04 · Out of sync
Treat this as an accounting question. Follow each group across three steps: its share of the country's 18-year-olds, its share of all U.S. college students, and its share of an elite private class. If admission were neutral the three bars would stay level. They don't. Some groups expand sharply at the elite tier while others contract: Asian students roughly quadruple, international admits go from zero to a sizable slice, and several domestic groups shrink at every step.
The country → all colleges → elite, by group
Each group's share at three stages: U.S. 18-year-olds, all U.S. college students, and a stylized elite private class.
The hook paradox.
Here's the counterintuitive part. A group that leans heavily on legacy and recruited athletics doesn't get those hooked seats for free. They come out of the group's overall footprint. So when you strip the hooks away and look only at the unhooked "merit" pool, that same group can be crowded out of it: its own hooked admits have already spent the seats. First, who actually fills each track:
Who fills each admissions track
Estimated racial composition of each track's admits. The hooked tracks and the unhooked pool have very different makeups.
The merit ratio makes the paradox one number per group: its share of unhooked admits ÷ its share of all admits. Below 1.0 means the group is thinner in the merit pool than on campus overall, because the hooks did the heavy lifting and its unhooked applicants face the steepest pure-merit climb. Above 1.0, the group earns its place and would gain seats if hooks were abolished. Split it by race and gender and the pattern sharpens: men lean harder on the male-skewed athletic and legacy hooks, so every man sits below his female counterpart on the same scale.
The merit ratio, by race and gender
Each group's share of the unhooked (merit) pool ÷ its share of all admits. 1.0 = neutral; left = hook-dependent, right = merit-carrying. Men trail women in every group.
SOURCE · Method as in the track composition above, with the male skew of athletic hooks applied (recruited athletes run roughly 55–60% male). The race-and-gender split is the most modeled figure on the page: a directional estimate, not a published statistic.
And per head of population? Divide each group's unhooked merit seats by its share of the country's 18-year-olds, so that 1.0 now means merit seats in exact proportion to that group's youth. The merit pipeline turns out to be a rounding error for most Americans and a firehose for one group:
Merit seats per 18-year-old, by race
Unhooked (merit) seats going to each group ÷ that group's share of U.S. 18-year-olds. 1.0 = population parity.
The hook advantage and the merit disadvantage are the same coin. The more a group is admitted through legacy and athletics, the more of its overall footprint is already spent, so its unhooked applicants compete for a shrunken remainder of merit seats, and against the largest unhooked applicant pool. The group that looks most "privileged" by the hooks is the one whose merit pipeline is squeezed hardest. (This reads the trial data as schools managing each group's total toward a rough band, which is well-evidenced but a point critics contest.)