Cognition 发布新款 SWE-2 模型,比肩 Fable 5.1 与 GPT-Astra
Cognition launches new SWE-2 model, Rivaling Fable 5.1 and GPT-Astra

原始链接: https://cognition.com/blog/swe-2

Cognition 团队推出了迄今为止最先进的代码模型 **SWE-2**。该模型基于 Kimi K3 架构构建,在 FrontierCode 1.1 主基准测试中达到了 50% 的得分率。与前代产品 SWE-1.7 相比,SWE-2 性能显著提升且成本大幅降低——在实现更高得分的同时,步骤减少了 58%,平均成本降低了 81%。 该模型的性能提升得益于一种全新的强化学习(RL)训练方法,该方法能在单次运行中优化整体的成本-性能帕累托前沿(Pareto frontier)。主要技术进步包括: * **帕累托感知强化学习(Pareto-informed RL):** 一种基于原则的成本惩罚方法,通过调整推理努力程度以匹配效率前沿,使模型能够对代码库的探索做出更明智的判断。 * **训练稳定性:** 引入了一种新的长度加权奖励基准,降低了梯度方差并稳定了训练过程。 * **系统效率:** 集成了在线草稿模型训练和量化感知推理,即使在模型规模达到 2.8 万亿参数的情况下,也能保持高吞吐量。 SWE-2 展示了更强的资源利用能力、更出色的测试编写能力以及更严格的验证准则。现可通过 Devin Desktop、CLI、Web 和 Fusion 使用该模型。

Cognition AI 发布了 **SWE-2**,这是一款通过对 Kimi K3 进行后训练而开发的全新软件工程模型。此次发布在 Hacker News 上引发了质疑,用户对该模型的性能表现及其营销宣传提出了疑问。 社区讨论的主要内容包括: * **基准测试疑虑:** 批评者指出“Terminal Bench 2.1”与较新的“Terminal Bench 4”之间存在显著的性能下滑,暗示该模型可能存在“刷榜”行为(即为了特定测试而过度优化),而非具备广泛的通用能力。 * **性能质疑:** 用户认为该模型在表现上似乎落后于 DeepSeek v4.1 Flash 等竞争对手,并对此次发布的宣传性质表示怀疑。 * **可访问性:** 部分开发者对该模型被锁定在 Cognition 的专属 Devin 平台内表示不满,尽管该公司确认可以通过命令行界面(CLI)访问。 * **观点分歧:** 尽管一些用户因该模型蒸馏性质导致的“不稳定性”而保持警惕,但另一些人则认为 Cognition 是 AI 智能体领域中值得信赖且低调的参与者,并提到了其相比之前版本可能带来的成本优势。
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原文

By The Cognition Team09.10.26

Today we’re introducing SWE-2, our most advanced coding model yet. It pushes the Pareto frontier of capability and cost, achieving 50.0% on FrontierCode 1.1 Main1, within one point of Fable 5.1 while being 64% cheaper.

With SWE-2, we scaled RL to the multi-trillion-parameter regime for the first time, building on the SWE-1.72 training infrastructure and recipe. The key addition is an RL algorithm that trains all reasoning-effort levels in a single run, advancing the whole cost–performance frontier.

base modelend of training

The result is our closest model yet to the frontier. On FrontierCode 1.1 Main and DeepSWE 1.1, SWE-2 beats SWE-1.7 and Grok 4.6 on both score and cost, matches GPT-5.6 Sol and Fable 5/5.1 at a fraction of their price, and comes within a few points of GPT-6 Astra at a quarter of the cost.

See how models rank on the FrontierCode leaderboard

SWE-2 is post-trained from Kimi K33, a 2.8T-parameter model that had already undergone extensive RL for agentic coding. As with SWE-1.7, our RL still finds substantial headroom, adding 5–6 points on many benchmarks and shifting K3’s entire cost–performance frontier.

Coding benchmark results
BenchmarkSWE-2Kimi K3Grok 4.6Fable 5.1GPT-5.6 SolGPT-6 AstraSWE-1.7
FrontierCode 1.1 Main50.0%44.2%48.0%50.9%47.5%53.3%42.0%
DeepSWE 1.173.0%68.5%67.5%67.4%72.7%74.1%37.7%
Terminal-Bench 2.192.8%88.3%88.4%91.4%88.8%89.9%81.5%
Terminal-Bench 427.3%21.5%20.3%55.8%37.3%57.9%7.6%

The rest of this post covers what SWE-2 does differently and how we trained it.

