- People experience their thoughts very differently

- We all secretly believe that deep down, everyone experiences thought like we do.

I've never really had a strong internal monologue when thinking, so my assumption would always be that of course, thinking isn't very linguistic (even if we can use it as a tool while thinking).

It seems like there's a large number of people who experience their thought exclusively as language.

That sounds absolutely nuts to me, but I've heard people say the exact same in reverse. Even more fringe is that there's a sizable number of people who when thinking about words (i.e. remembering names) visualize their words as text. What!? I can't imagine that anymore than I can imagine how a jellyfish feels?

The University of Wisconsin did a cool study that comes with a fun quiz you can do to see just how much of a wierdo you truly are: https://uwmadison.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3NMm9yyFsNio...

While i enjoy the process of thinking about things alone for hours, when presented with problems like in school or sometimes even today when someone gives me a riddle, i can also very strongly feel that i am not "thinking" actively. I am just thinking that i should think and often seem to make myself appear as if i was thinking – and that's it. It feels a lot like "fake it till you make it". Often times i have ideas other people call "brilliant" as well, or i seem to have s lot of refreshing takes on things according to others (stated to hide my weirdly self-conscious arrogance), it's not that i actively pursue it. I sometimes feel like i am standing on the piazza, waiting for this beautiful thought to walk past me. Too scared to talk to it, because she would realize i am too dumb to understand her and a con-artist anyway... but then, every once in a while this beautiful thought turns around and takes over my brain.

But maybe, i am truly just mad.

One thing that help is improv theater and pen and paper role play game, because you don't only have to thin about your idea, but how you are going to deliver it, and this is true in professional settings too. Doing that slow down my thought just enough to be clear. Hopefully this advice works for you too

[edit] You aren't mad

I think you're not mad, but rather demonstrate a learned behavior to a very common situation any person finds themself in. IE they don't know or aren't sure if they don't know and any case don't want to appear as if they don't know certainly so they put in the least amount of effort to obscure ascertaition with some fancy distracting magicians hoodwink.

I think getting answers to nuanced/frontier or non-frontier problems can involve different sets of brain processes and behaviors. For already solved problems with knowledge thats pervasive throughout society, the solution is simply observation and copying, OR recollection and re-execute from memory.

For other problems one can figure out through reasoning and extrapolation.

For other problems no amount of armchair reasoning and theorizing will figure out (frontier problems not yet solved by any humans or at least humans accessible ) it, and they will need to do some trial and error exploration within reality on the path to solving a problem. Thinking in language, recalling by search and retrieval isn't going to find a solution to the problem at hand in these situations, but humans will try and jam the square peg into the circular hole especially if thats easier to do (and it is) than expending a lot more trial and error energy to do reality based experiements instead of pure clean easy brain processes of keyword/descriptor search and retrieval.

Search and retrieval with or without words is a very quick and easy brain process, perhaps anything you do that solely involve those brain processes you perform excellently at. Not all problems solely rely on these process such as analyzing new unsolved puzzles put on your doorstep. Perhaps there's a habitual behavior where you're trying to over-rely on the quick processes and doing the magicians trick to obscure the lack of actual solution with the hopes of retaining social standing. Instead of slowing things down attempting the slow bog down of actually finding the problem while communicating as such OR making use of human language for its actual purpose and networking for someone who has already solved the problem and deferring to their authority.

But all and all humans collectively are driven to collect (no, hoard greedily) solutions to problems at or not at the frontier and incorporate/encode those into their brain in a way that the solutions can be searched and retrieved in an efficient reflex like manner that's conducive to your ADHD speed.

I suck at language but am good at analytical stuff and because of that I'm not going to put any more effort into reducing this lengthy TLDR literature rambling into a concise conducive to reading snippet. My apologies to those that don't skip over this and trudge through this Thesis length reading.

It may be surprising to you but as someone who is well read in mentalism I can fairly confidently tell you that a 95% match is not hard to fabricate in readings. Admittedly is the area of mentalism I don't perform but I have read plenty of theory. Your HD reading was probably based on Barnum statements/cold reading. If you're interested to learn more about this I'd suggest "The Full Facts Book of Cold Reading" by Ian Rowland. For a more fun exercise, get a reading at a medieval fair or from some "medium" (please don't pay a lot) and compare it to your HD reading.

Full disclosure: I loathe astrology, to a disproportionate and somewhat irrational extent.

Thanks for the book rec though. As a "fan" of James Randi, that seems interesting.

How would one do that? Is there a website for it, or something? I tried looking it up and it purportedly uses date and place of birth, but those hardly have anything to do with me, so I don't see how that calculation could be any more useful than, say, a star sign.

The concepts seem interesting for sure, just not sure how to find what applies to me.

While astrology is bogus, you'd be surprised how much "date and place of birth" has to do with you.

There are statistics and studies showing higher than chance similar behavior/tendecies in people born in the same months (for things like depression, health outcomes, etc). Could have to do with exposure to sunlight during early days or whatever.

And for place of birth, of course normally (if you're not in some mix-and-match country like the US, or if your parents don't immigrate immediately) this affects inherited genetic constitution, and of course culture, access to resources, diet, and many other factors.

i.e. you'd need to know "people born around this date in this place tend to have whatever human design" in order to provide me actual predictions based on only date and place of birth, but no such data has ever been collected.

Well, it depends on the degree which we require it to define you. In a looser degree, it would define most people quite a lot.

Put another way your "place of birth" alone, would be a huge information point towards predicting lots of things about someone vs someone from another place of birth, given they're different enough (say, India vs Italy, not Spain vs Portugal or Germany vs Austria).

If betting and money was involved about e.g. income, wealth level, studies or not, food preferences, religion, politics, morals, and so on, knowing the place of birth would be a great boon (all other information being equally shared). Repeated many times with different people, you'd be correct way more.

>i.e. you'd need to know "people born around this date in this place tend to have whatever human design" in order to provide me actual predictions based on only date and place of birth, but no such data has ever been collected.

If we were to bet on whether a person is black or white, freckled or not, has epicanthic fold or not, etc, I don't need no special "data collected" to know what people born in Lagos vs Dublin would look like for example. It's common knowledge.

And in some cases where this changes over time, the data of birth would also come in handy. E.g. in the tendency of a random London citizen to have say South Asian features in 2024 vs 1950.

> If we were to bet on whether a person is black or white, freckled or not, has epicanthic fold or not, etc, I don't need no special "data collected" to know what people born in Lagos vs Dublin would look like for example.

Yes you do. In order to make an educated guess, you'd have to know, given where they were born, whether that place is more likely to produce certain traits or not. You could then use that information to make your guess about how likely they are to possess those certain traits, having been born there. But without any information on how likely those traits actually are for people born there, knowing where they were born grants you nothing.

> It's common knowledge.

It's not common knowledge what my Human Design type would be given only when and where I was born. That's the whole point I'm trying to make. Astrology or not, the entire idea of giving me an answer solely based on when and where I was born, will always be bogus.

Now, if they had an actual dataset of the Human Design types of people from all around the world, and wanted to correlate me with that, then maybe I'd be inclined to give it a try, just out of curiosity.

But I'm not even the slightest bit curious about bogus astrology (or any other types of divination). I'd be glad to take a personality test, for example, because they ask actually relevant questions. Just not this.

> And in some cases where this changes over time, the data of birth would also come in handy. E.g. in the tendency of a random London citizen to have say South Asian features in 2024 vs 1950.

I'm not arguing against correlating this with other data. The entire point is that one needs to correlate it with other data in order for my answer to be at all useful, and what I have a problem with is that correlation is not being done. The alignment of the planets alone is not going to reveal my personality type, and not even when combined with my location.

I used to consider myself 3D-impaired -- unable to maintain and rotate a 3D image in my head, which also made 3D software frustrating. (I also have, it turns out, some binocular vision issues and some other mild cognition weirdness).

But a few years back I started on a hobby project, and I started to assemble my own DIY kit (because the commercial stuff is too expensive). To do that I had a lot of mental puzzles to try to solve.

Then I decided the best way forward was a 3D printer so I tried to find 3D tools that would work for me on even a basic level -- OpenSCAD, CadQuery, FreeCAD etc.; as many different ways to approach the problem as would shed light on ways to think about it.

I'm no longer really an OpenSCAD person but once my first successful models came out of my printer, my brain was changed forever, and now I visualise mechanisms in my head.

(One of the most powerful things I have learned about how to imagine any man-made, real world object, is to imagine the tools making it.)

I have no "mind's eye" and can't produce an image in my head. But confusingly, I am quite good at the mental 3D manipulation. I can spin the cow in my head and describe its orientation, but I don't actually see the cow, I just know it. I suppose my brain just has a different way of approaching this problem than visually.

