebanon. Meanwhile, support for the Arab plan to rebuild Gaza, which was first proposed in March 2025, is overwhelming.

But Israel’s behavior under its current government makes such a rebound unlikely. Among the countries surveyed, a majority of respondents in all countries (except Morocco) say that the two-state solution is the best way to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including 67 percent in Jordan, 64 percent in Egypt and Syria, 60 percent in Iraq, 59 percent in the Palestinian territories, and 51 percent in Lebanon. Yet in the past few years, Israel has practically extinguished any chance that a two-state solution could work, allowing settlements in the West Bank to expand to the point where the territory is virtually noncontiguous. In a sense, then, Arab anger at Washington and its allies reflects a call for Israel’s friends to hold Israel to account for its transgressions—and an expression of deep frustration at their failure to do so.

But dim views of the United States also go beyond Washington’s position on Palestinian issues. Perhaps the most damning finding for the United States is its loss of legitimacy on the international stage. When asked which countries uphold international law to a great or medium extent, respondents were much more likely to choose China than the United States. For example, in Egypt—one of Washington’s major non-NATO allies—25 percent of people say they believe the United States upholds international law, compared with 58 percent who say so for China. Among the countries surveyed, the United States came out ahead only in Morocco. To an extent, this might also be driven by concerns with the Palestinians; large shares of Arab publics, ranging from 26 percent in Morocco to 44 percent in Lebanon, believe that China is more committed to defending the Palestinians than Israel. (The one exception is Syria, where 15 percent of respondents say so.) But these are hardly overwhelming numbers. Instead, the United States’ abandonment of the rules-based order itself seems to be having effects on Arab public opinion. It is also affecting Washington’s partners. In most Arab countries, respondents say the European Union is less committed to upholding international law than is China and roughly on par with Russia.

People in Arab countries do not necessarily see China as a liberal power. But they do see it as holding the high ground. When asked if they thought American or Chinese policies were better at protecting freedoms and rights, few respondents chose American policies: seven percent in the Palestinian territories, 13 percent in Egypt, 15 percent in Tunisia, 17 percent in Lebanon, 19 percent in Jordan, 25 percent in Iraq, and 29 percent in Morocco. By contrast, the share choosing Chinese policies is far higher, ranging from 28 percent in Lebanon to 43 percent in Tunisia. (The remaining respondents said either that Chinese and American policies are equally good, that Chinese and American policies are equally bad, or that they didn’t know whose policies were better.)

China also comes out on top on matters of security. Asked if they thought the United States or China has the better policy for maintaining regional security, the United States was picked by six percent of respondents in Egypt and the Palestinian territories, nine percent in Jordan, 13 percent in Tunisia, 19 percent in Lebanon, 22 percent in Iraq, and 23 percent in Morocco. Far more respondents chose China: 46 percent in Tunisia, 43 percent in Jordan, 40 percent in the Palestinian territories, 38 percent in Iraq, 36 percent in Egypt and Morocco, and 26 percent in Lebanon. Others didn’t have an opinion or believed American and Chinese policies to be equally good or bad. On the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically, the pattern is even starker. Three percent of people in Egypt, nine percent in the Palestinian territories, ten percent in Jordan and Tunisia, 12 percent in Lebanon, and 20 percent in Iraq and Morocco prefer American policy.

TURN THE BEAT AROUND?

The warning in Arab Barometer’s latest data is clear: the United States and Europe are not just losing hearts and minds. They are losing the perception that they protect human rights at all. Over the last few years, most Arab publics have come to believe more than ever that the United States and Europe have failed Palestinians, failed to enforce international law, and failed to uphold a fair, rules-based order. The war in Iran will likely hurt the reputation of the United States and Israel even more. And although European countries have not joined the fight in Iran, they may, to some extent, be seen as guilty by association—although it’s unlikely their reputation will suffer as much as the United States’.

As long as Gaza remains the clearest measure of moral and political judgement for ordinary Arabs, China, Iran, and Russia will retain the moral high ground. It does not help that Washington has been undermining the international order and international law in general. Although Beijing and Moscow have historically been less involved in the Middle East than has the United States—with the exception, perhaps, of Syria—Arab peoples will support their global leadership rather than the U.S.-led order.

France’s popularity has rebounded after dropping in the wake of October 7.

Arab governments might then start to pivot their relations accordingly. Arab officials, for instance, may want to do more business with China and Russia, establish stronger defense partnerships with the two countries, or join the multilateral groups they lead. In fact, Arab governments are already starting to break with the United States or trying to hide some of their dealings with Washington. In the lead-up to the war in Iran leaders in the Gulf warned their U.S. counterparts not to launch another assault. Yet, the United States dismissed their concerns. As Gulf countries suffer massive damage as a result of the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran, some leaders are considering withdrawing their financial investments from American institutions.

The future of Washington and Europe in the Middle East, however, is not forgone. If the United States and its friends change their ways, they can resuscitate their reputation. One European country—France—has already pulled off such a feat. Its favorability among Arab publics has rebounded after dropping in the wake of October 7. In late 2025, support for France was up by 11 points in Tunisia, ten points in Morocco, and seven points in Lebanon compared with two years earlier. The only clear explanation for this shift was Paris’s official recognition of a Palestinian state in September 2025. Although largely symbolic, this change had a meaningful effect on Arab public opinion.

Whether Washington’s approval keeps tanking, flatlines, or rebounds is thus up to American officials. How they conduct the war in Iran, how they handle Gaza, and whether they can find a peaceful resolution to the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be important in the years ahead. The best thing they could do would be to quickly wind down the war in Iran and lean on Israel to give the Palestinians basic rights and, eventually, sovereignty. To rehabilitate its image, in other words, the United States must match its deeds to the principles it once professed to hold: a commitment to international law and support for human rights, democracy, and rules-based order. It must apply such principles not just when it serves its interests—as in Ukraine—but equally across the globe.

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