使用“后门”将患者数据发送到中国IP地址的中国制造的健康监视器广泛使用
Widely Used Chinese-Made Health Monitor Using 'Backdoor' To Send Patient Data To Chinese IP Address

原始链接: https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/widely-used-chinese-made-health-monitor-using-backdoor-send-patient-data-chinese-ip-address

美国网络安全和基础设施安全机构(CISA)在CONTEC CMS8000患者监控设备中发现了一个后门,从而使数据传输和执行来自大学IP地址的文件。该后门也被发现在重塑的Epsimed Mn-1220监视器中。 后门将远程NFS共享并将文件复制到设备上,从而提供潜在的远程访问和控制。 CISA警告说,此漏洞允许第三方覆盖文件,更改设备配置并有可能远程控制。 这一发现引起了人们对中国制造的健康监测器收集的患者健康数据安全性的担忧。在没有适当授权的情况下,将这种敏感信息(包括血压读数和潜在损害图像)的传播传播给外国大学。


原文

They've hacked everything else in the U.S., so why would we be surprised to find out that patient health data collected by Chinese-made health monitors was being sent, via 'backdoor' to China. 

Now China has access to Janet Yellen's photos (god we hope there's no nudes) and your blood pressure on a random Tuesday. 

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warns that Contec CMS8000, a widely used patient monitoring device, contains a backdoor that transmits patient data to a remote IP and downloads executable files, according to BleepingComputer.

Contec, a China-based healthcare tech company, produces various medical devices. CISA was alerted by an external researcher and, after testing the device’s firmware, found unusual network traffic linking to a hard-coded external IP tied to a university, not the company.

CISA discovered a backdoor in Contec CMS8000 firmware, enabling remote execution and full control of patient monitors. The device also secretly transmits patient data to a hard-coded IP upon startup, with no logs to alert administrators.

Though CISA withheld details, BleepingComputer linked the IP to a Chinese university, and the same address appears in other medical devices, including a pregnancy monitor. The FDA confirmed the backdoor also exists in Epsimed MN-120 monitors, rebranded versions of Contec CMS8000.

The BleepingComputer report says:

On analyzing the firmware, CISA found that one of the device's executables, 'monitor,' contains a backdoor that issues a series of Linux commands that enable the device's network adapter (eth0) and then attempts to mount a remote NFS share at the hard-coded IP address belonging to the university.

The NFS share is mounted at /mnt/ and the backdoor recursively copies the files from the /mnt/ folder to the /opt/bin folder.

The backdoor will continue to copy files from /opt/bin to the /opt folder and, when done, unmount the remote NFS share.

"Though the /opt/bin directory is not part of default Linux installations, it is nonetheless a common Linux directory structure," explains CISA's advisory.

CISA warned: "Generally, Linux stores third-party software installations in the /opt directory and thirdparty binaries in the /opt/bin directory. The ability to overwrite files within the /opt/bin directory provides a powerful primitive for remotely taking over the device and remotely altering the device configuration."

"Additionally, the use of symbolic links could provide a primitive to overwrite files anywhere on the device filesystem. When executed, this function offers a formidable primitive allowing for a third-party operating at the hard-coded IP address to potentially take full control of the device remotely."

You can read more of the technicals on the backdoor here. Oh, and go ahead and keep plugging your personal data into Deepseek, we're sure that's just fine. 

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