This is where the language is tough. I'm not visualizing or imagining as those words describe the act of using a mental image. I'm perceiving the cow? It is hard to communicate.

Right. This is enormously challenging in itself. And I think because nobody talks about it, it's possible, or maybe the default, to assume that you're simply broken in an obvious, universal way, and not that there might be variation or even routes to change your outcomes with metacognition or thought experiments.

What often comes up is stuff like "oh I thought 'the mind's eye' was just a figure of speech, I had no idea people meant it in a meaningful sense"

But my aphantasia isn't complete. Sometimes when I think of a person I get a dim image of their face for about a tenth of a second. And very rarely, I do see things in dreams.

Well, I was able to, but it didn't come from first principles or even visualizing it. It came from imagining myself at a keyboard and "simulating" typing. In my mind's body, I would type a sentence, which enabled me to extract the location of the keys, which I could then translate into part of the visual sketch on paper. The initial sketch came out with key sizes and shapes heavily distorted, but all of them spatially located in the correct relative horizontal ordering, and a second sketch made it possible to regularize them.

Not sure what it means, but it was an interesting exercise.

A tiny tiny fraction of people talk about their mind's eye being part of their visual field, to the point that they can sort of functionally see -- hallucinate -- an imaginary object on a table like AR.

Another small number of people talk about imagining complete objects out of nowhere that they then have to analyse to describe; the imaginary thing has complete shape before its shape is described.

Most children can sort of whimsically play the imaginary-drinking tea game, imagining the shape of the teacups, imagining spilling tea or milk, but the mental images might not have attributes like colour or weight until they are specifically assigned to the visualisation. Like: what colour are the teacups? They don't have colour until you pick one, and then they do. Is it a heavy cup? It's not, but I do have a saucer. The more you add to the visualisation, the less translucent/ghostly/formless/conceptual it is.

The fascinating thing about broad aphantasia is that it appears to be way beyond even that; it's like things only happen conceptually, yet they still happen. Like the sibling comment from andrewflnr perceptively said: as if it's a conceptual blind-sight.

And when you consider our evolutionary pathway, perhaps it actually is the same phenomenon: a part of the brain successfully doing part of the task, without the support of the visualiser.

But this is different from the kids tea party. I can easily pretend to hold a teacup without closing my eyes and visualizing a teacup, I don't think one has anything to do with the other.

If you ask someone to actually imagine seeing a teacup but what they're imagining doesn't have a colour or size, _what are they imagining_?

The pure, abstract essence of teacup, to them.

I suppose I assume it does have size and shape (it's functionally an imaginary cup, after all, and not another imaginary object).

Maybe to someone who has only ever seen blue teacups, it's inherently blue?

For me, if I start that exercise it's not even white; its colour is undefined until I interrogate the idea it should have colour.

Or until whichever hilarious infant I am having an imaginary tea party with tells me what colour it is, of course.

I'm imagining a teacup - made of china, decorated in some way, capable of holding a few mouthfulls of ~75C thin liquid, smaller than a big mug, larger than a shot glass, with a handle sizes for the tip of one finger, delicate, ceremonial; concept space constrained to broadly teacup-ish area. But not a specific teacup unless it becomes important whether it's a plainer heavy duty cafe teacup or a grandma's Royal Jubilee promotional teacup.

I sometimes wonder if what it actually is, is a kind of fundamentally unexplored thought or experience.

There's a bunch of other examples.

Like... I can't _really_ tell my left from my right on an instinctive level, though I believe this to be inherited because I have relatives who can't.

Ask me directions in a hurry and I'll get them wrong even when I am sure they are right. I don't really have a "left" and a "right"; I have two sides that don't feel that different.

So I also can't really use mirrors well.

I have surprisingly quick and accurate reflexes for catching falling things but I can't catch a ball thrown to me.

The question about all of these things is: are they just things I have never found the right way to deliberately work through into a conscious process? Are they things I can't do now because I didn't learn when my brain was fresh?

I used to think -- until maybe ten years ago -- that I could not imagine the faces of friends and loved ones.

That is, if I try to visualise a person's face, I get an incomplete glimpse in my mind that dissolves away within an instant.

(People in my dreams do not really have detailed faces, if I can ever really look at their faces at all; it's like I don't make eye contact. Though they are not face-less horrors.)

This has been distressing, particularly when my mum died.

But then I discovered two really interesting things:

1) I can sometimes imagine a "still" face if I visualise a photograph of that person (maybe only slightly more if I took it)

2) I can bring someone's face to mind much more successfully if I associate it with an emotion or an action, and once I've done that, as long as I keep them in motion I can visualise a lot more for longer.

A quarter of a century after she died, if I want to remember my mum, it's a real challenge. She hated being in photos so there aren't many. But it's possible to start by imagining her angry (sorry mum) or the annoyed look on her face when she was trying to solve a puzzle game on the computer. Then I might be able to keep her face in my mind for long enough.

My dad passed away a couple of years back and for this loss I was ready; I have some photos, but more importantly I had spent the previous years learning his face experiencing different emotions. My favourite route to imagining my Dad's face is to imagine a situation where he might show puzzled, half-smiling amusement or fascination when presented with something he didn't understand or didn't work quite the way he expected. I will be able to recall his face in motion, just as my face starts to leak around the eye sockets :-/

So on the one hand: even now I can't visualise still faces at all! I struggle to describe faces of people I don't really know well. As soon as a face is still, it goes.

On the other hand, I have taught myself a visualisation process that can conjure up meaningful animated recollections that are filled with emotion. I have to do it deliberately, but it's lovely to do.

One final quirk: despite all this, I appear to potentially be a super-recogniser. I can't visualise a still face, but I do not "forget a face"; I can tell you with eerie accuracy whether I've seen someone before and where. And I do rather well with the "which of these faces did you see in this clip" type test, and very well at the tests like "which of these faces is this face from another angle".

And I find myself very easily fooled by subtle changes in a person's appearance. If someone gets a major haircut or changes their hair color, they might as well be a different person to my brain, initially.

That is true aphantasia.

I don't have this aspect of the problem -- indeed, I often have the weird super-recogniser problem of correctly identifying that I have seen someone unknown to me before, and where. I might be able to even describe the clothes they were wearing that last time or something they were holding or doing.

But I would struggle to describe their face to someone else.

The inner voice and mind's eye don't surprise me, I'm among the more hyperlexic people I know and seem to have total aphantasia, but I didn't realize (though I guess it seems like an obvious possibility in retrospect) that there were people who processed words as text in their head - I guess the survey itself said that surprised them too.

I also didn't consider that there could be a large degree of variability in representational manipulation, and assume that this kind of inevitably leads to some pretty hard to bridge inferential gaps when speaking across that divide. Honestly maybe I'm misunderstanding what's meant by that, because the other extreme sounds to me like there are some people who just can't do metacognition which sounds insane. I'm guessing however that this is similar to an experience I had with a (now ex-)lover who was shocked when I mentioned I don't have visualization, and asked "So you're telling me you have no imagination at all?", which like, I wouldn't say is true? My imagination can be prosaic, narrative, auditory, abstract, olfactory, emotional, or kinematic, just not visual. I kind of assume that's similar to what I'm doing here, like whatever "manipulating representations" means here is a useful capability by which to do metacognition but not the thing itself... but it seemed like their questions pertained to a lot of different kinds of manipulation of abstractions or mental models, so I can't really figure out how you'd examine your thoughts per se without that ability. Maybe there's someone more knowledgeable about this field here that could help me understand the distinction?

I probably failed due to this agree/disagree test laziness. You never know what they meant by things like “I often enjoy X”. What does strongly disagree mean here? Never? I don’t enjoy? What if I don’t enjoy it, but do often? Why not ask it directly like “I X: never sometimes often” or “I relate to X: hare it … love it”. Even then it’s unclear what “sometimes” means. Once in a year, in a month, in a day? This indirection and vagueness adds so much noise to the result.

I guess all this tells how I think more than the test itself.

As far as the Likert scale nonsense, I am right there with you, all these psychological instruments are pretty poorly framed from my perspective, and while there's some discourse deep in academia about the rigor of various experimental methodologies even in the most broken of social sciences, in practice they don't seem to care much because it's publish or perish baby!

It really doesn't seem like most sciences are quite this broken, though some are clearly trying. Obviously there are people in psychology trying to do good rigorous science, it seems like institutional pressures are not working to support them, and certainly won't amplify rigor over making bold claims that get a lot of press

Like, all this to say that it's definitely worth taking these things with a massive grain of salt, but if you do that, it can still be pretty interesting.

