今天多哈是否会举行美伊会谈尚不确定,此次会谈或许重要,或许不然。
Today Will Or Won't See A US-Iran Meeting In Doha Which Will Be "Perhaps Important, Perhaps Not"

原始链接: https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/today-will-or-wont-see-us-iran-meeting-doha-which-will-be-perhaps-important-perhaps-not

迈克尔·艾弗里的分析强调,全球正转向“18和19世纪”式的治国方略,其特征是高强度的国防开支、工业保护主义以及地缘政治动荡。 全球稳定性正日趋脆弱,中东(伊朗、黎巴嫩、加沙和伊拉克)局势持续紧张,中国与西方之间的军备竞赛也在升级。各国正优先考虑国防、人工智能和供应链安全,导致了巨大的、不可持续的成本。对此,各国政府正诉诸“创造性”的经济手段,包括保护性关税、工业补贴,以及试图加强对中央银行和监管机构的控制。 文章指出,冷战后的共识正在瓦解。各国越来越愿意采取激进的重商主义政策,甚至由私营部门主导的地缘政治策略,以确保资源并维持主导地位。随着欧洲面临能源风险,英国也在复杂的再工业化进程中摸索,全球经济正进入一个深刻结构性变革的时期。市场对此转变准备不足,低估了转型的规模;世界正迈向一个更加碎片化、阵营化且动荡的时代,当前的“和平火种”可能很快会被更深层、更具破坏性的冲突所取代。

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原文

By Michael Every of Rabobank

In typical form, today will or won’t see a US-Iran meeting in Doha; which will be ‘perhaps important, perhaps not’; and either discussing the MoU or unfreezing $6bn of Iranian assets. So, the ‘peacefire’ continues, as expected, but with little chance this holds permanently. Likewise in Lebanon, where the US is pushing to disarm Hezbollah --which refuses-- and Israel won’t leave until that happens. And Gaza, where the Board of Peace is finalising its plans as the IDF warns Hamas is readying for war. And Iraq, which just set a September 30 deadline for pro-Iran militias to disarm. And Libya, where Marco Rubio is fighting another crisis. To give an early Christmas present to Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene, Israel also says it’s developing space lasers.

That’s as South Korea announced a $1.3 trillion AI and IT investment plan to maintain an edge vs. China over the next decade – which is showing footage of a 6G fighter jet and conducting tests of a hypersonic ramjet that can change shape in flight; China has restricted dual use exports to Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Komatsu units; Supermicro’s Taiwan offices were raided in a chip smuggling probe; and a Rakuten-led group is set for state subsidies to build Japan's answer to Starlink. In short, what we see around us is as about massive, urgent investment in defence and AI as much it is about related energy (i.e., Hormuz), broader commodities, and supply chains.

That’s unbelievably expensive to address. For example, the US is pushing for a $1.5 trillion defence budget, while keeping up with South Korea alone would require Europe to invest $14 trillion to match it equivalently. Tellingly, the UK will today unveil its new defence strategy, which shifts to cheap drones from larger platforms --guided missile destroyers and frigates are cut-- as outgoing PM Starmer presides over a plan that will only reach 2.7% of GDP by 2030, not the promised 3.0%; some say he wants to run NATO next (to tell his successor he must reach 3.5%).

So, we may soon require:

  • Creative book-keeping: Hungary’s new PM claims his predecessor hid half of the budget deficit, which is actually 8% of GDP.
  • Spending cuts: and good luck with that.
  • New taxes: France is now looking for EU-wide taxes to fund a planned €2 trillion commission budget, with the idea that foreign firms, like US tech and polluters, could pay more.
  • Tariffs: last week, US Treasury Secretary Bessent cited Hamiltonian economic statecraft; yesterday, White House macro-maven Miran penned a WSJ op-ed arguing for US tariffs. The EU just gave China an October deadline to address their huge --and predictable-- trade imbalance, kicking the can down the road, but pointing to a trade war and/or Hamilton (and Trump) moment ahead, which could prove transformative. Even Paul Krugman is telling the EU to tariff China.
  • Industrial policy: which is very much back in vogue, even if what this means is vague for many.
  • A compliant central bank: There, the Supreme Court just overturned precedent to allow the White House to remove heads of federal agencies, greatly empowering the executive. It kept FOMC member Cook in her seat for now until due process plays out but did not address whether “for cause” removals at the Fed are also constitutional or not, allowing Trump to restart the process of trying to fire her over allegations of mortgage fraud and, in time, to potentially relitigate if the Fed is a special case or not.

The ECB’s Lagarde, who years ago said the Bank should work hand-in-hand with governments to overcome geopolitical crises, just stated Europe is getting better at coping with economic shocks due to a better financial framework and the green transition. European refineries’ flexibility on jet fuel helped; but China did more by not importing as much oil, and the US and Japan by draining their SPRs, all due to *their* economic statecraft. Now the risk is rising of a China cut-off of rare earths to Europe, which account for half its total (and Russia a quarter), and of more expensive Chinese imports across the board. What if that transpires from October onwards – and if we get more war vs. Iran after the US midterms?

In the UK, the question is ‘Build ‘em up or Burnham down?’ as the soon-to-be UK PM just called to “rewire” the UK economy. He’s talking about devolution - which hasn’t boosted growth in Scotland; equalisation across regions – which most countries want but fail to achieve; (expensive?) public control of utilities; and reindustrialisation – in a period of protectionism and bloc-based realignment. In short, is the UK going to tariff everybody, or the US, or Europe, or China? Logically, one should start from there, not locally, only to then hit a low tariff ceiling on the attempted way back up.

In short, political economy remains in flux. Markets don’t think things through in such detail or depth: whatever happens is an input into the ‘up or down from here’ binary. However, the scale on which things can move up or down based on how political-economy transforms shouldn’t be understated. JPY is at a 40-year low vs. the dollar at time of writing: where will other crosses go as things unfold?

Yet even as politicians --and central bankers-- try to relearn things from first principles, revolutionary change can reshape the architecture which they think they are operating in. For example, regular readers may recall that years ago I floated the idea of letters of marque as a way to channel private sector energies and capital into national security without busting budgets or political constraints like no boots on the ground. On that note, see the following proposal taken from X and think about it seriously:

“A durable solution to the Iran problem is pretty easy:

  1. Form the American Persian Energy Company (APEC)
  2. Give 25% to Exxon and Chevron, who will capitalize it and provide expertise
  3. Ground invasion of Iran, but only with volunteer troops who will be compensated with APEC stock
  4. US military provides air cover and logistical support
  5. Defecting Iranian generals will also be compensated with a quantity of APEC stock dependent on their rank and the number of soldiers they bring with them
  6. All oil and gas rights in Iran are granted to the APEC
  7. New $2 trillion American company is created out of thin air
  8. Iran temporarily governed by APEC CEO while a transition to a suitable civilian government is negotiated”

If you think this kind of thing doesn’t happen (anymore: it used to) then you haven’t noticed how 18th and 19th century thinking is not just back in vogue but is actively winning vs. the post-Cold War political establishment consensus; or how modern mercenaries like Blackwater operate.

Political economy is changing; it will change much, much more; and markets will change with it. The volatility we are seeing in the Hormuz ‘peacefire’ is just a taste of what’s to come. Some assets will be built up. Others will be burned down.

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