NIH 向记者提供功能获得性虚假信息:文件
NIH Was Feeding Gain-Of-Function Disinfo To Journalists: Documents

原始链接: https://www.zerohedge.com/medical/nih-was-feeding-gain-function-disinfo-journalists-documents

能源和商业委员会的调查人员披露了一份长达 73 页的报告,指责美国国立卫生研究院 (NIH) 官员在涉及猴痘和功能获得技术的危险病毒研究方面误导国会和记者。 此前的报道揭露了 NIH 主任 Anthony Fauci 博士关于他在《自然医学》论文中所扮演的角色的欺骗性言论,淡化了 Covid-19 大流行源自他资助的武汉一家中国实验室的可能性。 这项调查的最初触发因素是 2022 年 9 月《科学》杂志上的一篇文章,该文章讨论了猴痘在全球范围内不断蔓延所带来的危险及其对人类的潜在适应。 对伯纳德·莫斯(Bernard Moss)等研究人员的采访表明,这种疾病的进化枝 1 变异被认为是更致命的,目前正在通过有争议的“功能获得”技术使用小鼠进行研究。 俄亥俄州立大学的克劳德·普尔哈克 (Claude Puelhac) 表示担心,限制性法规可能会限制理解和应对新的和不断演变的病毒的进展。 然而,当 NIH 研究员伯纳德·莫斯 (Bernard Moss) 声称他的工作将仅关注危害较小的 Clade 2a 时,却出现了相反的信息,他反而推进了操纵危险的 Clade 2b 形式的计划。 尽管早些时候否认,但内部信件和政府记录显示,莫斯确实早在 2015 年就申请并获得了进行潜在危险研究的许可。此外,莫斯的团队试图将致命的进化枝 1 菌株的基因引入进化枝 2 样本,从而提高了 出于安全考虑而发出警报。 尽管包括众议院共和党在内的多党指责 NIH 和莫斯不诚实,但最近的事态发展表明,对他们的指控可能有道理。 美国卫生与公众服务部 (HHS) 的大量文件证实,莫斯七年前就正式请求并获得批准进行这项有争议的研究。 截至今天,莫斯的实验仍在进行中,尚未接受公众监督。 针对这些发现,美国国立卫生研究院继续坚持要求他们在进行研究时严格遵守安全处理和遏制传染源的指南和协议。 他们坚持认为,如此严格的程序

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原文

Authored by Paul D. Thacker via The Disinformation Chronicle,

House investigators on the Energy and Commerce Committee released a 73-page report yesterday documenting NIH officials lying about dangerous gain-of-function virus research to reporters and withholding information from Congress. These latest revelations follow reporting last week that Tony Fauci lied to the New York Times about his involvement in a Nature Medicine piece that advanced the theory that the pandemic could not have started in a lab Fauci himself was funding in Wuhan, China.

The House began the investigation following a September 2022 article in Science Magazine that reported on the dangers of monkeypox virus, spreading across the globe with the potential to adapt to humans and become more transmissible or deadly. Bernard Moss, a veteran poxvirus researcher at the NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), told Science Magazine that monkeypox evolves to replicate faster in humans.

Science noted that Moss had begun gain-of-function experiments—swapping out genes from various variants—to understand why some are more dangerous or transmissible than others.

Moss has been trying for years to figure out the crucial difference between two variants of monkeypox virus: clade 2, which until recently was found only in West Africa and is now causing the global outbreak, and clade 1, believed to be much deadlier, which has caused outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of Congo for many decades. He’s found that clade 1 virus can kill a mouse at levels 1000 times lower than those needed with clade 2. To find out why, Moss and his colleagues swapped dozens of clade 2 genes, one at a time, into clade 1 virus, hoping to see it become less deadly, but with no luck so far. Now, they are planning to try the opposite, endowing clade 2 virus with genes from its deadlier relative.

Moss’s disclosure that he planned to insert genes from the more deadly clade 1 monkeypox strain into the more common and transmissible clade 2 monkeypox virus triggered a second story in Science Magazine with scientists expressing alarm at the study’s dangers.