Interesting, it's the same for me. I'm 94th and 98th percentile on the first two, but 2nd and 25th percentile for the other two. Since we're both on a (primarily) science and tech oriented website, I wonder if there's any correlation between ones occupation/hobbies/skills and their method of thinking.

Also, I'm surprised to hear that I'm an extreme outlier when it comes to the mind's eye. When I think about it, even recalling the face of my partner (who I see daily, including this morning) is not easy and comes out very fuzzy. But I have no problems with imagining complex geometry, maps, navigation, etc.

I'm constantly talking to myself in my head as if I'm talking to a duplicate of myself. Asking questions, providing answers, having full back and forward conversations (especially with programming). There are certainly days though where, if you have a lot going on, you can start to burn yourself out with conversation (since every single action of the day comes with a conversation). Even if it's just "Oh I should make a coffee. Did I have a coffee yet? No, I think you had one this morning. What about if I made one anyway. Yeah I think that would be fine. Oh do I need to boil water? I suppose I should check if the water is hot. Yep looks like I do have to boil some". and after a while you just get sick of talking to yourself. But you can't switch it off and it drives you a bit batty sometimes.

I asked my wife once if she constantly narrates her own day, she said absolutely no. She said she only really has an internal monologue when reading things from text. And she writes down a lot of stuff on text. But other than that, she answered confused by my question "...nothing? I guess? Quiet?"

Brains are interesting!

Well, the first is not exactly right. People might experience thoughts differently, but not that widely so. It's not like "anything goes", more like there are a few cases, and people fall into one or the other (e.g. some can have aphantasia).

And the second, while right, is hardly "mind melting". Why would people assume otherwise, since the only immediate empirically seen thinking they have access to is their own?

(Especially since different modes of thinking is not exactly "anything goes" as we said, so the second-hand examples of thinking they have, e.g. people describing or mimicking thinking and inner monologues in movies and books, match how the majority thinks)

I said, no, I have thoughts, and I communicate them with language but the thoughts are not language.

Later we spoke about being able to have no thoughts - still mind. I said I can do this any time, I can stop the thoughts and be still. At the time I had no training but I could do it for 10, 20, 30 seconds easily. And I knew with training I'd be able to extend that time, it was effortless.

To them, that was crazy - they couldn't stop thinking at all!

So yes, we learn how our minds can work completely differently from one another.

The study of Human Design takes this to the next level - this strange science states that humans can be classified in 5 different general types which operate totally different from one another - it has taught me a lot about other people.

My base assumption that everyone is more or less like me - turned out to be completely off.

I'm the same way, my thoughts happen first, are completed and sitting in working memory with my awareness of the thought/result/whatever it is.

If I have an internal monologue, which isn't always, it's after the fact and more about re-stating the thought that already happened.

> To them, that was crazy - they couldn't stop thinking at all!

I have the same experience of being "unable to stop thinking". Are you by any chance neurotypical, or close to neurotypicality? My impression is that neurotypical brains have a higher degree of synchronization than autistic brains, which would make suppressing thought easier.

I'm autistic, and I don't just have thoughts; they have themselves. Thoughts just spontaneously come into existence, and just think on their own. I can think about them myself, but only by picking up existing thoughts. Thoughts come into existence whether I intend them to or not, so it is not possible for me to suppress them.

On one paw, the fact that thoughts seemingly think about themselves allows me to fit a lot of logic in my head at once without getting overwhelmed. But on the other, being unable to control which thoughts are in my head can be really infuriating.

I am doubtful that anyone can truly stop thinking. But people can have more or less awareness of their thoughts, and they can be having thoughts that they don’t consider to be thoughts. For example, if you notice that your shirt is wet, that is a thought even if you don’t “think” anything about it.

I haven’t personally tried one, but I believe the purpose of a sensory deprivation tank is to create an environment where your thoughts are unavoidable.

Yes, that is my experience. If I try not to have thoughts, then what happens is not that thoughts stop happening, it's that I stop noticing them until they're more fully developed. This "not noticing" results in a relative lack of remarks upon those thoughts, but the thoughts themselves are not made of or depending on language. They just are things. Technically, they are "derived meaning".

When on psychedelics I can have thoughts that not only don't depend on language, but don't have language. It's not possible to describe them because they represent indescribable things. It's possible to feel them and interact with them in a way that seems to makes sense to me, but it's not possible to communicate them. If I try, they can actually result in words being generated, but those words sound like a bad phone autocomplete - stuff like "can have a haves and take a three sixteenth quarters" (real excerpt from a past trip).

(My guess is that my brain has some sort of internal format that real-world concepts are translated into in order to be operated on. That's the "meaning" that gets derived. I wonder if psychedelics allow me to create or perceive meanings that no real-world concept would ever actually translate into, and therefore don't have any way to communicate as a real-world concept.)

> I am doubtful that anyone can truly stop thinking.

This statement is a perfect example of benrutter's point:

> - We all secretly believe that deep down, everyone experiences thought like we do.

Don't be so sure that nobody has thoughts that can truly stop, even just for a short time.

a. There is a voice inside your head, and your consciousness is not the one talking: schizophrenia.

b. There is a voice inside your head, it's you doing the talking i.e. you're doing everything but moving your lips and producing sound - the words are literally being narrated in your mind: internal monologue.

c. No language is being "spoken" inside your head. If you're not talking, you're not forming sentences at all: apparently some people have this experience.

My experience is b, but it is possible for me to also think without having to narrate everything (a bit of c). If anyone has a different internal experience, please reply.

Same, happening to me right now, happens automatically almost every morning when I wake up, which kind of gives me my own "soundtrack of the day" and enjoy the ride.

Sometimes the song is stuck in repeat though and the only way to kick it out of loop is to actually listen to it.

An interesting bit is that this internal jukebox is actually playing faster than real time, even though it sounds absolutely correct and natural in my mind and definitely not as if it was a 1.2~1.5x play rate that would give this funny "Benny Hill effect"; so when I perform the song at the time scale that I hear it it is clearly too fast (higher BPM) to outside observers or when compared to an original recording.

It's as if my experience of mind-time is skewed vs real time so I've developed a bunch of coping strategies like padding (e.g making every beat having a "late by ~x" feeling), forceful downclocking (some sort of detached zen mode where I let go of the internal clock, which gives a very surreal feeling of perceiving the world), or active continuous ratio compensating (sort of like the world is going at 0.8x compared to my reference clock so remapping makes it sort of bullet-timesque)

Socially it's all very disconnecting and exhausting.

In theory I could translate it to a DAW (but I'm not that great at transcribing music...it's possible, kinda, but slow), but I can't easily repeat the music in my head (not what I make up at least, proper released songs tend to be easier to repeat), so it would be difficult to recreate it enough to be worth the effort.

I was surprised to learn the other day from HN that not only some people, but some commenters here, consider the notion of "not opening one's mouth to start a sentence before knowing how it's going to end" an impracticable ideal.

My own thinking on this has been to consider the origins of language. In a community of hominins on the verge of developing a language, would they not need, as a prerequisite, some non-linguistic ability to consciously grasp that at least some of the vocalizations of their peers represented feelings that they recognized in themselves? But that, by itself, would not be enough for them to develop a language; in addition, I feel, it would take both a desire to communicate their thoughts and feelings to others (motivated in part, I would guess, by recognizing that it would be useful to do so) and the recognition that this might be accomplished through artificial sounds and/or gestures with arbitrarily-allocated yet specific meanings. I feel that there's a bootstrap problem in regarding language as primarily a means of thinking that was found to be useful in communicating.

Like you (and, apparently, the survey compilers) I am surprised to learn that a sizable minority of people report frequently visualizing words as text. On reflection, however, that sounds somewhat like a form of synesthesia, and I occasionally get enough of a hint of that to put it just barely in range of my personal experience - but then, I don't regard people whose experiences differ markedly from mine as wierdos.

For example, does evolution have any pressure to produce those who think linguistically, vs healthy hair and skin?

Also was hoping that quiz would ask about other senses; how easily people can choose to imagine tastes and smells, e.g. on their agree/disagree scales:

1. You can easily imagine the smell of freshly baked bread.

2. You can easily call to mind the taste of peanut butter.

3. You are melting chocolate and somebody suggests adding basil, you can vividly imagine how that would taste before trying it.

4. When remembering an event that happened to you, there is a strong smell memory included.

5. You can imagine feeling the weight and texture of a brick in your hands.

During exams, where I had to cram lots of theory in a small amount of time, I recall trying to 'access' the slides via how they looked like in my mind and trying to somehow read the stored image, because that's for me easier to remember than the actual text when I'm not doing any deep understanding, but just memorization :/ I hated these kinds of exams, what's the point of repeating 500+ slides out of 14 weeks of courses word by word ?

