The U.S. decision targeting Autistici/Inventati should not be read simply as another sanction in Washington’s crackdown on violent extremism. According to Beniamino Irdi, senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and CEO of Highground, the more significant point lies elsewhere: for the first time, the logic of material support is being applied openly and forcefully to technological infrastructure. The target is no longer only those who carry out an act, but also those who provide the infrastructure that makes it possible. It is a choice that sets a delicate precedent for European allies and for the balance between security, intelligence and legal safeguards.

Why it matters. The designation marks an unusual use of U.S. counterterrorism sanctions against a European technology collective whose main activity is providing digital infrastructure – from encrypted communications to web hosting.

• It also creates a potential point of discussion between Washington, Rome and Brussels: the U.S. designation carries immediate financial consequences under American jurisdiction, but does not automatically place Autistici/Inventati on Italy’s or the European Union’s terrorist lists.

What happened. On August 26, the State Department, working with the Treasury Department, designated Autistici/Inventati (A/I Collective) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.

• The State Department describes A/I as an Italy-based extremist organisation that builds and operates digital infrastructure used by violent Antifa cells and other far-left groups internationally. Washington says its services include encrypted email and chats, web hosting, secure videoconferencing and streaming, anonymity tools and the infrastructure behind the Noblogs platform.

Washington specifically cited the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States and is also on the EU terrorist list. Treasury says Autistici/Inventati was designated for having “materially assisted” or provided technological support, goods or services in support of an act of terrorism

Q: Irdi, what is the most significant element of the U.S. decision?

• A: The most interesting part is not so much the sanction against this organization, but the fact that the logic of material support to terrorist organizations is being extended to the infrastructure layer. Washington is looking not only at what an entity does, but at what it enables others to do through its services, including in third countries.

Q: So the United States is not targeting an operational organisation in the traditional sense?

• A: Exactly. The United States is not targeting an operational organisation, but an infrastructure. It is an extension of the scope of countermeasures to technical and infrastructure services that can be used by actors considered dangerous. The key point, however, is the principle being established: infrastructure itself can become the object of a countermeasure.

Q: How much will the sanction actually affect Autistici/Inventati?

• A: The asset freeze is probably the least significant part of the measure: it is difficult to imagine that a small Italian association has substantial assets in the United States. The real effect comes instead through de-risking. A U.S. designation prompts banks, payment systems, registrars, hosting providers and connectivity providers to pre-emptively cut ties.
• An entity can therefore effectively be expelled from the services market without any court ruling ever having been issued in Italy, and potentially without a criminal proceeding even having been opened. In other words, the real coercive power of the United States lies in progressively making it impossible to bank, host or provide services to the designated entity.

Q: In other words, the strongest effect could be ostracism.

• A: Yes. They have ostracised them. And this is precisely one of the most interesting and problematic aspects of the case. The power of sanctions derives from the ability to influence third parties, financial and commercial operators that, for compliance reasons, may decide to sever relations with the designated entity.

Q: Why have we reached this point?

• A: Because over the past few years, the evolution of hostile activities in Europe has followed a very clear trend, especially on the Russian side. After the mass expulsion of Russian officers operating under cover, Moscow has increasingly relied on intermediaries and proxies.
• Assessments by European intelligence services describe a model in which recruiters can identify financially vulnerable individuals or people from criminal environments online and task them with surveillance, vandalism, arson or sabotage. Contact takes place remotely, payment can be made in cryptocurrencies and the person carrying out the act may not even know who they are actually working for.

Q: And does this also change the way authorities need to look at the threat?

• A: The advantage of this model is deniability. If an operation is built through a succession of intermediaries, it becomes much more difficult to trace it back to the principal. And if the operational model is based on intermediation, it is quite natural for the response to begin shifting from the perpetrators to the enablers: not only those who physically carry out the act, but also those who provide the infrastructure that makes it possible or more difficult to attribute. This is an important evolution of the security paradigm.
• The U.S. designation of A/I does not claim that the organisation is controlled by Russia and should not be interpreted in that way. But the analytical perspective is the same: identifying not only those who carry out the action, but also the network of actors and tools that makes it possible.

Q: From the standpoint of the legal safeguards typical of Western democracies, how do you see it?

• A: That is the main dilemma. In Western democracies, legal safeguards are difficult to circumvent. An organization may be considered dangerous from an intelligence perspective, but that does not automatically mean that the evidence required under the standards set by law exists to adopt a judicial measure.

Q: Could Washington ask its allies to follow the same path?

• A: It is possible that the United States is setting a precedent and wants to signal to its allies that efforts to contain the infrastructure supporting violent activities should also be extended to other countries. But this raises a very delicate problem. If the criterion becomes too vague, the risk is that it creates divisions with those same allies.

Q: What would be the critical point?

• A: For example, it is difficult to imagine that all allies would accept the principle that networks which, in some way, are associated with the Antifa sphere should no longer be allowed to provide services. A very careful distinction must be drawn between political affiliation, protest activity, ideological radicalism and concrete support for violence.
• The same infrastructure can be used by a dissident, a journalist, a political activist or someone claiming responsibility for an act of sabotage. In A/I’s case, projects are openly selected based on their compatibility with certain political principles. Taken on its own, that is a rather weak element on which to base judicial proceedings.

Q: What, then, is the lesson for Western democracies?

• A: That they will increasingly have to confront the structural elements of the threat. Intelligence may reach the conclusion that an organization represents a risk, but moving from that assessment to a measure carrying legal consequences requires different standards. The issue raised by the A/I case is therefore broader than the individual organisation.
• It is another manifestation of a dilemma that liberal democracies are facing in many different forms as they confront modern threats to their security: how to fight them without eroding the safeguards that constitute their foundation and, ultimately, their freedom.