On the other hand, Ohio State University researcher Linda Saif told Science Magazine’s Jocelyn Kaiser that she was worried that excessive regulation could “greatly impede research into evolving or emerging viruses” and drive research overseas, where U.S. regulations don’t apply or are looser. Oddly enough, I previously reported that Saif helped orchestrate a February 2020 essay ghostwritten by Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology that called the possibility of a Wuhan lab accident a “conspiracy.”

Based on a statement from Moss’s NIAID, Science Magazine’s Kaiser later updated her article to claim that Moss’s research would only involve clade 2a, not clade 2b monkeypox virus.

Eight months later, STAT News reporter Helen Branswell wrote that Republicans were “targeting” NIAID researcher Bernie Moss and alleged he had never proposed to move forward with the dangerous virus studies.

But a spokesperson for NIAID told STAT in late May that there had been no formal proposal from Moss to do the research and the institution had no plan to proceed with the study.

Branswell then posted on X that “House Republicans want to interrogate poxvirus scientist Bernie Moss—who has been at NIH for 57 years—for work he did not do.”

The reports by Science Magazine’s Kaiser and STAT’s Branswell are both false.

In their report, House investigators document that—weeks after NIAID claimed to Science Magazine’s Kaiser that Moss’s planned monkeypox research involved clade 2a, not clade 2b monkeypox—Moss posted a preprint reporting he already started research with clade 2a and planned research with clade 2b.

“We have started to investigate the genetic determinants responsible for virulence differences of clade I and IIa viruses and plan to extend this to clade IIb pending institutional approval,” Moss and co-authors wrote in a preprint.

House investigators document several other examples of NIH lying about the nature of Moss’s research and withholding documents demanded for over a year. After investigators threatened a subpoeana, NIH relented and admitted in March that Moss had submitted a formal proposal to insert genes from the more deadly clade 1 monkeypox strain into the more common and transmissible clade 2 monkeypox virus (MPXV).

And the NIH’s Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) approved Moss’s research plan to conduct these dangerous studies in 2015.

A March 19, 2024, letter from HHS and documents reviewed on March 20, 2024, in camera by bipartisan Committee staff confirmed what the agencies had been denying for over a year: that a research team led by Dr. Bernard Moss of NIAID submitted a proposal for a bidirectional MPXV approach at a meeting before the NIH IBC on June 30, 2015.35 This bidirectional approach “was considered and approved by the IBC.”36 The research proposal involved bidirectional transfer of genes between clades I and II of the MPXV, including a proposed transfer of genes from the more lethal clade I into the less lethal but much more transmissible clade II.

Despite NIH approving Moss in 2015 to conduct studies they falsely claim he never proposed, NIH now claims Moss never performed the research.

On a final note, pandemic author Laurie Garrett promoted Helen Branswell’s post on X to falsely claim that House Republicans want to “crucify” Bernie Moss for work he never did. “But he mentioned it in an interview with @ScienceMagazine—and that, apparently, is enough to put a target on his back. This is why scientists are clamming up, avoiding media.”

House investigators continue to press the NIH to explain the research Moss actually conducted and said they would like to see lab notebooks to prove which studies he actually performed.

Attempting to flush out who sent Science Magazine false information about Moss’s studies, House investigators demanded last October that NIH turn over all documents related to Science Magazine’s coverage of the controversy “including communications between NIH and American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) or Science magazine.”

NIH has failed to respond to this request and Science Magazine has not corrected their reporting.

However, House investigators have not demanded that NIH explain who provided false information to STAT News reporter Helen Branswell claiming Moss had not proposed the monkeypox research he had actually proposed and was approved to conduct in 2015.

But in a deposition released by the House COVID Select Subcommittee, Tony Fauci’s former chief of staff, Greg Folkers, testified under oath that STAT’s Branswell would call him to get direct access to Fauci.

“So you asked me the names of a couple people who might call me directly,” Folkers told House investigators. “John Cohen of Science who I've known for a long time would sometimes say, ‘Hey, can I talk to Tony?’ And Helen Branswell of Stat, again, would do the same thing.”

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