法院认同 EFF 的观点:犹他州的 VPN 法律要求实现技术上不可能的事情
Court agrees with EFF: Utah's VPN law demands a technical impossibility

原始链接: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/10/court-agrees-eff-utahs-vpn-law-demands-technical-impossibility

联邦法官初步阻止了犹他州执行SB 73法案。该法案要求成人网站屏蔽VPN用户,或确定用户的确切物理位置。巴洛法官裁定,该法律可能对犹他州境外的企业和用户造成宪法所禁止的负担,并要求网站在地理定位方面实现技术上不可能达到的完美精确度。 VPN通过中间服务器路由流量来隐藏用户的位置,因此网站无法可靠区分连接来自犹他州还是其他地区。法院指出,经营多个大型成人内容平台的Aylo否则可能因核实全国数百万名用户的位置而承担责任。 电子前哨基金会(EFF)认为,犹他州拟议中要求识别“地理定位混淆”的规则会助长侵入性监控,产生不可靠的结果,并对隐私和安全造成不成比例的伤害。禁令在法院进一步采取行动前保留了与VPN有关的条款,但未涉及该法律中禁止提供绕过VPN说明的规定。EFF将继续反对其他州采取类似的反VPN措施。

一家法院认同美国电子前哨基金会(EFF)的观点,认为犹他州的 VPN 法律实际上几乎无法遵守。平台必须将 VPN 流量与普通网络连接区分开来,但无论是代理服务器、共享主机、流量分流、CGNAT,还是用户通过另一个家庭的线路转发流量,都可能导致这种判断不可靠。 封锁被认定为 VPN 的流量,会误伤许多用户,但 determined 用户仍可规避;与此同时,合法流量也可能被错误封锁。另一种选择则是直接停止向犹他州提供服务。 评论区有人提出,可以通过流量指纹、流量模式分析和用户申诉来改善执法,但这些方法都无法保证准确识别。在某些网络配置下,平台还只能看到连接中的一部分流量。 更广泛的讨论质疑“互联网总会绕过审查”这一说法。中国和伊朗表明,受到严格控制的网络可以严重限制访问,甚至完全切断访问。犹他州可以实行极其严格的 ISP 白名单制度,或拦截所有流量,但评论者认为这些措施负担极重,而且不太可能真正实施。总体而言,这场讨论凸显了审查制度与互联网技术架构之间的根本矛盾。
相关文章

原文

When state lawmakers attempt to rewrite how the internet works, users rely on courts to recognize that laws can’t make technical impossibilities a reality. That’s why we were happy to see that a court has blocked Utah’s attempt to outlaw the privacy protections of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). 

In a win for digital rights, a federal judge has issued a preliminary injunction blocking Utah’s SB 73, the state’s draconian anti-VPN age verification law. The decision comes as EFF submitted our comments to the Utah Department of Commerce, detailing how forcing platforms to detect and block privacy-preserving tools undermines user privacy and security worldwide while demanding the impossible.  

What SB 73 Does 

Signed into law earlier this year, SB 73 attempted to regulate adult websites by requiring them to block VPN users or to identify the physical location of visitors using them or similar tools that mask their network traffic. It even went so far as to prohibit websites from offering instructions on how to use a VPN to bypass these checks. This made Utah, to EFF’s knowledge, the first state in the nation to target the use of VPNs to avoid legally mandated age-verification gates. 

The Utah federal court halted enforcement of the law's VPN provisions last week, ruling that the law likely violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on passing laws that significantly burden businesses and people outside Utah’s borders.  

SB 73 burdens the rights of all internet users outside of Utah because it requires adult websites to either know every visiting user’s physical location, and then block those in Utah, or to verify every visitor’s age just in case they might be in Utah. The law’s “actual-location provision in practice requires an entity to perform age verification services for every user visiting its site from any location because the entity would violate the law if even one of those users happened to be obfuscating,” the court wrote. The court essentially ruled that Utah has less-burdensome ways to prevent Utah minors from accessing adult websites than requiring all users in the world to comply with SB 73. 

