As previously disclosed by The Insider, at the time of his poisoning Gebrev was seen as a consequential supplier of ammunition to the Ukraine Army, then reconstituting itself following Russia’s seizure of Crimea and orchestration of a plausibly deniable “separatist” insurgency in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Gebrev says that shortly before being poisoned he stopped supplying Ukraine with ammunition in voluntary compliance with the Minsk Accords, two serially violated ceasefire agreements signed in September 2014 and February 2015 by Ukraine, Russia, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Two sources active in weapons procurement in Ukraine at the time told The Insider that immediately after Gebrev’s poisoning, Šapošnikov offered Ukrainian government buyers “a reliable replacement” for the Bulgarian arms merchant. In the event, Kyiv never purchased from the supplier suggested by Šapošnikov due to the deficient quality of his inventory.
The Saboteurs
Czech police investigators now disclose that Elena, the senior illegal in the husband-and-wife team, communicated with Averyanov via his Gmail account, offering critical intelligence about pending weapons sale contracts involving Imex Group. The Šapošnikovs’ cultivation of Gebrev paid off. Their company began trading frequently with EMCO, which produced and repaired everything from Soviet-era artillery to armored vehicles across a host of plants in Bulgaria, often for export to Georgia and Ukraine. EMCO also refurbished dated Czech-made ammunition, including rounds subsequently purchased by Imex Group, corporate records show.
Averyanov’s interest in Imex Group’s partners across NATO was obvious. Any sales deemed contrary to Russia’s interest would be ideal targets for Unit 29155, which could target the weapons and ammunition, if not try to kill the brokers responsible for selling them to enemy states or non-state actors, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a collection of Western-backed rebel groups opposed to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The Czechs allege that Imex Group was involved in deals with European counterparts that resold mines, assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-tank missiles. One Slovakian company, Kelson, sought to acquire these wares through intermediary companies, all with the intent to resell them to the Saudi Ministry of Defense. The FSA, the Czechs conclude, were “probably” the ultimate recipient. (Saudi Arabia did indeed purchase weapons in Croatia that wound up in FSA custody, as the New York Times reported in 2013.)
As a senior GRU commander overseeing a strictly kinetic unit within the service, Averyanov would have been ordered by Moscow to interdict covert weapons shipments intended for Syria’s mainstream insurgents, who, prior to Russia’s direct military intervention in the country’s civil war in 2015, were perilously close to unhorsing one of Russia’s most valued client regimes in the Middle East. The CIA and Turkish intelligence backed dozens of FSA formations battling Assad’s army and Iranian-backed militias until the rise of hardline jihadists, particularly as the Islamic State, transformed NATO’s approach to Syria as a counterterrorist mission.
On July 24, 2013, Averyanov wrote to Šapošniková that “very, very much we need a complete list…” of sought-after platforms. She later forwarded the GRU general attached PDF files titled “Aircraft_FSA.pdf,” “Ammunition_FSA.pdf,” and “Weapons_FSA.pdf,” all of which Pavel Šapošnikov sent her on August 3.
The GRU was therefore “informed about the planned trade from beginning to end,” the Czech investigators conclude. “These goods were stored exclusively in Vrbětice in warehouses No. 16 and 12. As a result of the subsequent explosions, the goods were not delivered and were completely destroyed.”
The Šapošnikovs — likely aided by Petr Bernatik Jr., the executive director of Imex and the son of its founder — provided physical access to these warehouses. They may have also conspired to help the GRU commit an act of piracy or maritime terrorism.
The first case of Unit 29155 sabotaging a military consignment may have involved disappearing a ship carrying pontoon bridge parts and Ukrainian-made KrAZ trucks destined for Vietnam. The “INA,” a Ukrainian ship, disappeared in 2013 sometime after passing through the Suez Canal and switching off its transponder. According to Czech investigators, Elena and Averyanov “communicated about this order,” which set sail from the Bulgarian port of Varna on December 17, 2013, where the Šapošnikovs had arrived personally to oversee the departure. People familiar with the transaction told The Insider that this shipment would have interfered with a direct sale to Vietnam by a Russian arms export company, and the ship’s disappearance may have been aimed at sabotaging this competing supplier.
Almost a year later, on October 16, 2014, the first warehouse in Vrbětice went up in flames.
Czech investigators are clear that this was the handiwork of Unit 29155. On September 26 of that year, Averyanov, using his Gmail account, messaged Šapošnikova: “Hello Elena, I am sending a request to visit the warehouses…”
The subsequent digital exchange between the GRU handler and his Czech agent consisted of pleasantries and business. Šapošnikova wished “Andrusha,” the diminutive for Andrey, a happy birthday on September 29, and the two made plans to meet in person in Portugal the following month. Evidence shows Averyanov and Nikolay, along with Elena and their daughter Valeria, did in fact meet in Lisbon on October 3.
A week later, the Šapošnikovs were back in Czechia, where Nikolai met with Petr Bernatík Jr., the son of the Imex Group’s founder and “a key player in its operations,” according to investigators. Averyanov then sent a blank email to Bernatik Jr.’s corporate Imex address. The message contained an attachment of Photoshopped passport scans for two men: “Ruslan Khalimovich Tabarov” and “Nicolai Popa.” These were fake identities of Mishkin and Chepiga, the Unit 29155 operatives who would go on to poison the Skripals in Salisbury.