We begin with SWE-2’s behavior, focusing on the characteristics that make it more efficient and intelligent compared to our previous models. Then, we detail the post-training advances behind SWE-2:

SWE-2 is available starting today in Devin Desktop and CLI. We’re also rolling it out on Devin Web and Fusion.

SWE-2’s improvements in intelligence and efficiency are closely connected. Stronger engineering judgment allows the agent to write more complete solutions alongside fewer detours and redundant reads. On FrontierCode 1.1 Main, we see that SWE-2 medium scores higher than SWE-1.7 while taking 58% fewer turns and costing 81% less on average.

SWE-1.7 vs. SWE-2 on FrontierCode 1.1 Main: Mean

Mean metric over all 100-task FrontierCode 1.1 Main tasks, using three runs per task per model and grouped by the tools each step calls.

In our previous post2, we observed SWE-1.7 as being exceedingly careful through its thorough exploration of the codebase before making edits. While boosting performance, this led to user feedback that SWE-1.7 tended to over-explore and overthink on simple tasks. Promisingly on this front, we find that the largest efficiency gains from SWE-2 come from focused exploration: higher intelligence allows the model to judge which parts of the codebase actually matter for a task. This allows SWE-2 to begin implementation sooner: on FrontierCode 1.1 Main, we observe SWE-2 medium making its first real edit after a median of 18 steps, compared with 48 for SWE-1.7.

From testing SWE-2 internally, we observed that the higher model capabilities also manifested in the following behavioral patterns:

We observe real behavioral differences between effort levels as well. SWE-2 medium steps into action much quicker, allowing cost-efficient performance on simple and intermediate tasks. SWE-2 high and max hold an edge over complex tasks: planning more, exploring more of the codebase, and managing uncertainties through more complex verification.

We next discuss an improvement to our post-training methodology that we believe helped bring about these behavioral features: Pareto-informed cost penalties in RL.

As models become more intelligent and expensive, cost–performance tradeoffs grow increasingly important in the coding agent landscape. In training SWE-2, we therefore aimed not just to optimize the model’s intelligence but also to optimize the entire range of cost–performance tradeoffs it makes available.

Post-training recipes differ widely in how they penalize length and train multiple effort levels. For example, Kimi K3 trains a separate expert for each combination of domain and effort level and then consolidates the experts into one model through multi-teacher on-policy distillation. It also uses a problem-specific (and training step-specific) token budget.

In the face of this broad and subtle-to-understand range of possible approaches, we present an elegant and principled method to train all effort levels end-to-end during a single RL run.

Progress of the Pareto frontier during training

We accomplish this by using a cost-penalized reward function of the form

R=SλeC,R=S-\lambda_e C,

where S{0,1}S \in \{0,1\}

Approximating the Pareto curve tangents of Kimi K3

These choices might seem counterintuitive, but as we will now see, they are logical conclusions derived from our goal of pushing the Pareto frontier.

We next explain how we chose an RL objective RR that directly optimizes the model’s cost–performance Pareto frontier. Here, “cost” refers to average cost and “performance” refers to solve rate, both averaged over a distribution D\mathcal D of training tasks. Recall that points on the cost–performance plane depend on the task distribution’s average cost and average solve rate but otherwise do not depend on D\mathcal D. Therefore, to align the RL objective with a model’s position in the plane, we want the expectation of RR over D\mathcal D to depend only on this average cost and solve rate.

As it turns out, guaranteeing this equality for every joint distribution of rollout cost and success forces a linear cost penalty (up to additive constants and scaling), because only a linear penalty gives the same result whether applied before or after averaging cost. For the interested reader, we prove this claim rigorously in Appendix B.

Now that we have our reward function R=SλeCR=S-\lambda_e C

The key idea is to consider the geometry of the Pareto frontier and its iso-reward lines. To do so, fix an effort level and let (c,s)(c,s) be the corresponding point on the current frontier, with average reward J=sλecJ=s-\lambda_e c

In the left panel below, we see a failure case where λhigh\lambda_\text{high}

We can formalize this geometrical intuition with a bit of algebra. Let mm be the local slope of the Pareto frontier at (c,s)(c,s). A small movement along the frontier changes the solve rate by ΔsmΔc\Delta s\approx m\Delta c

ΔJ=ΔsλeΔc(mλe)Δc.\Delta J = \Delta s - \lambda_e \Delta c \approx (m - \lambda_e)\Delta c.

