利用静默送达回执监控即时通讯用户
Exploiting silent delivery receipts to monitor users on instant messengers

原始链接: https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.11194

## 漫不经心的低语:移动消息中的隐私风险 这篇研究论文详细描述了一种影响流行的移动即时通讯应用程序(如WhatsApp和Signal)的隐私漏洞,该漏洞源于静默送达回执的使用。研究人员证明,攻击者可以通过发送旨在触发这些回执的消息,在用户不知情的情况下反复“ping”他们。 这使得能够秘密监控用户的活动——确定他们的手机是开机还是关机,估计他们活跃设备的数量,甚至识别他们的操作系统。至关重要的是,目标用户不会收到这些“ping”的任何通知。 除了监视之外,这种技术还可以被用于拒绝服务攻击,耗尽电池寿命或数据流量。由于只需要一个电话号码就可以定位用户,因此该漏洞影响了大量人群。作者建议重新设计送达回执系统,以减轻这些重大的隐私风险。

一篇新的研究论文“Careless Whisper”详细描述了Signal等即时通讯应用中的隐私漏洞。该研究表明,“静默送达回执”——即使消息未被阅读也发送的确认信息——可能被利用来识别与特定电话号码关联的设备。 本质上,一个能够观察网络流量(无需解密内容)的攻击者可以使用这些回执来监控用户活动。鉴于潜在的国家级对手,这尤其令人担忧。 Hacker News上的讨论强调了Signal基金会缺乏回应,引发了隐私倡导者的担忧。用户指出,即使送达回执是预期功能,将它们发送到无效消息也代表着一个需要立即关注的重大错误。该漏洞允许设备识别,从而构成实质性的隐私风险。
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原文

View a PDF of the paper titled Careless Whisper: Exploiting Silent Delivery Receipts to Monitor Users on Mobile Instant Messengers, by Gabriel K. Gegenhuber and 6 other authors

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Abstract:With over 3 billion users globally, mobile instant messaging apps have become indispensable for both personal and professional communication. Besides plain messaging, many services implement additional features such as delivery and read receipts informing a user when a message has successfully reached its target. This paper highlights that delivery receipts can pose significant privacy risks to users. We use specifically crafted messages that trigger delivery receipts allowing any user to be pinged without their knowledge or consent. By using this technique at high frequency, we demonstrate how an attacker could extract private information such as the online and activity status of a victim, e.g., screen on/off. Moreover, we can infer the number of currently active user devices and their operating system, as well as launch resource exhaustion attacks, such as draining a user's battery or data allowance, all without generating any notification on the target side. Due to the widespread adoption of vulnerable messengers (WhatsApp and Signal) and the fact that any user can be targeted simply by knowing their phone number, we argue for a design change to address this issue.
From: Gabriel Karl Gegenhuber [view email]
[v1] Sun, 17 Nov 2024 22:58:28 UTC (738 KB)
[v2] Tue, 19 Nov 2024 11:26:29 UTC (986 KB)
[v3] Tue, 1 Jul 2025 14:41:35 UTC (1,364 KB)
[v4] Fri, 31 Oct 2025 10:57:27 UTC (929 KB)
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