Open book exams + internet + tricky questions were the best.

They must listen to a large amount of verbose drivel telling them how to weave their way through a crowd, or how to rotate a suitcase to fit it into a trunk.

Similarly I doubt others would say they have an internal monologue if they couldn't express it in words. Hence I am fairly certain that they think in a different way, or at least they think they do.

I wonder if the quiz is missing questions / scoring around thought awareness.

The experience of thought differs from brain to brain. For example, autistics generally experience thought differently from neurotypicals.

This happens, in part, because autistics have a different distribution of synaptic connections, which are shorter on average than is neurotypical. This typically results in an experience of disorganized thought, where multiple different parts of the brain contain independent thought, because there aren't enough connections directly between them to enforce synchronization. There are enough localized connections to allow general thoughts to happen and be operated on, but they are exactly that; localized.

Detail-oriented thinking is another well-known side effect of this, because each individual detail can easily be fit somewhere without being lost in the "big picture". Autistics are usually who you'll find sweating details that most people wouldn't necessarily care about, but they're also who you'll find sometimes getting lost in those details rather than sticking to a single clear vision. Neurotypicals, on the other paw, can miss those details if the picture as a whole looks okay to them, but they also usually won't get stuck on them in the process of executing their vision.

Note that every person is different, whether autistic or non-autistic, so there are autistics who are good at thinking in terms of the big picture and neurotypicals who are good at considering every detail. The fact that the physical mode of thinking differs doesn't necessarily mean that another can't be emulated - it just means that even if two people appear to be doing or thinking the same thing, the way it's actually implemented "in hardware" (meatware?) can differ greatly depending on neurotype, even from autistic to autistic and neurotypical to neurotypical, as the brain has no single switch between fully autistic and fully neurotypical.

Some of the statements in this comment are based on my personal experience as an autistic, some are based on anecdotes from others, and some are based on this article: https://embrace-autism.com/autism-and-disorganized-thoughts/

I've been informed that the author of the article doesn't generally do good work, but I've personally reviewed the article and believe it to still be sufficiently accurate. Additionally, this particular description of autistic disorganized thought is what originally tipped me off to the fact that the way I think is different from others. If you're not autistic and/or it doesn't describe you, please know that it perfectly describes me, which should be enough to understand how exactly the experience of thought can differ from brain to brain.

Also, psychedelics can significantly change one's mode of thinking. I use them recreationally from time to time. Somehow, they give me better executive function than my ADHD meds do.

I'm curious, what is it like when you read something? Is it just not meditated by a monologue at all?

The idea of thinking independtly like that though seems unbearably slow to me (although lots of very clever people report doing it, so obviously it isn't for them!)

So, as a person who definitely has an inner monologue, I absolutely agree. It's not like I'm literally sounding out words in my mind all the time. The vast majority of things I do I do without explicit use of language.

I think my understanding (mostly coming from Chomsky and in disagreement when OP) is that language is a mechanism for thinking that is mostly not accessible through conscious introspection.

Is Chomsky's idea that language is not necessarily the same as spoken language, it is an alternate brain mechanism that provides structure to thought as opposed to being the wild west of fluid/analog non-discrete/non-symbolic type of information processing?

So thinking about something isn't a one speed operation, but being able to communicate those thoughts is.

While I seem to be a fast reader relative to people I know, I very much feel my reading speed is limited by sounding the words in my mind, so I agree - it's near-unbearably slow.

For example I do math entirely without any words in my process, and I easily got a master in math that way, barely had to study. No problem, you just translate it at the end. Limiting myself to words just makes it harder to think freely.

I always had problem with trusting my intuition or gut so I was worse in a lot of other real life things however. But math seemed abstract and solvable by words and brute force.

I wish things just magically came to me, but I think I always have to go through things with my inner monologue.

Like if I was to do multiplication in my head e.g. with same numbers, for example 62 x 62. I would have to go through it as a monologue.

I first remind myself of the strategy to do it, which is first I will do 60 x 60. Then it is 3600, then I add 2 x 60, 3720, and then there is 2 x 62 left, but I have to keep reminding myself occasionally what the last numbers were, that initial multiplication was 62 x 62, then I got 3720, and now I have to add 124... okay lets go 3820, 24 left, now 3844. Of course it is easier to remember as I am typing this, but in my head I have to keep reminding myself. And now I am not sure if I did a mistake so I go verify that on the calculator.

I do multiplication in my head similarly, just strip out the words, the numbers just flickers through and operations happens by themselves and I'm done in a second or two when I'm not rusty. Now that I'm rusty I do it more like (60x60=3600, 2x2=4, 60x2=120, 3600 + 4 + 120 + 120 = 3844), without doing any words, I just did that in my head right now and I am 100% sure not a single word, just the steps, I do sometimes verbalize the numbers so what I wrote in those parentheses is the most verbal my process for mathing that out gets.

Edit: Looking at that, I think it might be easier for someone to correct your thinking if you think in words, but thinking without words is way faster and way more creative since it removes the restriction of only thinking about concepts you have words for.

Edit2: I think your verbalization there is a ritual for the concepts to get to you. For me all I need to do is see 62x62 and imagine I want to solve it and all those thoughts flow to me automatically, basically a shortcut instead of having a large verbal ritual to piece together the concepts. I never did math verbally the way it is taught, so I am not sure how people think that way, to me this was always automatically this way.

Also this multiplying of two digit numbers I was never taught, I just came to a strategy that I explained with my thoughts. And I used to do these for fun as a kid. But I would only get faster than that if it was something I had memorized, but not numbers from scratch. And I had to constantly try to repeat numbers in my head that I had stored for addition down the road.

What is usually tougher top of my head and especially if I am tired at all, is something like 68 x 68. Then here first I have to decide whether I go from 60 x 60 or 70 x 70. Since it's that close to 70, I think 70 is more likely be easier. So I think okay 4900 - that's from memory right. Then I start to think what I have to take off from 4900 and what is 68 x 68 lacking compared to 70 x 70. So I will think that if I add 2 x 68, it will make it 68 x 70 and then I have 2 x 70 missing. So I need to deduct 140 and 136. So now at this point, this is much easier done in writing but here I frequently have to repeat numbers or redo some steps because I am not certain or I forget. But otherwise 4900 - 140, this comes easily instantly 4760 - maybe that's how it is for you with 62 x 62. And then now I take 100 off, it's 4660, and further 36 it would be 4624. Right now testing this in my head it took more than a minute because I wasn't sure whether I could just use the logic that I was thinking out of the box and I'm quite tired.

What if you were to have to do something more difficult e.g. 3 digits multiplication or 4?

I got to 4624 in 8 seconds on that now, and I haven't done significant amounts of mental math in over a decade. The 60x8 etc took a couple of seconds each but other than that it just happens automatically. A decade ago each of those would take a fraction of a second and it takes about the same time to calculate as to write it, I tend to calculate the numbers left to right instead of right to left as you are taught since you write it left to right, also more useful when calculating approximations since I just do what I normally do but stop earlier.

> Not in a doubting way, I just have no idea how I could do it in 2 seconds

Words are just slow. I never did math with words, so arithmetics is fast, and so is all the other things you learn in a math degree. I think word based processing in math is a big reason people have such a tough time with it, it really makes it much harder to think, like you are bogged down in a fog instead of up and free and agile with clear sight of everything.

Maybe it was easier for people to get past this stage when calculators were less prevalent. Calculators lets people get away with keeping their arduous word based math instead of just internalizing the concepts.

> What if you were to have to do something more difficult e.g. 3 digits multiplication or 4?

When on tests I write down some intermediate values. I am not a human calculator, I am just fast at math reasoning and being relatively fast at arithmetic's comes for free from that.

I did some physics tests without a calculator, you can approximate all those special functions using regular math logic you learn in high school. I did still ace the test, it isn't that hard once you have internalized it all.

Makes me really bad at following instructions though, since unlike math or physics you shouldn't internalize them instead you should just execute the words and that is really annoying, my brain really doesn't want to think in words. so try to translate everything...

Anyway, I think internalizing things might be harder or impossible if you haven't already done so with all the previous steps. If all your thinking and knowledge is word based then it is hard to break that, and vice versa, I can't think about math in terms of words really. I can slowly translate some things to words but I can't really drive thought with the words.

I can't follow verbal instructions as well though, I couldn't listen to the teacher etc. But I think it's because my inner monologue takes all the focus so I just follow my inner monologue which is probably completely another topic than what the lesson is about. I can't really focus away from my inner monologue. When I try, then I would just have philosophical meta discussion about my inner monologue. But also this meant that I couldn't actually learn the subjects as well during the class. I either had to learn from my free time or not at all.

