Apple 内存违背了 OCSP 选择退出的承诺
Apple memory holed its broken promise for an OCSP opt-out

原始链接: https://lapcatsoftware.com/articles/2024/8/3.html

2020 年,苹果承诺允许用户在设备启动应用程序时选择退出安全检查。 然而,近四年过去了,苹果仍未实现这一功能。 此外,有证据表明苹果删除了一份详细说明这一承诺的支持文件。 最初,苹果声称他们将停止收集与开发者 ID 证书检查相关的 IP 地址数据,但没有观察到任何变化。 相反,苹果继续使用其在线证书状态协议(OCSP)系统来确认应用程序的真实性。 2020 年,发生了大规模 OCSP 中断,导致尝试运行应用程序的 Mac 用户出现全球性问题。 因此,苹果承诺提高其安全措施的可靠性和隐私性,包括为用户提供选择退出的选项。 尽管做出了这样的承诺,苹果公司还是未能提供此功能。 因此,隐私倡导者认为,如果用户不能信赖苹果对隐私的保证,就会引发对该科技巨头的其他主张的质疑,例如维护用户数据的机密性。 为了减轻潜在威胁,一些人建议使用 Little Snitch 等第三方软件来管理网络流量。

讨论围绕操作证书状态协议 (OSCP),这是一种用于验证数字证书有效性的方法。 批评者认为,以纯文本形式发送域名信息会带来隐私风险。 然而,OSCP 的支持者强调了它的好处,例如提供实时证书状态检查以及无需下载很快就会过时的大型证书吊销列表 (CRL)。 如果配置正确,OSCP 会降低浏览器默认采用不太安全设置的可能性。 一些批评来自需要维护响应式 OSCP 基础设施的证书颁发机构 (CA)。 该帖子建议通过强制 OSCP 装订来解决这些隐私问题,限制 OSCP 响应者对 Web 服务器的基础设施要求。 作者认为 OCSP 本身并没有缺陷,尽管 Ballot SC63 似乎已达成共识。 讨论继续讨论 AdGuard,这是一个 DNS 过滤器应用程序,用于阻止不需要的广告和跟踪。 用户根据自己的喜好自定义阻止级别,并提供不同程度的严格性。 它通过更改设备的默认 DNS 服务器来发挥作用,从而提高客户端兼容性,同时保持高水平的隐私。 某些应用程序存在一些限制,特别是那些需要特定 DNS 配置的应用程序。 一名用户在服务于 50 多个用户的本地网络中使用多个 AdGuard,各个用户可以根据自己的偏好修改其限制级别。 由于限制,银行应用程序通常无法运行。 尽管受到限制,YouTube 仍在运营,尽管有前置广告。 谈话涉及与苹果和谷歌这两个著名科技巨头相关的信任和隐私。 两家公司都被认为致力于保护各自生态系统内的用户数据。 虽然苹果专注于在其生态系统内保护用户数据的机密性,但它允许有针对性的广告曝光。 另一方面,谷歌在其生态系统内对用户数据进行保密,并避免与外部实体共享个人详细信息,并将收集到的数据用作其广告帝国的基础。 对于哪家公司更注重隐私,人们的意见存在分歧,这取决于人们对这些公司在个人生活中所扮演的角色的看法。 接下来简要提及 OSCP,讨论其在确保软件完整性方面的作用,特别是防止恶意软件广泛传播。 OSCP验证数字签名
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原文
Apple memory holed its broken promise for an OCSP opt-out
Jeff Johnson (My apps, PayPal.Me, Mastodon)

Feedback Assistant Boycott

August 7 2024

When you launch an app, macOS connects to Apple's OCSP service to check whether the app's Developer ID code signing certificate has been revoked by Apple. In November 2020, Apple's OCSP service experienced a mass outage, preventing Mac users worldwide from launching apps. In response and remedy to this outage, Apple made several explicit promises to Mac users in a support document, which can still be seen in a Wayback Machine archive from September 24, 2023.

To further protect privacy, we have stopped logging IP addresses associated with Developer ID certificate checks, and we will ensure that any collected IP addresses are removed from logs.

In addition, over the the next year we will introduce several changes to our security checks:

  • A new encrypted protocol for Developer ID certificate revocation checks
  • Strong protections against server failure
  • A new preference for users to opt out of these security protections

The last item, "A new preference for users to opt out of these security protections", has never been implemented in macOS, and two years ago I wrote that Apple reneged on OCSP privacy.

Now I've discovered that on September 26, 2023, the day that macOS 14 Sonoma was released to the public, Apple erased its promise from the support document. This can also be seen with the Wayback Machine.

Oddly, the original support document URL https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202491 now redirects to a slightly different support document URL https://support.apple.com/en-us/102445, though the content of the two documents remains mostly the same.

Apple's broken promise is shameful. The company apparently hopes we forget that it ever made the promise. Apple talks a good game, claiming "privacy is a fundamental human right", yadda yadda, but talk is cheap. When it comes to our right to stop our devices from phoning home to Cupertino, Apple is not interested. And if we can't trust Apple to keep its promises, then why should we trust anything else that Apple says, such as that our IP addresses are not logged? After all, it's impossible for us to verify this from the outside. Trust is earned through actions, and in this case Apple has neglected to act.

At this point, the only way to protect your own privacy is to use a firewall such as Little Snitch to block the connections.

Feedback Assistant Boycott

Jeff Johnson (My apps, PayPal.Me, Mastodon)
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