我在 Google 应用广告上花费了 220 美元,其中 60% 的安装量来自机器人。
I spent $220 on Google app ads and 60% of the installs were robots

原始链接: https://dayzlegame.com/blog/google-ads-bot-farm/

益智应用《Dayzle》的开发者近期发现,其旨在提升安装量的谷歌广告(Google Ads)活动遭到了刷量工作室的攻击。在取消了每次安装成本(CPI)上限后,该活动的每日支出翻了一倍,但数据分析显示,绝大多数“安装”均为虚假流量。 这些机器人通过侧载(sideloading)过时的应用版本,在完全绕过 Play 商店的情况下触发了谷歌的转化跟踪。这些设备表现出高度统一且不自然的规律——仅短暂打开应用后便不再使用。这形成了一个反馈循环,导致谷歌的算法误将机器人工作室判定为高性能的广告来源。 在计费的 56 次安装中,仅有 13 次是真实玩家。为此,开发者将广告活动的转化目标从“打开应用”调整为“完成拼图”,从而提高了机器人模拟人类行为的技术门槛。这是一个警示:虽然谷歌的安装指标在技术上是准确的,但极易受到欺诈行为的影响。开发者不应仅关注基础的转化数量,还需审计流量来源,因为刷量工作室会专门瞄准小型广告预算,以利用自动化优化算法进行牟利。

Hacker News 上近期的一项讨论突显了开发者们面临的长期困扰:谷歌广告平台深受机器人流量的困扰。一位用户报告称,在其 220 美元的广告支出中,有 60% 产生了虚假安装。 评论者普遍认为这是一个系统性问题。许多人指出,谷歌实际上助长了这种行为,因为它无论流量质量如何都能收取广告费。此外,开发者还陷入了一个讽刺的循环:他们购买广告,结果引来了机器人流量,最后却因为收到这些“无效流量”而被谷歌 AdMob 团队封号。 讨论中出现了几个反复出现的主题: * **“黑箱”问题**:用户认为谷歌的广告控制台故意设置得不透明,迫使广告商只能依靠反复试验,而该平台优先考虑的是快速消耗预算,而非转化质量。 * **经济效率低下**:许多人认为在线广告已成为一种“税”而非增长引擎,大部分支出最终变成了广告巨头的经济租金,而非触达真实客户。 * **“机器人”激励机制**:机器人农场通过提供“广告位”(通常是通过低质量网站或应用)并利用机器人模拟互动来牟利。这使得农场所有者能从谷歌获得收益,而广告主却损失了投资。
相关文章

原文

I run a small puzzle app called Dayzle. I’m a numbers guy, so a marketing optimization problem is right up my alley. Two weeks ago I turned on a Google Ads campaign for Android at CA$40 a day, with the goal set to installs.

For the first few days it barely spent anything. I had a target cost per install of $1.50, and Google couldn’t find installs at that price. So, as a test, I removed the target. It immediately spent double my daily budget, CA$80, and reported 21 installs. I was excited. Then I checked my admin panel, which said 1. Turns out I didn’t need to be a numbers guy to see something didn’t add up.

The panel had missed them because old versions of the app don’t report an install date. When I went into the raw analytics there were 21 new Android devices that day, and 20 of them were running an old version of the app that the Play Store had stopped serving days earlier. You can’t get an old version from Play, so these phones got the app from somewhere else, even though every one of them said Google Play was the installer. Each opened the app once, spent zero seconds on any screen, and never came back. Twenty-eight phone models across nineteen states, which is a lot of variety for twenty phones that all did exactly the same thing.

Over the whole two weeks: 56 installs billed, 33 with that pattern, 7 more from countries the campaign wasn’t targeting, and 13 people. The 13 people finished 92 games between them, which is a nice signal that real people enjoyed what we’ve built.

The 33 weren’t behaving like people, so I suspected a bot farm, and the analytics export bears it out. Google optimizes for whatever goal you give it, and my goal was installs. This farm would watch the shortest video in my ad group, not click it, and then install our app from a saved copy of the file instead of from the store, because that’s faster and Play might notice. Google counts a view followed by an install as a conversion, so the irony is that the more the farm “installed” our app, the better it looked to Google’s algorithm, which sent more of my ads to the farm, which installed it more. A loop that guaranteed my ad spend was wasted.

Where I am now: waiting on Google’s answer to the invalid-traffic form, and the campaign’s goal is now “won a puzzle” instead of “opened the app”. It’s low effort to make a script open an app and click around; it’s higher effort to make one solve a Sudoku. The idea is just to make us more expensive to farm than the next app. That’s probably decent protection for an app my size. Larger apps are worth the extra effort, and I’d guess they see a lot more of this than they know. I’ll report back on the refund.

So I guess this is my PSA: if you’re relying on Google’s install count for your ads, it’s a real number, but it’s definitely worth digging into. If a bot farm can find my tiny ad budget, it can definitely find yours.

联系我们 contact @ memedata.com