2026年现代AI代理对机器人检测系统的基准测试
Benchmarking Bot Detection Systems Against Modern AI Agents in 2026

原始链接: https://research.poh.org/bot-benchmarking-2026/

在初次基准测试一年后,研究人员重新测试了五种机器人检测系统——Proof of Human、Google reCAPTCHA v3、hCaptcha、Cloudflare Turnstile 和 Cloudflare Bot Management——与五类对手的对抗情况,对手范围从脚本化 Chromium 浏览器到隐身浏览器和 AI 驱动的代理(Browser Use、Perplexity Comet、Grok)。每个对手都尝试完成 20 次五题问卷。聚合检测率差异很大:Proof of Human 为 99%,reCAPTCHA v3 为 69.4%,hCaptcha 为 44.3%,Turnstile 为 42.1%,Cloudflare Bot Management 为 9.1%。脚本化浏览器大多被 hCaptcha 和 Turnstile 捕获,但 AI 代理绕过了它们并能解决图像挑战。reCAPTCHA v3 检测到了大多数代理,但在隐身的 CloakBrowser 前失败,其指纹/IP 组合避开了检测。Cloudflare Bot Management 总体只捕获了少量会话。研究结果表明,针对使用真实浏览器的 AI 代理,传统自动化信号和交互式挑战正在减弱,而会话全程的行为信号对于区分人类与自动化正变得越来越关键。

一篇 Hacker News 讨论链接到一份 2026 年针对现代 AI 智能体的机器人检测系统基准测试。评论者指出,Anubis、SafeLine 和 Sibuna 等开源/自托管工具被遗漏,并要求开源基准测试代码。其他人认为零售场景的机器人检测无效,而辩护者表示这些系统主要旨在减缓或提高重复滥用的成本,而不是捕获所有机器人。多位评论者强调误报:验证码和封禁会挫败真实用户,而更新的系统可能把新账户当作机器人。一名评论者批评该基准测试只测量自动化会话检测,而不评估误报,因此容易被操纵。另一名评论者询问测试是否使用了带有 Cloudflare Bot Management 的第三方网站。另一段轶事称,10,000 个网站中有超过 1,200 个拒绝 robots.txt 爬虫访问。还出现了一条 YC 申请广告。
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原文

A year ago, we evaluated five leading bot detection systems (Proof of Human, Google reCAPTCHA v3, hCaptcha, Fingerprint Pro, and Cloudflare Turnstile) against automated browsers programmed to complete a set of predefined tasks. Detection rates varied substantially, ranging from 33% to 87%. Systems that incorporated behavioral signals alongside device-level signals generally outperformed those relying on device information alone.

Since then, browser automation has advanced considerably. Modern AI agents can interpret webpages, plan actions, and interact with interfaces through increasingly capable browser environments. We therefore revisited our benchmark with an expanded set of adversaries, including conventional browser automation, stealth browsers, and AI-powered browsing agents, and tested a similar set of detection systems: Proof of Human, Google reCAPTCHA v3, hCaptcha, Cloudflare Turnstile, and Cloudflare Bot Management. The results reveal similarly wide variation in detection performance.

In this post, we examine how each system performed, where it failed, and what these results suggest about the challenges of distinguishing humans from increasingly capable AI agents.

Methodology

Our task used a five-question survey combining multiple-choice items with open-ended responses. Each of the five adversaries (i.e., AI agents) attempted the survey 20 times, yielding up to 100 sessions per detection system. Some detection systems failed or crashed before session completion, leaving between 89 and 100 evaluable sessions for each system.

The table below summarizes the detection systems included in the benchmark and the signals each uses to identify automated activity.

Detection system Description
Proof of Human Uses a machine-learning model to classify sessions as human or automated based on both behavioral and device signals, including typing, mouse movements, clicks, and scrolling.
Google reCAPTCHA v3 Assigns each session a score from 0 to 1 indicating the likelihood that the user is human. It operates without a visible challenge and considers browser-integrity and Google-side reputation signals; the site determines the threshold for accepting a session.
hCaptcha Presents an “I am human” checkbox and evaluates the browser's risk profile. Depending on the result, it either verifies the session immediately or presents an image-based challenge that must be completed.
Cloudflare Turnstile Performs browser-integrity checks in the background and issues a verification token when a session passes. It generally operates without a puzzle but may request user interaction when signals are ambiguous.
Cloudflare Bot Management Evaluates requests using heuristics and machine-learning models trained on traffic across Cloudflare's network. Although the full system assigns scores from 1 (automated) to 99 (human), the Pro-tier implementation returns broader classifications such as likely_human, likely_automated, automated, or verified_bot.