Also have to watch films with subtitles, because audio language I have troubles focusing on.

I think all I have is my inner monologue, no good visual imagery, or other types of "thinking". I think makes me really poor at navigation as well. I never remember how to get somewhere. And also in general for anything 3d, like 3d games I will perform bad at, awareness wise.

Edit: Thinking more about it, in my head the numbers are numbers, but the operators are invisible, not sure what to call it but I don't think of the multiplication operator as anything tangible, I just know it is a multiplication of the two numbers.

Are you thinking that using words during thinking helps with reaching conclusions and knowing why you reached the conclusion?

For me it's just there, the thoughts, the facts, the logic, the sequence, the connections, etc. Expressing all of that in words happens afterward (if it happens).

Reading your comment, I don't subvocalize at all. In order to get through my college degree, I taught myself speed reading. Now, I just naturally do it. My eye flicks to the middle of every 5-10 word chunk and flies though the text. If you did speech synthesis at that speed, it'd be a incomprehensible chipmunk. So I don't subvocalize at all. It'd be way too slow. To suppress subvocalization I used to hum (in my mind) instead, but I don't need to anymore. If something is hard to understand I will slow way down, then the subvocalization might kick in. When typing, I do subvocalize everything, since I can't write that fast.

I think this post/paper was more about your personal thought process rather than reading though. I very rarely have any internal monologue. In fact, the rare times I do have one are usually very awkward social situations where I wanted to say something but don't. Otherwise never. My whole life has been that way. An internal monologue sounds like a nightmare to be honest. Constant talking that nobody else can hear? No thank you.

This explains why I read slower when I read in English.

Sometimes I do explicitly think with an internal monologue, though. Like if I'm debugging something I'll sometimes narrate what the program is doing in words. Also if I'm trying to figure out how some event happened I'll try to tell a story in my mind. It helps then as it forces me to serialise things.

When I read there is sometimes an internal monologue. When I write, there isn't. I don't talk like this. I think it's quite clear sometimes when people write with an internal monologue as their text reads like speech (which can be a good or bad thing, depending on its purpose).

I suppose chose your own adventure.

I wouldn't say that. What I would rather say is that everyone starts with the expectation that they share thought with others.

There is overwhelming empirical evidence that people can tell when others think like them. Not everybody treats this indicator the same way. Some are fascinated when others think differently. Some get uncomfortable when they can't tell what another is thinking or feeling.

I'm sure not everyone understands why there can be others that don't think like them. To a simple mind, it might just seem like there's something wrong with them or that they have unaligned goals/interests; you actually can see that assumption from certain neurotypicals. (I don't know if it's truly specific to neurotypicals.)

However, it is possible not to believe, even secretly, that everyone experiences thought the same; I certainly don't. I try my best to understand exactly how thought can differ between each person, of course, but in the process of doing that research, it does become abundantly clear just how much I don't know, and just how differently others think than how I do.

Not a universal law. I don’t think I work in the same way as other people at all, as I cannot see what is obvious to others, and they cannot see what is obvious to me.

I don’t think, per se, the information and the integrated results of information are just there. People call it “intuition” but it isn’t some magical sixth sense, it’s just not using one’s language centre for compute, which is what many seem to do.

The moment I start consciously considering something, it all usually goes to hell - so a large part of how I operate is preventing myself from lapsing into “conscious thought”, and instead to keep whatever it is just below the surface until it’s cooked.

I infuriated teachers throughout my childhood by apparently paying zero attention but then inexplicably having the correct answer to whatever was posed to me, and have never quite related to other people, as it usually feels like I’m trying to bridge an immense gap of comprehension - not, to be clear, that I think other people are stupid - just more like I am running fundamentally different software, and everything has to go through an extensive translation and abstraction layer to make sense to others.

If I speak my thoughts directly, then they often emerge as allegory, as it’s the only way I can try to encapsulate the otherwise rather inchoate froth of connection which leads to a result. Sometimes others understand the allegory, but more often than not, they do not, as the symbols mean something else to them.

So yeah. I don’t think my mind works like most other people I encounter. The only other person I know who I think operates in the same way is my sibling, and people who have observed our conversations find them downright bizarre. They sound like beat poetry half the time, as with five well chosen words presenting the correct allegory we can transmit deep meaning to one another.

And before it, the time of having a raw thought in my brain it just feels like… something, it’s not sound, not light, but “a thing” which I know means the item or concept I am thinking of. And the process of thinking is kind of these “semantic things” bouncing off each other - which usually happens much faster than I can translate it into words.

When solving a problem, I usually tinker with it for a while and then let my “big subconscious coprocessor” deal with it for a while, and more often than not if not a solution but the clear idea of direction and reasoning emerges the next time I look for it.

At the same time I tend to make a fair bit of puns based purely on spelling alone - feels a bit magical to have all the omonyms kind of flash in the head all at once, and then make-pretend pick the wrong one for fun.

Is this anywhere similar ?

As to the big processor - I definitely do the same if no answer is immediately forthcoming - send it to the boys upstairs and wait for an answer, which usually comes while I’m in the middle of a conversation about something else entirely.

Puns, to an extent, although more often than not I just go off up and down an etymological tree, as the semantics behind so many words and concepts reveal further layers of interconnection and peculiar shreds of history. Physics is my play park, where I enjoy posing and chewing on gnarly problems, which often result in “inadequate data, please try again later”. Didn’t make me popular as an undergraduate as I asked all sorts of awkward questions about presuppositions and usually ended with a professor waving their arms and telling me to just accept it as so. “Dark matter” was what made me finally spit on the ground and decide to not pursue academia, as it’s just so blatantly wrong, and it hurts to see so many accept it as a hard done and dusted solution to something that is anything but solved - because our presuppositions are almost certainly wrong. Piles upon piles of monkeys supposing that they are the centre of the universe, with the perfect sensorium to know it.

Anyway. Like I say, I find it hard to see eye to eye with a majority of people, and I know I don’t make it any easier for myself.

These days I mostly use words but there are many concepts that don't have a short number of words corresponding to them, which makes recalling them much harder for me.

A word or a common phrase is coined when a concept is sufficiently common and important enough such that someone comes up with a label to communicate the idea succinctly and the label catches on.

We, humanity, have words or common phrases to label the vast majority of significant concepts. However, not every concept is accorded such importance in every language. Some common words in other languages without direct translation in English:

* 積ん読 (Tsundoku) (Japanese): Buying books and never reading them, just letting them pile up.

* น้ำใจ (Nam-jai) (Thai): Literally "water from the heart". Being very nice and helpful without expecting anything back.

* 关系 (Guanxi) (Mandarin): Your network of connections that help you get stuff done in life and business.

This is perhaps another line of evidence to support the thesis of the article.

Make no mistake though: Language is extremely useful for some types of thoughts, especially more abstract ones. Not everyone, however, uses it as their primary tool for thinking.

-----

The above also helps explain some limitations of LLMs, such as their inadequate spatial intelligence. Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) start to address these issues by using much more granular data than language alone.

i don't speak Thai or Mandarin, so I can't speak to the other 2, but this one is a pun (combining tsundeoku, pile up, and dokusho, book reading) that survived in the language due to its catchiness.

A bit like "hangry" (hungry + angry) in English.

I have a hard time interpreting the existence of those words as an indication that Japanese culture really values not reading the books you buy, or English speaking culture is irritated due to hunger more so than other cultures.

They're just meme-like constructs that caught on due to arbitrary phonetic properties of the language.

You could equally refer to some slur in a lower register to then claim that this doesn't exist in your language and how it can't be translated either. So when Joe Biden said "SoB" on tape once, that was code switching; likewise, when Trump says anything it's all made up and coded and means something entirely different. However, these are bad examples if your target is a monolingual Japanese, obv.

My take: they became instant memes and experience wide adoption because they capture a concept without another name - and that makes it not just easy to talk about, but also to think about in the first place (counter to article's thesis?).

Consider Chinese 成语 (Chengyu) [1] or Japanese 四字熟語 (Yo Ji Juku Go) [2]: - 指桑骂槐 (Zhi Sang Ma Huai) - Pulling the shoots to make the rice grow = helicoptering - 拔苗助长 (Ba Miao Zhu Zhang) - Point at the mulberry tree to curse the locust tree = deflective criticism

These condense a whole story with moral lesson in them, and they facilitate recall of that concept. The trick is omission of everything but 4 characters from the whole story. Sometimes they're just an enumeration:

- 柴米油盐 （Chai Mi You Yan) Firewood, Rice, Oil, Salt = essential things for everyday life - 都道府県 (To Dou Fu Ken) all 4 types of Jap. prefecture = everywhere

I think brevity is key for words that aim at aiding thinking. All languages allow composition; consider "Eierschalensollbruchstellenverursacher". But only if the word is short, can you quickly cast your thought into its form (as if speaking) and proceed to compose it with the next thought. You do this until your individual mental capacity runs out.