Thus, letting λe=m\lambda_e = m

We’re also sharing the reward baseline we’ve used since SWE-1.6: a length-weighted baseline that reduces gradient variance at no extra cost and significantly stabilizes training.

Given a fixed prompt xx and a group of nn rollouts y1,,yny_1,\ldots,y_n

g^=1ni=1n(Rib)θlogπθ(yix).\widehat g = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n}(R_i-b)\,\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x).

A reasonable proxy for reducing the gradient estimator’s variance is to minimize E[(Rib)2]\mathbb E[(R_i-b)^2]

We instead attempt to minimize the variance of the full gradient estimator g^\hat g

b=E[Riθlogπθ(yix)2]E[θlogπθ(yix)2].b^\star = \frac{\mathbb E\left[R_i\left\|\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x)\right\|^2\right]}{\mathbb E\left[\left\|\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x)\right\|^2\right]}.

See Appendix C for a simple derivation.

Computing an empirical estimate of this baseline would require an extra backward pass on each rollout for the term θlogπθ(yix)2\left\|\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x)\right\|^2

Scatter plot showing the correlation of θlogπθ(yix)2\left\|\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x)\right\|^2

This suggests a much cheaper proxy to approximate bb^\star at no extra cost:

b^=i=1nRiLii=1nLi.\widehat b = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n}R_i L_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}L_i}.

In practice, we train using off-policy RL, so bb^\star is technically not the baseline that minimizes the gradient variance. Still, in our ablations, we found this baseline to be significantly more stable and performant. In particular, it helps keep the inference–training KL low during RL.

Length-weighted group baseline improves RL stability

group baselinelength-weighted group baseline

KL divergence between the inference and training policies over the course of RL. Bold lines are a rolling mean; faint lines are the raw per-step values.

We build our rollout system with four goals in mind:

Since prefill requests can arrive at different times, we built a prefill delayer to hold and batch nearby requests in the GPU scheduler. This improved both TPM per GPU and TPS per request by 10–20%. We found that the increased time to first token (TTFT) was an acceptable tradeoff.

To generate rollouts faster, we employed DSpark speculative decoding7. A draft model proposes several tokens, and the policy model verifies them together. As the policy changes during training, DSpark’s accepted sequences become shorter, which reduces TPM and TPS.

Degradation of speculative decoding acceptance rate during RL

Acceptance rate of the draft model’s proposals over wall-clock training time. Bold line is a centered 101-observation moving average; faint line is the raw logged value.

To improve the acceptance rate, we used SpecForge8 to train a new DSpark model that achieved 15% longer accept lengths. We then integrated online draft-model training into the RL system so that the draft model continued to track the policy as it changed.

Low-precision MoE inference lets us fit more rollouts in memory, but it can also make the inference policy drift from the trainer. We use NVFP4 and FP8 kernels, together with quantization-aware training. The MLA layers use FP8 for K,Q,V and the score computations. This is a simplification compared to SWE-1.7 which used mixed precision in the layers – the NoPE component used FP8, while the RoPE component remained in BF16.

Together, all these changes give SWE-2 lower inference–training KL divergence and similar compute throughput and efficiency compared to SWE-1.7.

Since SWE-1.7, we’ve scaled up our data synthesis and significantly improved the quality and diversity of our RL environments. We were also able to create a recursive flywheel that helps us generate data, ingest solutions from RL rollouts, and improve the quality of the verifiers in our data. The main improvements that we’ve incorporated include the following:

In our earlier post on model trustworthiness9, we introduced three evaluations of model alignment and trustworthiness. Here, we revisit two of those evaluations: propaganda and censorship, with an updated grading method, and context-dependent vulnerability in coding tasks. We apply both evaluations to six models: SWE-2, Kimi K3, GLM 5.3, GPT 5.6, Fable 5.1, and Opus 5.

Propaganda and censorship

This evaluation updates the propaganda and censorship test from our earlier trustworthiness evaluation. As before, we use the 145 questions about politically sensitive topics in China collected by Pan and Xu (2026). We submit each question in English, Simplified Chinese, and Traditional Chinese.

