信用卡奖励演变成了92亿美元的财富转移
Credit Card Rewards Became a $9.2B Wealth Transfer

原始链接: https://www.library.hbs.edu/working-knowledge/how-credit-card-rewards-became-multibillion-dollar-wealth-transfer

哈佛商学院及其他研究机构的研究表明,信用卡刷卡手续费造成了累退式的财富转移,每年约有 92 亿美元从中低收入家庭流向富裕的消费者。 由于商家将这些交易费用计入所有商品的定价中,使用现金和借记卡支付的客户实际上是在补贴高端信用卡持卡人所享有的丰厚奖励计划。高收入消费者每年通过这些奖励获益约 390 美元,而低收入家庭平均则损失 88 美元。 研究强调,政府对这些成本进行监管的尝试(如 2010 年的《德宾修正案》)往往适得其反。该政策通过限制借记卡手续费,取消了借记卡用户的优惠,同时进一步巩固了信用卡用户的利益。归根结底,当前的支付生态系统实际上是对不使用高端信用卡的人群征收的一种隐形税。研究人员得出结论:随着高端卡的使用普及,这种财富差距可能会持续存在;商家若想在不疏远依赖这些“特权”的富裕客户的前提下管控成本,将变得愈发困难。

近期一场 Hacker News 的讨论指出,美国的信用卡奖励机制实际上是一种累退式的财富转移。由于商户需向信用卡网络支付交易手续费,他们往往会提高商品价格以抵消这些成本。 虽然信用卡用户可以通过奖励回扣拿回部分支出,但使用现金或借记卡的用户在支付同样高价的同时,却无法获得任何回馈。评论者指出,这实际上是用低收入群体的钱去补贴高端信用卡用户,而这些低收入者往往因缺乏信用渠道或财务稳定性,无法参与到“奖励”体系中。 该讨论帖提出了几个复杂因素: * **监管差异:** 与美国不同,许多国家(包括欧盟成员国)会对银行卡交换费设定上限,这导致了当地的奖励计划不如美国丰厚。 * **“信用陷阱”:** 该体系利好那些全额还款的用户(常被发卡机构戏称为“吸血鬼”),同时剥削那些因支付利息而陷入债务的用户。 * **商户动态:** 大型零售商拥有更强的议价能力来协商较低的手续费,而小企业则往往难以承担这些成本,或只能通过附加费的形式将其直接转嫁给消费者。 归根结底,用户认为该体系是现代商业中根深蒂固、效率低下且往往不公平的一种特征。
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原文

American Express has famously touted that “membership has its privileges.” For wealthy consumers today, those benefits total $9.2 billion each year, subsidized by middle- and lower-income households.

As inflation-weary businesses raise prices to cover credit card interchange fees, the pain isn't universal, says research by Harvard Business School Professor Mark L. Egan. Because merchants charge everyone the same price regardless of how they pay, those fee costs are factored into prices for all shoppers. However, credit card users get that money back and then some through rewards, while cash and debit users get little or nothing.

The result: People paying cash face the equivalent of a 26% higher sales tax than premium credit card users shopping at the same store.

Collectively, interchange fees shift an estimated $30 billion from those paying with cash and debit cards to credit card users at similar merchants annually, Egan and his fellow researchers estimate in the April working paper “Who Pays for Payments?” That windfall is as “economically significant” as government policies that support low- and middle-income Americans, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit and unemployment insurance.

“It's just the way the market was set up,” says Egan, the George E. Bates Professor. “It turns out to be unfavorable to people who use cash and debit, and those who happen to be people with low incomes.”

Egan’s research shows how consumer policies, banks’ need for fees, and buying behaviors have converged to facilitate a massive wealth transfer. The findings arrive amid a widening schism between the country’s richest and poorest residents, as wealthy households gain from surging stocks and many lower-income families struggle to afford basic necessities.

Egan coauthored the paper with Gregor Matvos and Lulu Wang, professors at Northwestern University, Stanford University Professor Amit Seru, and Georgia State University Professor Vincent Yao.

How did this system evolve?

One factor stems from an amendment to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed in 2010 at the crest of the global financial crisis. The law includes a provision known as the Durbin Amendment that caps debit card interchange rates charged by large banks.