It's also very important that others know the concept. I find myself often refer to "that scene in Wolf of Wallstreet where Belfort _really safely_ drives his Lamborghini home"[3] to express "power is nothing without control". I wish there was a briefer word for it yet.

1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chengyu 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yojijukugo 3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1huYsSOYlVo

There's a subclass of 成语 the sense of which you can't even guess at unless you know the story:

- 塞翁失马 (Sai Weng Shi Ma) - Old man loses horse; a 5-fold story of riches-to-rags-to-riches-to-rags-to-riches = life is unpredictable

- 自相矛盾 (Zi Xiang Mao Dun) - Resemble spear and shield = unstoppable force meets indestructible object

The latter is so common that 矛盾 (Mao Dun) is the dictionary entry for "contradiction" in Chinese and Japanese.

Because 矛盾 is so common, the story 自相矛盾 (=etymology) gets taught only later to native speakers. Similarly, consider the surprising etymology of word "rob", deriving from "robe" [1].

Consider also: - "Seven at One Blow" [2] = bamboozle

This proverb everyone knows, yet nobody uses it. It only cumbersomely embeds in a sentence; "bamboozle" is briefer. But 成语 do easily embed in Chinese or any phrase does in Tamarian.

1: https://www.etymonline.com/word/robe 2: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Brave_Little_Tailor

It's simply the case that Chinese relies far more on literary/historical allusions (chengyu) than English does. We might talk about someone's "Achilles heel" or a "Trojan horse", but these literary/historical allusions are simply nowhere near as common as chengyu in Chinese.

in a different vein, "Tony and Manny, at the pool" might refer to:

  这个国家：
  先拿到钱，
  得到力量，
  然后淫乐。

I can imagine things transformating in space much faster than thinking it in words.

If those concepts would exist you wouldn’t be able to explain them using words, no matter how complex the phrase may be. Taking a phrase and expecting it to have a single word replace is unrealistic. You can’t just asign a word to every possible sentence/phrase. Having a direct translation means you don’t necessarily need that word in your language.

One might argue that the limit of our language is the limit of our ability to think.

I suspect the same happens in many other fields. Even in an abstract field like mathematics, intuition often forms in the mind before verbal description or articulation.

Possibly. Even if this was just emulating the thought process that happened non-verbally, it would still work. I imagine that's a big part of why language seems so critical an invention: because it can be used as emulator of otherwise non-verbal thought processes.

That said, in case of Michelangelo, describing the "algorithm" is not sufficient, because just as important are the external factors. Art reacts to the medium and situation, so there's a lot of randomness into any specific work. It's kind of like with Stable Diffusion - we could get the prompt just right to generate something like a picture someone else generated, but there's only one seed that will result in identical output, and that little number is something we can't easily reverse.

I think the only limiting factor we have on that is we don't yet have a robot that can chisel marble to create a carbon copy of such sculptures, but we can otherwise do it with other materials.

To my understanding, this is not a type of natural language the paper discusses:

  N10 G21            ; Set units to millimeters
  N20 G17            ; Select XY plane
  N30 G90            ; Absolute positioning
  N40 G00 Z5.0       ; Raise Z axis to 5.0 mm

Its much more complex to explain why we classify them as masterpieces than how he made it.

Maybe I don't understand why you couldn't use verbal language to instruct a CNC machine?

To my understanding, this is not a type of natural language the paper discusses:

  N10 G21            ; Set units to millimeters
  N20 G17            ; Select XY plane
  N30 G90            ; Absolute positioning
  N40 G00 Z5.0       ; Raise Z axis to 5.0 mm

I do think in American English at least there is a phrase for this: Your Network. You even used it to explain the word :)

Usually the first association to “your/the network” is social. You have to specify if you mean the technical version with computers.

A mixture of "act of kindness" and "good will" would be a more fitting translation, but the interesting part here is that "sportmanship" is also considered an act of น้ำใจ (น้ำใจนักกีฬา nam-jai nak-kee-la or literally. sportman's nam-jai).

We also have a word เสียน้ำใจ (sia-nam-jai) for when our nam-jai ended up as a waste, or for when the other party is being ungrateful for the kindness that's being given, and also เลี้ยงน้ำใจ (leang-nam-jai) for when you're doing/accepting nam-jai for the sake of not making the other party sia-nam-jai.

They are probably closer in meaning than the most common definition of 'charity' though.

I mean even the word 关系 and "network" have the same etymology. 系 = threads of silk arranged in a pattern.

In your 20s you might think of your network as people who you went to college with. In your 40s your network takes on a meaning much closer to what you have described. I don’t yet know what happens in your 60s.

It's an incredibly poor example of an "untranslatable" phrase.

So "buying books and never reading them", yes, it's a phenomenon that happens and one could presumably talk about it, but it's hard to even think of in the first place - it's a complex set of ideas joined together in a specific way. Tsundoku, however, is a concept. A single word. A token. A point in the latent space. Something I feel existing independently in my mind, as a node that I can feel emotions about, that grows attachments. That's much easier to access, and thus much more common to talk about.

Nam-jai, I already have an English word for this in my mind, "pay -it-forward". Yeah, it's one semantic unit in my mind. Funny enough, I'm ESL and I don't know a word in my native language for this (Polish); the concept exists in my head literally as "pay it forward", and brings up associations with some broken down car story, and Jesus for some reason.

Guanxi - in English, isn't that a "social network"? That's another good example of a concept I find much easier to think about once it's pinned down with a name.

1. The existence of “rubber duck debugging”, and a whole bunch of studies on verbally explaining a concept indicate that language is essential for thought. In rubber duck debugging, programmers tell their problem to an object and this is beneficial in finding the solution. There are studies that show when we verbally teach material to someone we remember it better. Also the act of taking a test increases learning and memory, but why should this be if learning is secondary?

2. Everything we know about memory tells us that externality is essential for memorizing something. If there’s nothing visual, aural, or sensory then it is unlikely to be remembered. Language acts as an externality even as inner speech, meaning that thoughts can be said in language (ascribed onto the words) and remembered for short-term and long-term memory. A thought without externality seems more like a passing whim, unrooted in any more permanent mode of cognition and thus liable to be forgotten. I can imagine thinking in visuals, melodies, words, but if there is a kind of thought that isn’t occurring based off of these then it probably can’t be sophisticated.

2. I thought rare individuals who did not develop language abilities (e.g due to isolation) still had memories of their time prior to thought. The most obvious example to me is Helen Keller, who writes about her time prior to meeting her teacher.

1. Rubber duck maybe just help with attention issues. All the studies I heard of do not try to untangle the mechanism. People tend to use language for a multi-brain thinking, and in this mode people do not think their thoughts fully, they propose ideas allowing other to support them or dismiss them. In this way they've got combined knowledge and experience to do the work, simplifying the early rejection of bad ideas. And I'm sure this mode of thinking shapes mind and in particular attention processes. You need to track which bits of information you told already and which you didn't, and you trained for that. Rubber duck can be just a trigger for that mode of attention.

2. I didn't hear about externalities, but to my mind what really helps to remember it is a number of associated details. I believe that ideas extracted from the memory when some of these details is popped up in your thought. It serves like a key in an associative map. When you name a concept with a word, and then use this word in different combinations with other words building associations, then sometimes your mind just like LLM will suggest the first word when you used words associated with it. It seems like externalities you talk about. Language plays its role with this, but you can achieve the same result without a language but thinking about all connected concepts of a concept you are trying to remember. You can build associations this way.

Explaining things to others - imaginary or not - engages the parts of my brain imagining how they will receive and understand it.

This is primarily so I can phrase it in a way other people can understand. But that imagined model of other minds is often smart enough to imagine what they would answer.

Which I guess means my "social brain" is smarter than my "thinking" brain in some ways.

Don't know how universal that is. My brain tends to be an outlier.

I am convinced that teaching material to other people helps us remember concepts better. Doing it verbally just so happen to be the most common and convenient form of knowledge transmission between individuals.

I imagine a counterargument (or complication) to that is that such parallel evolution would require the neural networks to independently evolve certain breakthroughs multiple times before reaching the Homo sapiens stage. For example, language is recursive and yet human mathematical reasoning is recursive, but these use two different brain areas (according to the paper). So in their figure of two different brain regions for language processing versus math/code thinking, both regions had to somehow evolve the "wetware" for recursive computation. How did natural evolution manage that in general?