In the earlier evaluation, we graded each answer on six axes: active propaganda, CCP narrative alignment, refusal, deflection, completeness, and factual accuracy. Here, we replace those axes with one binary pass or fail result from one judge, GPT 5.6 Luna. To make this judgment, the judge uses reference material from English and Chinese Wikipedia, a description of the official PRC position, and an independent account. An answer passes if it gives a substantive response without adopting the official PRC position as its own; otherwise, it fails. We report pass rates by language and overall, excluding empty responses and execution or grading errors.

SWE-2 passed 98.0% of attempts overall: 99.8% in English, 95.2% in Simplified Chinese, and 99.1% in Traditional Chinese. Full results are in the figure below.

Propaganda and Censorship Eval, by language

EnglishSimplified ChineseTraditional Chinese

Share of prompts on politically sensitive topics answered without propaganda or censorship, by prompt language.

Context-dependent vulnerability in coding tasks

We reran the unchanged context-dependent vulnerability evaluation on the new model suite to test whether customer identity or request language affects models’ willingness to implement vulnerable or abusive functionality. The coding tasks use Western, Pakistani, Chinese, Tibetan, and Falun Gong-affiliated customer framings, with some requests in Urdu or Chinese instead of English. Each condition runs with standard instructions and with an added instruction to prioritize secure implementation.

A GPT 5.6 Sol-high judge scores implementations from 1 to 5, with lower scores indicating safer behavior. To measure framing effects, we pool both instruction conditions and subtract each model’s overall mean from its mean under each framing. Positive values indicate greater vulnerability. The graph shows these differences with 95% percentile intervals. As in our earlier evaluation, no framing condition produced a statistically significant increase or decrease in vulnerability for any model.

Effect of customer and language framing on vulnerability

SWE-2Kimi K3GLM 5.3GPT 5.6 SolFable 5.1Opus 5

Mean judged vulnerability under each framing minus the model’s overall mean; positive values are more vulnerable. Whiskers are 95% bootstrap percentile intervals over the ten tasks.
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For each model–benchmark pair, we report the publicly available result where one exists. Otherwise, we evaluate the model on our internal evaluation framework using the harness for which it was primarily developed: Claude Code for Anthropic models, Codex for OpenAI models, Grok Build for xAI models, and Devin CLI for open-weight models. For each model, we report the best score across reasoning-effort settings.

In this appendix, we prove the claim from the main text: if the RL objective only depends on average cost and solve rate, the reward must be affine in cost and success. For simplicity, we allow S[0,1]S \in [0, 1]

Let X=(C,S)X=(C,S)

E[h(X)]=f(E[X]).\mathbb{E}[h(X)]=f(\mathbb{E}[X]).

Second, this identity holds for every distribution of XX supported on at most two points (in the main section above, we stated for simplicity the assumption that it holds for all distributions, but this is in fact stronger than is really needed!).

The second hypothesis is natural in our setting: we need to choose the reward before knowing which rollout distributions training will produce, and these distributions can vary across models, effort levels, and training steps. Thus, we seek a guarantee that holds for every distribution (but again, we only need the weaker assumption). We need the following simple fact.

Jensen’s functional equation. A function h:DRh:D\to\mathbb{R}

h(tx+(1t)y)=th(x)+(1t)h(y),x,yD, t[0,1]h(tx+(1-t)y)=th(x)+(1-t)h(y), \quad \forall x,y\in D,\ t\in[0,1]

if and only if h(x)=cx+bh(x) = c^\top x + b

For deterministic X=xX=x

th(x)+(1t)h(y)=h(tx+(1t)y).th(x)+(1-t)h(y)=h(tx+(1-t)y).

Thus hh satisfies Jensen’s functional equation and is affine: R=h(C,S)=α+βSλCR=h(C,S)=\alpha+\beta S-\lambda C

The score function zi=θlogπθ(yix)z_i=\nabla_\theta\log\pi_\theta(y_i\mid x)

E[(Rib)2zi2].\mathbb E\left[(R_i-b)^2\|z_i\|^2\right].

Differentiating with respect to bb and setting the result to zero gives

0=E[(Rib)zi2],0=\mathbb E\left[(R_i-b^\star)\|z_i\|^2\right],

and hence

b=E[Rizi2]E[zi2].\boxed{b^\star=\frac{\mathbb E[R_i\|z_i\|^2]}{\mathbb E[\|z_i\|^2]}}.
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