Aylo’s lawsuit does not challenge SB 73’s provision prohibiting the websites covered by the law from sharing information about VPNs. 

The Legal Challenge 

This court order follows months of legal maneuvering.  

Initially set to go into effect in May 2026, SB 73 sparked an immediate constitutional challenge from Aylo, the parent company of major online adult platforms like Pornhub. In response to the lawsuit, Utah and Aylo initially agreed that the state would pause enforcement while the court considered the preliminary injunction request or until administrative rules setting specific compliance terms were finalized. Those proposed compliance rules (R152-78B, see Utah State Bulletin, page 6) were published by the Utah Department of Commerce’s Division of Consumer Protection on September 1st, and EFF submitted formal comments to the Department in opposition. According to the notice, the proposed rules could be effective as soon as October 8, 2026. However, Judge Barlow’s decision means that it cannot be enforced pending further action by the court. 

The Ruling 

EFF welcomes Judge Barlow’s ruling, which recognizes the fundamental disconnect between state legislation of the internet and how technology works. In his ruling, Judge Barlow noted that the statute requires a technical impossibility on pain of legal liability. “Aylo is correct that the statute, as amended, now essentially imposes strict liability for entities like it when it comes to determining the location of its websites’ users.” 

The court recognized that the problem is that SB 73 “requires entities like Aylo to geolocate its website users with perfection to avoid liability.” But, at the same time, the court acknowledged “that geolocation perfection is not presently possible.” 

EFF explained this technical impossibility in our comment to the Department of Commerce. VPNs protect user privacy by routing web traffic through intermediary servers. Because destination websites only see the IP address of the VPN server, they have no reliable mechanism to tell whether a connection originates from Salt Lake City, Seattle, or Shanghai. So, under Utah's current statutory framework, platforms are left with an impossible choice: completely block all VPN traffic nationwide or withdraw access from Utah entirely. Judge Barlow agreed, asserting:  

Because the law requires perfection in the absence of perfect geolocation tools, Aylo would need to verify those 28 million users—whether located in Salt Lake City, Boston, New Orleans, Anchorage, or Honolulu—to ensure compliance and avoid liability.

The Rulemaking 

The administrative rules drafted by the state compelled commercial entities to implement "commercially reasonable geolocation obfuscation detection systems", which is a directive, we argue, that demands a technical impossibility.  

In our submission to the Utah Department of Commerce, EFF also detailed how these rules force an invasive data collection regime onto internet users everywhere. So, in response to internet users trying to avoid invasive data collection required by age-verification requirements, SB 73 requires even greater surveillance of internet users’ online activities. The Department’s suggested detection heuristics (like monitoring connection latency or device time zones) are notoriously unreliable and easily skewed by normal network conditions. This active surveillance inevitably leads to widespread misclassification, unwarranted access blocks, and severe impacts on users’ privacy far beyond Utah's borders.  

You can read EFF’s full comments to the Department of Commerce here. 

What Now? 

As we’ve said time and time again: the internet will always route around censorship. 

Mandating invasive tracking and punishing the use of essential security tools turns genuine privacy concerns into mere compliance theater and requires more state-mandated surveillance of internet users who rely on VPNs. As is the case in heavily censored regions, VPN services and obfuscation tools will simply adapt, making this framework fundamentally unsustainable.  

As we’ve said time and time again: the internet will always route around censorship. 

While Utah legislators have indicated they may attempt to revise the law during the next legislative session, the court's preliminary injunction sets an important precedent: state lawmakers should not weaponize age verification to force dragnet tracking or undermine essential security tools.  

As other states consider similar anti-VPN proposals, EFF will continue pushing back against these technically impossible mandates and defending users’ privacy and anonymity. Thus, we urge legislators and regulators to reject anti-privacy rules, prioritize real user security, and safeguard constitutional protections for all users. 

联系我们 contact @ memedata.com