打算终止 OCSP 服务
Intent to end OCSP service

原始链接: https://letsencrypt.org/2024/07/23/replacing-ocsp-with-crls.html

Let's Encrypt 宣布决定逐步取消对在线证书状态协议 (OCSP) 的支持,并专门过渡到证书吊销列表 (CRL)。 与 OCSP 相比,该交换机具有多项优势,包括改进的隐私保护、简化基础设施和节约资源。 自成立以来,Let's Encrypt 已提供 OCSP 响应,并于 2022 年增加了对 CRL 的支持。虽然网站和访问者不会注意到任何变化,但某些非浏览器应用程序可能会因缺乏 OCSP 兼容性而遇到问题。 放弃 OCSP 很大程度上源于隐私问题; OCSP 根据用户的 IP 地址向证书颁发机构 (CA) 揭示用户访问的网站,这可能会暴露敏感数据。 与 OCSP 不同,CRL 保持用户匿名。 此外,维护 OCSP 需要宝贵的资源,否则这些资源将有助于改善运营的其他方面。 此外,CA/浏览器论坛最近为公共信任 CA 提供了可选的 OCSP 服务,减少了对 OCSP 的依赖。 除 Microsoft 外,所有主要 root 程序现在都无需 OCSP 即可运行,预计 Microsoft 很快也会效仿。 在微软采取类似政策后,Let's Encrypt将提供停止OCSP服务的时间表,目标是在此后三到六个月内完成过渡。 要随时了解更新,请注册 Discourse 上的 API 公告类别。 依赖 OCSP 服务的用户必须及时迁移,以避免 OCSP 服务器停用后遇到问题。 确保支持非浏览器通信的软件在不存在 OCSP URL 的情况下正常运行。 当前大多数 OCSP 实现都会安全失败,这意味着即使无法检索 OCSP 响应,它们也会继续运行。 最后,负责逐步淘汰 OCSP 的实体 Let's Encrypt 是互联网安全研究组织 (ISRG) 的一部分,该组织是一个致力于确保在线安全的非营利组织。 您可以通过参与、捐赠或企业赞助来帮助维持其努力。

在引入 OCSP Watch(一种旨在监控证书颁发机构 (CA) 响应的工具)后,发现 CA 对证书透明度 (CT) 日志中发现的证书频繁响应“未知”或“未经授权”,表明旧的和废弃的证书。 这引起了人们的担忧,因为这些丢失或过期的证书可能在没有适当监控的情况下仍然处于活动状态,从而带来安全风险。 传统的证书吊销列表 (CRL) 无法识别此类错误,因为它们主要记录吊销的证书,而不是为所有已颁发的证书提供实时状态更新。 为了解决此问题,建议消除在证书本身中包含在线证书状态协议 (OCSP) URL 的必要性,而是强制要求在证书颁发机构数据库 (CCADB) 中公开每个 CA 的 OCSP URL。 通过这样做,我们将消除隐私问题并降低与维护 OCSP 响应程序相关的运营成本,确保证书状态的持续透明度。 但是,在处理证书使用中的时间戳时存在一些限制,特别是对于吊销时间很重要的联合签名或电子签名场景。 根据现行标准,证书一旦颁发,就不能因其颁发前发生的事件而更改其撤销。 这阻碍了检查先前颁发的证书的有效性,并且需要在其整个生命周期内维护准确的记录。 撤销中间 CA 时会出现另一个挑战,因为在撤销之前颁发的证书无效,导致设备难以获取这些受影响证书的更新撤销详细信息。 在网页浏览之外的许多场景中,缺乏适当的吊销机制会导致证书状态检查未经验证,从而导致性能下降或完全放弃吊销检查。 尽管流行的浏览器通常会下载并刷新 CRL 列表,但鲜为人知的软件包可能缺乏类似的功能,需要下载大型且繁琐的 CRL 文件,甚至无法完全验证证书状态。 像 CRLite 这样更加用户友好的解决方案可以解决状态信息检索中的错误,应该得到更广泛的采用,以确保跨不同平台的可靠认证流程。
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原文

Today we are announcing our intent to end Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) support in favor of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) as soon as possible. OCSP and CRLs are both mechanisms by which CAs can communicate certificate revocation information, but CRLs have significant advantages over OCSP. Let’s Encrypt has been providing an OCSP responder since our launch nearly ten years ago. We added support for CRLs in 2022.

Websites and people who visit them will not be affected by this change, but some non-browser software might be.

We plan to end support for OCSP primarily because it represents a considerable risk to privacy on the Internet. When someone visits a website using a browser or other software that checks for certificate revocation via OCSP, the Certificate Authority (CA) operating the OCSP responder immediately becomes aware of which website is being visited from that visitor’s particular IP address. Even when a CA intentionally does not retain this information, as is the case with Let’s Encrypt, CAs could be legally compelled to collect it. CRLs do not have this issue.

We are also taking this step because keeping our CA infrastructure as simple as possible is critical for the continuity of compliance, reliability, and efficiency at Let’s Encrypt. For every year that we have existed, operating OCSP services has taken up considerable resources that can soon be better spent on other aspects of our operations. Now that we support CRLs, our OCSP service has become unnecessary.

In August of 2023 the CA/Browser Forum passed a ballot to make providing OCSP services optional for publicly trusted CAs like Let’s Encrypt. With one exception, Microsoft, the root programs themselves no longer require OCSP. As soon as the Microsoft Root Program also makes OCSP optional, which we are optimistic will happen within the next six to twelve months, Let’s Encrypt intends to announce a specific and rapid timeline for shutting down our OCSP services. We hope to serve our last OCSP response between three and six months after that announcement. The best way to stay apprised of updates on these plans is to subscribe to our API Announcements category on Discourse.

We recommend that anyone relying on OCSP services today start the process of ending that reliance as soon as possible. If you use Let’s Encrypt certificates to secure non-browser communications such as a VPN, you should ensure that your software operates correctly if certificates contain no OCSP URL. Fortunately, most OCSP implementations “fail open” which means that an inability to fetch an OCSP response will not break the system.

Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) is the parent organization of Let’s Encrypt, Prossimo, and Divvi Up. ISRG is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit. If you’d like to support our work, please consider getting involved, donating, or encouraging your company to become a sponsor.

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