Our set of adversaries covers increasingly sophisticated forms of automation: conventional scripted browsers, stealth browsers designed to conceal automation signals, and AI agents capable of navigating webpages and completing tasks autonomously.

Uses
Adversary Description
Chromium A standard Chromium browser automated through Playwright and the Chrome DevTools Protocol, without stealth modifications. It retains common indicators of automation, such as navigator.webdriver and CDP-related artifacts, and serves as the baseline “obvious bot.”
CloakBrowser A stealth-focused Chromium fork that modifies browser fingerprints, including GPU, canvas, WebGL, audio, fonts, user-agent, and TLS signals, at the source-code level. We ran it through a residential proxy with its optional humanization features for mouse and keyboard input enabled.
Browser Use An open-source AI-agent framework that uses an LLM (Claude Opus in our setup) and visual page information to plan actions and operate an unmodified browser from cloud infrastructure.
Perplexity CometPerplexity's AI-powered browser, which uses an LLM and visual information to navigate webpages and complete tasks.
Grok xAI's browser-use agent, which uses an LLM and visual information to navigate and complete web tasks.

Results

We found that detection performance varied substantially across systems. Aggregated across all adversaries, Proof of Human identified 99% of automated sessions, followed by reCAPTCHA v3 at 69.4%, hCaptcha at 44.3%, Cloudflare Turnstile at 42.1%, and Cloudflare Bot Management at 9.1%.

Bot benchmarking results
Figure 1: Bot benchmarking results. Each bar shows the percentage of automated sessions identified by the given detection system, aggregated across all five adversaries.

Performance differed considerably by adversary. The clearest split was between scripted browsers and AI agents. hCaptcha and Cloudflare Turnstile caught nearly every scripted Chromium and CloakBrowser session but few of the AI-agent sessions. reCAPTCHA v3 showed the opposite pattern, identifying most agent sessions but none from CloakBrowser. Cloudflare Bot Management caught few sessions from any adversary, while Proof of Human detected at least 95% of sessions overall.

Detection rates by detection system and adversary
Figure 2: Percentage of sessions identified as automated for each combination of detection system and adversary. Green cells indicate adversaries that were caught; red cells indicate adversaries that fooled the detection system.

As most detection systems are black-box, we cannot directly determine which signals produced each result. However, the systems' observed behavior, together with publicly available documentation, suggests several likely sources for this failure:

  • reCAPTCHA v3 detected most sessions from standard Chromium and the cloud-hosted agents but did not detect CloakBrowser. CloakBrowser was the only adversary that combined a source-level modified browser fingerprint with a residential IP address. Our results cannot determine whether its browser fingerprint, residential IP, or a combination of the two was primarily responsible for its success.
  • hCaptcha gave challenges to both Chromium and CloakBrowser, neither of which could reliably complete the image-based task. By contrast, the three vision-capable agents—Browser Use, Grok, and Perplexity Comet—were generally able to interpret and solve the image grid, allowing most of their sessions to pass.
  • Cloudflare Turnstile detected both scripted-browser adversaries: Chromium and CloakBrowser failed to receive verification tokens, even after the full 30-second waiting period. However, it did not detect any of the three AI agents, and did not even issue challenges during these sessions.
  • Cloudflare Bot Management detected relatively few sessions overall. This pattern is consistent with the stealth browser and cloud agents presenting clean browser-level signals, although the higher detection rate for Grok may reflect infrastructure-level signals Cloudflare uses, such as IP or TLS reputation.

Limitations

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting these results:

  • Some systems crashed or failed before completion, resulting in slightly different sample sizes across conditions.
  • We evaluated the product tiers available to us rather than enterprise versions, which may incorporate additional signals or more advanced detection capabilities.
  • We measured detection rates for automated sessions but did not evaluate false-positive rates among human respondents.
  • Some systems, including reCAPTCHA, may become better calibrated as they observe more traffic and establish a reputation for a website. Detection rates could therefore differ in a longer-running deployment.

Conclusion

Our results suggest that bot detection is entering a new phase. Traditional automation signals remain effective against scripted browsers, but they are less reliable against AI agents that genuine browser environments intelligently. Interactive challenges may offer limited protection when vision-capable agents can interpret and complete them. And as browser-level indicators become easier to avoid, the way a user behaves throughout a session becomes increasingly important for distinguishing human activity from automation.

Future benchmarks should test larger volumes of traffic, include human participants to measure false-positive rates, and evaluate more complex tasks and emerging agents. At Proof of Human, we will continue tracking these changes and developing methods in this evolving threat landscape. To test Proof of Human on your own application, visit poh.org.

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