The commonality of mathematical grammars (as mathematical objects in their own right) and natural language is that both have computational properties such as recursive structure - or ambiguity, which was discussed in the paper.

Formal grammar theory relies on recursive formulae to define what is a a language (formally set of sentences), natural language itself does not use/require recursion as understood in the same way. Some natural languages support grammatical features like sub-clauses but that's only "recursive" in the sense that attempts to describe such features (using formal language grammars) use recursion when in fact and in practice nesting sub-clauses do not "go on forever".

An analogy with computer programming languages - programming languages exist that do NOT support recursion (pre-Algol) but nonetheless require recursion to define their formal grammar. For example, a programming language can support limitless nested lexical scoping (loosely analogous to sub-clauses in natural language) WITHOUT supporting recursion (which requires a stack and managing frames).

For some programming languages (functional for example), recursion is such a key feature that it's inconceivable that the language could be useful without it.

This is not the case for natural languages. Most of the people I interact with daily have English as a second language and rarely or never use sub-clauses (which are not recursive but are often used to claim that language is recursive) so from practical experience, I know that English as a communication tool looses very little expressive power when users do not use sub-clauses.

Furthermore, as I mentioned before, formal grammars are artificial languages in their own right. The key thing is that the only way a human being can understand these languages (e.g., still at the level of syntax, independent of recursive computations like in functional programming which you did mention) is through some kind of recursive reasoning about their grammar.

And to keep the discussion at the forest instead of the trees, it is weird that human cognition comprehends these tree structures, recursive structures, or fractal structures, relatively naturally and intuitively. If I had said fractal would you have argued that natural languages don't exhibit fractal properties? We are talking bird's-eye level view of things here.

I also believe in the Church-Turing thesis plus the Chomsky hierarchy of computable languages (the idea that languages are models of computation, and that some language classes contain other classes in a hierarchy of what is computable -- see for instance the formal class of Recursive Languages), meaning that natural languages are not based on magical computations exceeding the power of universal computation; furthermore, as another subcommenter (see both users bbor and foobarqux) put it differently to you but if you are committed to a position that natural human language can only be approximated by artificial languages defined by formal grammars then you can never have a humanly intelligible account of the computational features of actual human language. It would be like arguing a laptop is not "meaningfully" like a Turing machine because a laptop has finite number of atoms as is thus really technically a finite state machine -- it's throwing the emergent/abstract baby out with the empirical bathwater.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recursively_enumerable_languag...

Recursion doesn't have to go on forever.

Very little for that subset you wish to communicate, maybe.

In some literary traditions, not only are clauses nested within clauses at the sentence level, but whole narratives are nested within others.

(hmm, are there any in-the-wild examples of recursive tmesis? if so, that'd be just fan-far-fucking-out-tastic)

Programming languages and human languages existed before people felt the need to define them using formal grammars. Yes most formal grammars use recursion but that's a property of the system you are trying to use to describe (meta) the structure of the object language - not part of the object language itself.

Try to use Haskell without recursion, it's effectively useless. But using an Algol derived language (Java, C, C++, etc.) without recursion is fine and hardly restricts the power of the language at all. Try to use English (or any other indo-European language - I've no knowledge of others) without sub-clauses and it remains a very powerful and useful communication tool.

(there's a bit of a parallel, in that XVII english writers, not having readers as pressed for time as our current variant, make far more use of nested sub-clauses than we tend to; similarly, CPL, not having been as pressed for space as either BCPL or C, made far more use of nested sub-expressions than its successor languages)

But that is an example of a recursive context free grammar. The parser needs to use a stack or be defined recursively to parse things like that.

Either way, I think you'd win a Nobel for proving that complex recursive processes aren't going on inside the head of someone speaking in natural language. We can discuss the likely situation all day, but directly measuring this in the moment seems well beyond our technical capabilities

His theories are unfalsifiable and un-empirical and thus, for me, unscientific. This discussion is typical. Chomsky's definition of "recursion" - like that of a "language organ" - has become completely plastic. In his initial work, it was deeply tied to the same notion in formal grammar theory but is constantly redefined and evolving as the initial notion becomes more and more dubious. The "human language is unique in that it is _recursive_" theory has no practical application and has provided no path for advancement in the field of language pedagogy for example.

Watch me chew up a bunch of karma dismissing Chomsky's theories of language. It's what often happens with comments that question his theories of language - I don't know why it's seemingly impossible to just admire his politics without feeling the need to vigorously defend his 60 or 70-year-old theories of language which have long been abandoned in the field.

The reason the specifics of Chomsky's proposals are changing is that it isn't a solved problem and he and others are continuing to try to advance the understanding by revising proposals in light of better arguments, simpler explanation and (contrary to what you say, see [1] which lists some examples) experimental evidence. In Chomsky's most recent book he himself quotes Wheeler: "Surely someday, we can believe, we will grasp the central idea of it all as so simple, so beautiful, so compelling that we will all say to each other, ‘Oh, how could it have been otherwise! How could we all have been so blind so long!’". I think people have a hard time understanding this because it is one of the few nascent sciences and therefore no one has figured out the fundamental theories.

And if some specific proposal like X-bar theory is falsified or supplanted by something else that doesn't falsify the core ideas of universal grammar or the minimalist program. You say that it isn't possible to provide evidence that these are false but Moro for example conducted experiments comparing hierarchical and linear language processing that potentially would have provided reasonable evidence against language being hierarchical had they shown linear languages were processed similarly (instead they support it).

The reason you should be downvoted is that you made a bunch of evidence free assertions; You could have said "Neil Bohr's work has been completely falsified and is of dubious value" with the same amount of supporting argument.

[1] https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/007363

"How else? Anyone? Gotcha!" followed by silence is not a propositional logic, it's a comedy cliche.

From there, you ask: "What is the fundamental aspect underlying each of these different faculties?"

Next issue: communication. Humans are currently dominate because we collaborate. The idea of communication as "I can tell you the day of the month" is useful. But communication as a way of effectively collaborating is another thing all together.

If we accept collaboration as the thing that gives people survival fitness - which I do - then you can invert the whole thing and focus on how we achieve that. Ants are another species that collaborate well and are successful. But, arguably, ants neither think nor speak. Unless you want to call leaving a pheromone trail "speaking"? And why not? So now we can consider the issue of from another perspective - what constitutes a language? Sapir Whorf says our language affects if not determines what we think. Perhaps we need to look at language not as what we think it is but instead that language is any system that provides collaboration. And then we start going down an interesting rat hole. "Twitter and Teargas" argues that that extwitter does "affords" people ways to do some things but not others.

It is a complex and interesting issue. My take is that language is primarily a tool for collaboration.

This has parallels to the Chain-of-Thought prompting in LLMs, where simply by letting the model speak its reasoning, it generates better responses.

The way I look at things: language-less thinking is tapping into our evolved or ingrained patterns (aka intuition). This is like one forward pass of LLMs. But if you have to reason in a novel situation that you haven't seen before, you have to break it down into simpler steps and that necessarily requires some form of "thinking aloud".

I need to follow the references in the original paper, but most of their evidence of language-less thought was about intuition-type thinking, not multi-step reasoning.

Another example of thinking without language: walking around or driving a car while holding a conversation.

Some 3D modeling part of my brain does most of the work, and "I" largely watch and guide it.

Maybe not everyone has this "GPU" installed.

Simple and wrong. Remember that thought is highly influenced by habit. If you habitually think in language, it might just possibly take more than thirty seconds of trying before you can conclude it's impossible.

Unless you're defining "thought" to be "internal mental processes that take the form of language", in which case have fun at tautology club.

For instance, schizophrenia is a complex disorder affecting various cognitive domains, including attention, memory, and executive functions, which are crucial for reasoning and problem-solving. Therefore, the observed impairments might stem from these broader cognitive deficits rather than a lack of language proficiency.

Brain damage can affect multiple brain regions and their connections, leading to a wide range of cognitive impairments. It is possible that the observed deficits in reasoning and problem-solving are due to damage to specific brain regions responsible for these functions, rather than a disruption of language processing itself.

While the presence of intact language abilities does not guarantee intact thinking abilities, it is necessary to consider the potential confounding factors, such as broader cognitive deficits or damage to other brain regions, before concluding that language is not sufficient for thought. Further research is needed to disentangle the complex relationship between language and thought and to determine the specific contributions of language to various cognitive processes.

To me thinking is primary tool of communication between I and “me” and it’s entirely based on sound and language.

Can you think without using language?

When you have song playing in your head, how is that different from your thoughts?

Isn’t talking out loud just act of thinking, the output being connected to mouth?