The law, which went into effect in 2011, aimed to protect consumers and merchants from excessive interchange fees on debit cards. However, the policy ended up hurting debit card users, who lost rewards and perks like free checking as banks made up the lost fee revenue. And while cash users benefited, the biggest winners were credit card users: lower debit interchange fees reduced the prices merchants charged, and credit card users enjoyed those lower prices while their rewards remained untouched.

Ultimately, the policy proved regressive, benefiting affluent consumers while middle-income debit card users lost the most.

“It's just unfortunate,” says Egan, a professor of business administration in the HBS finance unit. “No one wanted this outcome from the Durbin Amendment.”

Parsing payments at 1.8 million merchants

To study how interchange fees impact consumers, the authors partnered with financial transaction firm Fiserv, owner of the popular Clover payment platform. The partnership allowed the researchers to examine card payments across roughly 1 million merchants—about one-fifth of all US card volume—plus data from 800,000 Clover merchants that captures notoriously hard-to-track cash transactions.

The analysis assumed that retailers pass interchange fees to customers through higher prices, but the results held even after relaxing that assumption. Tallying who receives card rewards versus who effectively pays the fees that fund them, the researchers found:

  • Premium card users reap 43% of rewards, but pay 30% of interchange fees.

  • Cash users receive no rewards, but pay about 10% of fee-related costs.

  • Users of debit cards issued by large banks covered by the Durbin Amendment receive about 13% of rewards but pay 23% of the fees.

Because credit card use rises with income, this redistribution translates into a $9.2 billion annual transfer to households earning more than $150,000 from lower-income households—a gain of about $390 a year for high-income households, while lower-income households lose about $88.

The authors found two factors that mitigated the transfer. First, cash, debit, and credit card users tend to shop at different merchants, which limits cross-subsidization. Second, the merchants with more overlap—large grocery stores, gas stations, and big retailers—tend to pay the lowest interchange fees, thanks to sector discounts and the negotiating clout of major chains. Together, these forces shrink the transfer by about 25%.

“Because there's this consumer sorting, and places like Target and Walmart negotiate lower fees, [the redistribution is] not quite as bad as you might think,” Egan says.

Managing the shifting fee landscape

Interchange fees have grown with rising card use, raising strategic questions for any business that sells to consumers, from big box stores to small gas stations. Among the factors they will likely grapple with:

  • Premium card use will likely grow. When forecasting interchange fee costs, it’s fair to assume that premium card use will expand, especially as more middle-income consumers embrace them and stop carrying cash. “More expensive payment methods are just going to drive out cheaper ones,” Egan says.

  • Sound forecasting will require more granularity. A business with multiple sites might need to consider customer behavior at each location, rather than relying on averages. “Card type, merchant sector, and merchant size play fundamental roles in determining merchant-level interchange fees,” the authors write.

  • Squeezed merchants have few easy solutions. Rejecting premium cards or adding surcharges, for example, might undermine competitiveness and alienate customers. “People like to pay with fancy credit cards,” Egan says. “You certainly see that in the data.”

Where do we go from here?

In trying to rein in bank fees, the Durbin Amendment ended up being a regressive transfer from middle-income consumers to high-income consumers. Policymakers weighing future reforms to fees should keep in mind that:

Consumers “self-sort” by income

Wealthy people tend to shop at retailers that anticipate premium card use and price accordingly, the researchers find. And businesses that cater to cash and debit customers might not need to raise prices as aggressively to cover rewards. For that reason, more targeted reforms might be more effective.

Large merchants have more options to manage costs

Big-box stores, for example, have more leverage to negotiate interchange fees than small businesses, Egan says. Niche merchants that serve a variety of customers might be most vulnerable.

Middle-income households often suffer most

After the Durbin Amendment, credit card users enjoyed lower prices while keeping their rewards, and cash-reliant shoppers benefited from lower prices too. Middle-income shoppers—most likely to use debit cards—lost free checking and other perks that outweighed any price relief.

“We find that low-income consumers were relatively unaffected, middle-income consumers were hurt the most by the Durbin Amendment, and higher-income consumers benefited,” the authors write.

Photo credit: Adobe Stock/Lenny.

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