使用低成本嵌入式时域反射仪的防篡改网格
Tamper-Sensing Meshes Using Low-Cost, Embedded Time-Domain Reflectometry

原始链接: https://jaseg.de/blog/paper-sampling-mesh-monitor/

一种新的、低成本的防篡改网格监测方法——用于保护高安全设备免受物理攻击——已被开发,并详细内容已发表在CHES/TCHES 2026会议论文中。该系统利用时域反射计 (TDR),元件成本约为10欧元,实现皮秒级分辨率。 传统的网格监测依赖于电阻测量,灵敏度有限且容易出现误报。更先进的射频技术成本高昂或需要专门的网格设计。这种新方法利用廉价的STM32微控制器和现成的DisplayPort/HDMI“再驱动器”芯片(如TI的TDP0604和Diodes的PI3HDX12211)来产生快速脉冲,并结合肖特基二极管进行采样。 由此产生的TDR电路创建了网格的独特“指纹”,能够实现精确的篡改检测,甚至可以区分由同一制造商生产的看似相同的网格,因为存在细微的差异。源代码和详细测量数据已公开提供。

这个Hacker News讨论围绕一篇研究论文,详细介绍了一种使用时域反射计 (TDR) 的低成本防篡改网状网络。该系统旨在通过监测网状网络内的电信号变化来检测物理入侵。 用户认为这篇论文很有趣,尤其赞赏其创新地使用ST HRTIMERs来替代传统TDR设置中昂贵的延迟线组件。一个突出的关键挑战是验证系统的性能,因为它需要专门的设备。 一位评论员提出了关于TDR产生的快速边缘可能导致辐射发射的担忧,这可能会使生产复杂化。另一位则质疑TDR相比于更简单、更便宜的方法(如惠斯通电桥)提高的灵敏度在实际应用中的必要性,认为该项目可能更偏学术研究,而非立即适用于诸如保护支付终端之类的应用。
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原文
A PCB with several chips sitting on a table with another PCB
    with only traces on it plugged in through a board-edge connector. The first PCB looks not very complex.
The final setup. On the right is the measurement board, and on the left is the mesh test specimen plugged in. In a real application, you would integrate both into your target circuit.

I've got a new paper accepted at CHES, to be published in TCHES 2026/1 around beginning of December and out on eprint now. The topic of the paper is a way of monitoring a tamper-sensing mesh through time-domain reflectometry using very cheap components. The end result is a circuit that costs about 10 € in parts that is able to measure TDR responses with a few hundred picoseconds of resolution.

Tamper-Sensing meshes are squiggly circuit traces that are used to tamper-proof high-security devices like hardware security modules, ATM pin pads and countertop card payment terminals. Any area where you would like to prevent an attacker from drilling or sawing through in a physical attack, you completely cover with one or more such circuit traces in a meandering pattern. I've written up some work on a KiCad plugin for creating these meshes in another post.

Up to now, the state of the art in monitoring these security meshes has mostly been finding ways to precisely monitor their ohmic resistance in the analog domain. This has the disadvantage of both being fairly complex in circuitry and of presenting a steep trade-off between sensitivity and false-positive rate since all you get out of the whole mesh is a single analog measurement containing maybe 12 to 16 bits of entropy. There have been a few papers on using more advanced RF techniques, but they all either required really expensive circuitry and/or highly customized meshes that for instance couldn't easily be fitted into arbitrary shapes.

Four plots showing edge response for four different chips: 74LVC2G157,
    MAX3748, TDP0604 and PI3HDX12211. The first two are fairly slow at about 1 ns risetime, while the last two are
    very fast at around 300 ps risetime.
The sampling edges as measured by the board itself. As you can see, using a cheap microcontroller and some cheap display signal redriver ICs along with commodity RF schottkies you can get pretty spicy edges on a budget. Link to full resolution.

In this paper, I wrote up a method using the high-resolution timer of an inexpensive STM32G4-series microcontroller together with a DisplayPort/HDMI "redriver" chips meant for amplifying high-speed display signals to create fast pulse edges. I characterized several chips, with the best performers being TI's TDP0604 and Diodes' PI3HDX12211, coming in at 2 to 5 € depending on where and how much you buy. The fast edges generated by these drivers are then fed to a set of four-diode sampling gates using cheap RF schottky diodes to create a really cheap but fast time-domain reflectometer. Using this TDRD circuit, a security mesh can be monitored much more precisely than before, since the circuit creates a sort of fingerprint of the mesh's trace along its length.

One of the fun highlights of this project to me was micro-soldering test boards using different redriver ICs. Above, you can see the result of that soldering work. I was really happy with my cheap aliexpress microscope and with my fancy titanium tweezers!

Have a look into the paper, where I wrote up details on the circuitry as well as a whole bunch of (>1000!) measurements characterizing the system. As it turns out, it's really sensitive to attacks while being reasonably robust to environmental disturbances. In fact, it's so sensitive that the circuit can distinguish multiple identical (!) copies of the same mesh produces by JLCPCB from their manufacturing tolerances such as FR-4 fiber weave alignment.

You can find a preprint of the paper on eprint, and I'll update this post with a link to the published version of the paper when it becomes available. The eprint is identical to the published version as of now.

The source code of the project is available at https://git.jaseg.de/sampling-mesh-monitor.git.

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