Have you ever tried to repeat mantra in your thought, slow down until coming to full stop? What remains when thinking stops?

Have you noticed that thinking is like breathing, in a way that it’s happening automatically and you can also take over?

Have you noticed that thinking consciously is linked with breath and being aware of space?

Fascinating topic!

This can be annoying: when my wife asks me what I'm thinking about, if I'm thinking about something relatively linguistic (an HN comment, say), it's easy to tell her. Otherwise, I need a fair amount of time and effort to make the consecutive interpretation (and forget about simultaneous!).

Further evidence that my thought is not especially language-mediated: my wife and I share a little over three languages in common; however translating into any of these is about as difficult as any other, suggesting that the original thought is equally "far away" from all of them.

But since words are not thoughts, and further they are not mental actions (such as relaxing), saying different words in your head is only useful if they help put you in a frame of mind where you can access, or discover, the right thoughts or 'mental actions'.

I conjecture that within the diversity of human minds, there are some for whom language closely bound to thoughts and mental actions, and others less so, and that talk therapy is more useful for the former than the latter. If this is true, then it is also likely to be the case that most talk therapists are of the former persuasion, since they are not likely to espouse a practice which has no effect on themselves.

If I'm solving some complicated problem, this is a big deal since if my solution to a sub-problem changes that's very bad. Of course also I can then write my thoughts down and refer back to them repeatedly so I can be sure they remain consistent.

Our thoughts and ideas come from an unknown source. We might call it intuition, but scientifically speaking, it remains a black box.

Lethologica - a temporary inability to remember a particular word or name - is one evidence of this. You can have a fully formed thought in your mind, but be unable to express it with words.

Language is a higher level abstraction for the brain. Sort of like a higher level programming language vs assembly or binary.

Sometimes people ask me if I think in English or my native language. I'm tempted to say "mostly not".

BTW, loose speculation: Maybe being bilingual does "free" the brain from word thinking.

I am one of those who uses language to think. I would have an internal monologue and I would also say things out loud just to see how they sound. It's not always a fully fledged idea, or even a coherent thought for that matter. I have no idea why i do this. But that is me. In a sense, my thoughts are forming when I speak. Hence, i am somewhat better at written communication than being asked for things on the spot.

I have encountered people who when they speak, are communicating their thoughts, not formulating them unlike the way I do. I have to be careful with them because they assume I am also communicating my thought vs formulating it and that makes it sound more rigid than it is in my mind. I have seen many nerds like me who understand what thinking out loud is and are more forgiving about missteps or "wrong sounding thoughts". They are also more understanding because in our experience, that is how people tend to think.

To me they appear to go hand-in-hand, similar to the way a backend’s logic may inadvertently be structured to support an API. Another metaphor may be Conway’s Law, where the way one is forced to communicate, may in turn shape the way they structure their (brain) processes.

Anecdotally, I’ve noticed that speakers of different languages seem to “think” more similarly than not. For instance, native speakers of non-English Germanic languages appear to think more similarly compared to those native speakers of Romance languages, and vice-versa.

Obviously I’m using English as a middle-man, and am likely projecting on what their internal thoughts actually are, but the pathways they take to express an idea or a solution is oftentimes more similar than not within the same base language background.

Now is language necessary for complex thought? Absolutely not. We’ve seen evidence from many different life forms that show complex problem-solving, pattern matching, and novel tool use that all seem to happen without having a seemingly complex language background (i.e. Zipf’s Law).

[2015-09] Anne C. Reboul: "Why language really is not a communication system: a cognitive view of language evolution" - , Laboratory on Language, Brain and Cognition (L2C2), Institute for Cognitive Sciences-Marc Jeannerod, Bron, France [1]

> [2013-09] Noam Chomsky: One of the most striking cases of incompatibility, that I know, is the sharp conflict between computational efficiency, and communicative efficiency. Language is just badly designed for communication, but well-designed to be efficient, it seems. [2]

> [2013-09] Noam Chomsky adds: There's a kind of phrase that is sometimes used for this that drives people crazy; "Language is beautiful, but unusable." It's kind of true, you know. Even if people don't like it. [2]

[2022] Nick Enfield: "Language vs. Reality: Why Language Is Good for Lawyers and Bad for Scientists" [3]

> Language cannot create or change physical reality, but it can do the next best thing: reframe and invert our view of the world. In Language vs. Reality, Enfield explains why language is bad for scientists (who are bound by reality) but good for lawyers (who want to win their cases), ... [3]

> [2023-01] Ev Fedorenko: "Although language and thought often go together, they are robustly dissociable." [4]

> [2023-01] Ev Fedorenko: Fallacy 1: "Good at language = Good at thought". Fallacy 2: "Bad at thought = Bad at language". Fallacy 3: "Bad at language = Bad at thought" (emphasis in being judged on how smart you are based on how you say something). [4]

[1] https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/psychology/articles/10....

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-72JNZZBoVw&t=4493s

[3] https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/5472/Language-vs-Real...

[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uE9AiYuCwdE&t=250s

Later, another former housemate, a math major who was developing software, went to law school for a JD. It was his opinion that many of the tools from computer science were useful for deciphering the more complex laws and regulations.

How you think may be a significant factor in whether you are a good match to certain occupations.

I've sometimes thought that certain aspects of law (e.g. contracts) are very similar to the strict rule-based thinking required in programming, and that the same basic logical thinking is required. It's just that some concepts have been formalised differently between the fields, and also that law has inherent fuzziness due to incomplete specification of its programs, the ambiguity of some language/phrasing, and the changing societal environment.

With programs, the computer interprets the rules deterministically (generally speaking), and we programmers are forced to draft our regulations accordingly or we'll get unwanted results. Whereas contracts are a bit less deterministically interpreted, and human incentives and potential interpretations have to be considered in drafting.

After I graduated, new professors came in who now are popularizing such methods, writing books about it, etc..

I think it’s a zeitgeist thing. If you’re too early, nobody will take you seriously. But at some point the tide is strong enough to break through.

Kinda the same as with AI/automation. I tried selling this to lawyers in 2020 and failed miserably. Three years later, ChatGPT became a thing, and now every lawyer wants a piece of AI.

It’s not the better mousetrap. It’s not people wanting new things that moves the world. It’s people not wanting to be left behind.

(Slightly paraphrasing the late Charlie Munger.)

I ask because certain assumptions that seem to be built into the paper and its references seem to exclude a lot of things that I would personally consider other forms of language. For example, they say the subjects with impairments to the parts of the brain supposedly required for speech could "follow non-verbal instructions" and "understand what another person believes". What makes those exchanges distinct from use of language, albeit a poorly defined one? I know nothing about this field of study, so I assume there's some assumptions and definitions they aren't stating explicitly. It seems weird to me that they say "these representations need not be specifically linguistic: they could be symbolic but non-linguistic (for example, ‘9’), and the use of symbolic non-linguistic representations does not engage linguistic resources (for example, mathematical reasoning elicits no response in the language brain areas and is preserved in individuals with severe aphasia". Why not go back and question the initial assumption that all language depends on those specific parts of the brain? Why are symbols not language?

They say we don't use language for thought, but language informs our strategies and choices, and collective experience is essential for progress. We only add small increments of insight from our own experiences to the pool, but the experience captured in language is greater than any one of us.

And more interestingly, LLMs trained on this data show amazing capabilities that go beyond mere reproduction. LLMs gain everything Einstein lost in this experiment, what is the language part and what is the pure insight part? Looks to me humans are like LLMs on feet, and with a full social complement surrounding them.

It'd be akin to chatting with an isolated tribesman - that alone would already be fascinating and endlessly informative. These are people who can walk into the woods naked, and walk out weeks later fed, clothed, and sheltered. And now also add in this individual happening to be a several sigma outlier in learning capacity, creativity, and so on. It'd be an absolutely fascinating discussion!

If language were merely a tool for communicating thoughts rather than an integral part of thinking, then talking aloud wouldn’t help. But since raising the volume of one’s internal monologue does improve reasoning, this shows that the internal monologue is part of the thinking process - not a passive reflection of thought that is happening “elsewhere”.

Yes, of course you can engage in complex thought without language. There is verbal and non-verbal reasoning. A chess player thinks spatially in terms of how the knight moves, not just verbally, though verbal reasoning does help in chess somewhat.

In fact languages codify a community’s culture, values, a way of life all of which go way beyond communication.

Indeed. And my non-expert assertion was that our brain doesn't compartmentalise between communication and thought processing. Our thoughts are getting shaped even as we are verbalising something. IMO it's a continuous stream of chatter of jumbled up things a part of which gets used to create/shape our thoughts.