Submitted by Thomas Kolbe

The United States is fighting against EU opinion control on digital platforms. From the perspective of the European Commission, this constitutes an unacceptable interference in internal affairs, which is why it is now delaying the ratification of the trade deal. In the meantime, the cost of higher tariffs due to the delay is being borne by the European economy.

Dealing with the EU is truly a headache. To be precise: The European Commission, under the leadership of its President Ursula von der Leyen, is currently squandering the last remnants of respect and trust it had left after the Pfizer scandal, the strict lockdowns, and continuous attacks on freedom of speech. The issue at hand in the continuation of trade negotiations with the United States concerns exactly this fundamental right of free citizens.

Clear Rules

Everything was essentially settled: The EU conceded and accepted the unilateral tariffs of 15 percent. Moreover, it committed to purchasing U.S. energy, such as liquefied natural gas, worth $750 billion spread over three years. Whether the market can actually absorb this volume and whether private industry can manage the coordination is another question.

The rules are unambiguous: The EU grants U.S. businesses free access to the EU single market, while, of course, the jungle-like harmonization and climate protection regulations still apply. These form the true, complex, and largely insurmountable trade barrier for most international competitors. This intricate framework, the core of the European Commission's interventionism, was accepted by the Americans. From the perspective of European industry, this is unfortunate, but the devastating domestic effects of EU protectionism and the climate fight under President Trump are irrelevant. It is the responsibility of European citizens to put an end to this disastrous policy.

Root of the Conflict

During the negotiations in Scotland, the U.S. side also made clear that it would not tolerate the massive attacks by Brussels on American communication platforms like X or Meta without pushback. And that is exactly what this is about.

Until the final signing of the trade deal between the U.S. and the EU, the pre-set higher U.S. tariffs remain in effect. For Germany’s key industry—the automotive sector—the delay is disastrous. Instead of 15 percent, manufacturers must still pay the higher tariff of 27.5 percent. The burdens add up: BMW, for example, expected tariffs of one billion euros this year. VW reported a tariff damage of 1.3 billion euros in the first half of the year alone due to U.S. tariffs that only came into force in April.

The tariffs strain already heavily restricted margins due to climate and energy policies. BMW estimates the margin loss from the trade dispute with the U.S. at around 1.25 percent. A quick deal would therefore be crucial to provide the German economy with much-needed relief in its struggle to stay competitive.

Calculation Without von der Leyen

A conclusion of the trade deal would be both possible and reasonable. But the German economy did not count on Ursula von der Leyen. The negotiations could now be finalized quickly to provide legal certainty for German businesses. Washington is ready, and President Trump has likely turned to more important matters. His tolerance for Brussels’ whining and endless trickery is probably limited. Everything points to a quick deal.

Yet for von der Leyen and her Brussels allies, other priorities take precedence.

What this exactly means was made clear last week by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. He instructed U.S. diplomats in the European Union to actively oppose the increasingly aggressive implementation of the Digital Services Act (DSA) by Brussels. Cases of abuse and attacks against U.S. citizens should be reported immediately. Rubio also wants active lobbying by U.S. representatives in EU political circles to counter this open attack on freedom of speech.

EU Censorship Attack

More than a month ago, the accompanying Digital Markets Act (DMA) became the focal point of the transatlantic dispute. At that time, Donald Trump insisted on having a say in interpreting the rules, which, like the DSA, primarily targets dominant U.S. communication platforms.

At its core, Brussels aims to enforce its censorship policies precisely on those platforms that are becoming increasingly important for public discourse. Disguised in the politically overused formula of “hate and incitement,” the digital communication space is to be brought under public censorship control.

Brussels has likely noticed that counter-narratives targeting centralized eco-authoritarianism are forming primarily on these platforms. They increasingly expose the functioning and objectives of the EU power apparatus.

To secure its censorship policy, Ursula von der Leyen and her Brussels apparatus willingly accept that, in the end, both companies and European consumers pay the price of the EU’s control mania through higher tariffs.

The U.S. will maintain the current tariff regime until a robust agreement is reached on handling European censorship policy.

Washington’s hardline stance gives hope that Brussels will suffer a significant setback in its attempt to establish a digital speech dictatorship.

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About the author: Thomas Kolbe, a German graduate economist, has worked for over 25 years as a journalist and media producer for clients from various industries and business associations. As a publicist, he focuses on economic processes and observes geopolitical events from the perspective of the capital markets. His publications follow a philosophy that focuses on the individual and their right to self-determination.