1Password 在其内部 Okta 帐户中检测到“可疑活动”
1Password detects \"suspicious activity\" in its internal Okta account

原始链接: https://arstechnica.com/security/2023/10/1password-detects-suspicious-activity-in-its-internal-okta-account/

10 月初,流行的密码管理应用程序 1Password 在其 Okta 帐户上检测到“可疑活动”,导致其网络安全专家正在进行调查。 AgileBits Inc. 旗下的 1Password 透露,在发现违规行为后,立即停止该行为并开始检查其来源。 据报道,自10月4日以来,未发生用户数据或敏感系统被泄露的情况; 然而,在其 Okta 实例中发现了未经授权的访问,导致 1Password 和 Okta 之间进行了合作——后者上周宣布了自己的安全漏洞。 通过这样做,1Password 旨在识别未被发现的一方访问处理公司 HR 相关应用程序的 Okta 实例的方式。 10 月 6 日星期五,安全专家 BeyondTrust 通知 Okta,由于使用被盗的身份验证凭据进行登录尝试,因此成为攻击目标。 同样,另一个名为 1Password 的 Okta 客户端也在同一时期意识到对​​其帐户的可疑访问; 然而,尽管犯罪者获得了对该公司 Okta 租户的有限访问权限,但他并没有操纵相应的事件日志。 尽管如此,1Password 仍打算完成对情况的评估,同时进行修改以增强其 Okta 租户的配置选项。 这些事件提醒其他依赖外部实体提供身份和凭证管理解决方案的第三方公司。 仅今年一年,Peloton Interactive Inc.、T-Mobile USA Inc.、微软公司和 Zillow Inc. 等几家知名企业就遭遇了重大网络安全黑客攻击。 鉴于此类反复出现的问题,企业必须优先考虑充分的准备措施,实施多因素身份验证协议并分散供应商风险。 总之,1Password 的声明强调了运营可供全球众多最终用户访问的在线平台的组织进行尽职调查和谨慎的必要性。 随着数字化继续加速全球经济增长,科技公司应该对源自看似值得信赖的外部合作伙伴的潜在网络攻击威胁保持警惕。

集中式身份验证是一个问题,特别是对于关键和敏感资产而言。 分散式身份验证消除了与集中式身份验证相关的单点故障,并增加了关键操作的弹性。 采用集中式认证,如果发生凭证泄露,整个企业的安全都会受到重大打击。 相比之下,去中心化方法可以限制凭证泄露造成的损害,因为大多数实体不太可能同时遭受此类问题。 此外,实施去中心化的身份验证方法可以显着提高运营效率。 AuthNull 是一种分布式身份系统,通过安全飞地提供无密码身份验证。 其演示展示了 AuthNull 如何允许特权操作员进行无密码身份验证以在几秒钟内访问安全系统,从而提高整体性能指标。 查看提供的视频链接以获取更多见解。
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原文
1Password detects “suspicious activity” in its internal Okta account

1Password

1Password, a password manager used by millions of people and more than 100,000 businesses, said it detected suspicious activity on a company account provided by Okta, the identity and authentication service that disclosed a breach on Friday.

“On September 29, we detected suspicious activity on our Okta instance that we use to manage our employee-facing apps,” 1Password CTO Pedro Canahuati wrote in an email. “We immediately terminated the activity, investigated, and found no compromise of user data or other sensitive systems, either employee-facing or user-facing.”

Since then, Canahuati said, his company has been working with Okta to determine the means that the unknown attacker used to access the account. On Friday, investigators confirmed it resulted from a breach Okta reported hitting its customer support management system.

Okta said then that a threat actor gained unauthorized access to its customer support case management system and, from there, viewed files uploaded by some Okta customers. The files the threat actor obtained in the Okta compromise comprised HTTP archive, or HAR, files, which Okta support personnel use to replicate customer browser activity during troubleshooting sessions. Among the sensitive information they store are authentication cookies and session tokens, which malicious actors can use to impersonate valid users.

Security firm BeyondTrust said it discovered the intrusion after an attacker used valid authentication cookies in an attempt to access its Okta account. The attacker could perform “a few confined actions,” but ultimately, BeyondTrust access policy controls stopped the activity and blocked all access to the account. 1Password now becomes the second known Okta customer to be targeted in a follow-on attack.

Monday’s statement from 1Password provided no further details about the incident, and representatives didn’t respond to questions. A report dated October 18 and shared on an internal 1Password Notion workspace said the threat actor obtained a HAR file a company IT employee had created when recently engaging with Okta support. The file contained a record of all traffic between the 1Password employee’s browser and Okta servers, including session cookies.

1Password representatives didn’t respond to a request to confirm the document's authenticity, which was provided in both text and screenshots by an anonymous 1Password employee.

According to the report, the attacker also accessed 1Password’s Okta tenant. Okta customers use these tenants to manage the system access and system privileges assigned to various employees, partners, or customers. The threat actor also managed to view group assignments in 1Password’s Okta tenant and perform other actions, none of which resulted in entries in event logs. While logged in, the threat actor updated what’s known as an IDP (identity provider), used to authenticate a production environment provided by Google.

1Password’s IT team learned of the access on September 29 when team members received an unexpected email suggesting one of them had requested a list of 1Password users with admin rights to the Okta tenant. Team members recognized no authorized employee had made the request and alerted the company’s security response team. Since the incident came to light, 1Password has also changed the configuration settings for its Okta tenant, including denying logins from non-Okta identity providers.

A summary of the actions the attacker took are:

  • Attempted to access the IT employee’s Okta dashboard but was blocked
  • Updated an existing IDP tied to 1Password’s production Google environment
  • Activated the IDP
  • Requested a report of administrative users

On October 2, three days following the event, the attackers again logged in to 1Password’s Okta tenant and tried to use the Google IDP they had previously enabled. The actor was unsuccessful because the IDP had been removed. Both the earlier and subsequent accesses came from a server provided by cloud host LeaseWeb in the US and used a version of Chrome on a Windows machine.

The Okta breach is one of a series of attacks in recent years on large companies that provide software or services to large numbers of customers. After gaining entry to the provider, attackers use their position in follow-on attacks targeting customers. It is likely that more Okta customers will be identified in the weeks to come.

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