(评论)
(comments)

原始链接: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39444500

总体而言,由于对电话号码的要求,与其他替代方案相比,Signal 在实际用途上的缺点似乎较少。 虽然它可能会在可发现性和可用性方面限制用户,但它提​​供了针对垃圾邮件和网络钓鱼尝试的强大保护。 此外,密封发件人功能提供了进一步的元数据保护,尽管仅限于防止观察通信模式而不是保护个人聊天本身。 此外,Signal 的透明度工作为数据处理实践提供了一些保证。 然而,最终仍然存在某些限制和妥协,特别是与元数据保存相关的限制和妥协。 与其他产品相比,Matrix 和类似产品面临着使用水平和垃圾邮件控制方面的挑战,凸显了通过工程决策解决权衡问题的重要性。 总体而言,Signal 在平衡竞争优先事项的背景下提供了一个务实的选择。

相关文章

原文
Hacker News new | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submit login
Keep your phone number private with Signal usernames (signal.org)
1213 points by Josely 16 hours ago | hide | past | favorite | 727 comments










This is fantastic! I also love that there is the QR code generator. It'll make connecting easier.

I hope moving forward we can have multiple usernames and profiles. This would greatly increase privacy since we may have different identities in different social groups. Even on HN a lot of us have multiple personas. I find one of the big challenges is actually handling these different identities as most software only assumes you have one. Though it seems to be common on social media like twitter or instagram. But bitwarden still doesn't know how to differentiate microsoft logins lol

Edit: I'd love in the future to also see things like self destructing or one time links. I don't think these should be hard to implement, especially if one can have multiple usernames. Certainly a limit like 3 would be fine with the numbers, right? Personally I wouldn't be upset if multiple names became a premium feature but I'd strongly prefer if it wasn't. I get that signal still needs money (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39446053)



> But bitwarden still doesn't know how to differentiate microsoft logins

To be fair to Bitwarden even Microsoft doesn't know how to differentiate between multiple Microsoft logins. As of at least a year ago, you can technically have different logins with the same username/email identifier, and different login prompts will behave differently.



Also nice to mention that some of those are connected and some are not. For example I have a personal account (that I did not create but appeared magically at some point; it behaves as totally separate), a work account (main work tenant) and three guest work tenants that share the password, but don't share the 2fa. For some apps you chose the tenant, but not for all.


indeed, with an incoming Teams meeting invite, it should be determinable from the sender's context which account should work on the meeting. Instead there is 2 minutes of waiting, and what seems like pot luck with the account.


Oh yeah it was more a joke than anything. Microsoft is just creating such a shitty environment. I can be logging in from my company portal where they know the identifier yet I still have to add @company.com. I mean I got one for my job, for my university, for conferences (CMT), and I swear I'm forgetting 30 others that I only use once in a blue moon.

They also are real shady with yubikeys. You can't set them as default but you can set "security key." So the process ends up being it assuming you want to use Hello (which breaks my Outlook... wtf), clicking use another device, security key, clicking next, then finally typing in your credentials. The next part makes me real suspicious since all the other dialogues go to the next page without clicking next. Why just this page? It's some weird dark pattern bs.

I'd call it malicious, but I think maliciousness requires intent. A chicken running around with its head cut off isn't really malicious if it runs into you.



You can use these “features” to hijack accounts too ;)

I’d call them bugs, but they’ve been reported and didn’t get fixed.



Telegram has had all of these features for a while… too bad it isn't as secure as signal or it'd be perfect, since it's also written in a real GUI toolkit and present in distribution repositories.

I do wonder how telegram and signal are planning to finance it long term. Telegram is adding absurd paid features like exclusive animations, which won't earn nearly enough to cover the costs.

I wonder where signal is about keeping the servers up, since they hate federation so much.



Telegram and Signal solves very different types of privacy issues.

Telegram is good, as you mention, to be relatively private in groups/chats/channels without a need to expose neither your phone nor even a nickname (unless you live in autocratic countries — will come to this later).

But it comes with costs. First, their p2p communication is not e2e encrypted by default. Not to say that all comments/group chats are not encrypted too, unlike let’s say WA.

Second, Telegram API. It gives too much information. You can do a lot with it: read history, track changes of usernames, etc. For example, it is quite easy to obtain an internal user ID and there are black market services and databases where they promise to connect that ID with phone number if that account ever had privacy settings switched off in the past.

Claimed that they kind of scrape all accounts and pair ID for those where privacy settings set poorly. Even if you change it later — your internal ID and that scrape will state forever.

Third, Telegram was funded by Russian government since Durov had issues with SEC. He raised money from different Russian state-owned banks like VTB, issued bonds which are traded in Saint-Petersburg stock exchange, and even take some money directly from Russian government though a Qatar proxy-company. Not to say, that there are cases when TG was involved in criminal charges against people (the most famous one is story with Ryanair plane being forced to land in Minsk to arrest Lukashenko’s critique) and it was never directly addressed and explained by company how exactly those people was caught and how company protect against “SIM card replacement” cases (Signal at least inform me everytime my peer logged to new device).

Selecting between Signal with AFAIK no known cases of charges in dictatorship countries like Russia, funded by non-profitable charity, and TG without default e2e encryption, public API and Russian-state funding, is quite obvious for me.



It was also banned and blocked in Russia for several years. It was only unbanned when they agreed to cooperate with security services.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blocking_of_Telegram_in_Russia



More to this “lucky coincidence” it was unbanned exactly when Durov failed in trouble with SEC and raised Russian-state money to solve his problems. Around same time almost all official Russian institutions open TG accounts and Russian Parliament (if we can call that silly thing like this) representatives was saying like “we solved all problems with them”.

When war started, and Russia banned a lot of services like FB, they created list of communication platforms they have questions about loyalty and cooperation with Russian government. TG was not on that list and through the whole war the only issue was about Telegraph — supplementary platform to publish long notes. AFAIK there was 0 questions or criticisms to TG in those 2 years.

As for me, it says a lot



I didn't know a lot of this. I thought Telegram was mostly funded through Durov's Bitcoin and VK money? It feels strange that he'd be so "in bed" with the Russian govt when the whole reason he left was because of his staunch opposition to taking down Navalny's VK page. But I haven't done extensive reading on this.


Durov was indeed an opposition to Russian govt for some time and TG was banned in Russia for some time.

But then “SEC-incident” happened. He and his brother wanted to build TON and fund it by kind of ICO (without naming it ICO). SEC decides enough is enough and blocked launch of TON with charging Durov for selling unregistered securities.

At the end, issue was settled, Durov returned all money and settle the deal with SEC, but it shrinks his finance by a lot and he ran out of money for TG.

Then he was seen in Russia and issued bonds for $1 bln. According to Russian financial press [1], bonds were underwritten by Russian banks closely affiliated with government or directly stated-owned (all of them are in sanctions list now), and even some money was invested by Russian Fund of Direct Investments [2]. Last summer he again issued bonds for TG for $270 mln. You can buy TG bonds at SPB stock exchange where they were listed 2 weeks after the issuing [3].

Surprisingly (repeating my comment below), around same time, Russian govt withdrew all their claims to Telegram and started to use as the official communication channel.

Not to say that other “transformations” happened like Duriv publicly denounce US declaring it is a “police state” [4]

All links in Russian, sorry:

[1] https://www.rbc.ru/finances/15/03/2021/604f11019a79478034130... [2] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-56501991.amp [3] https://www.forbes.ru/finansy-i-investicii/424665-shirokiy-k... [4] https://te.legra.ph/7-prichin-ne-pereezzhat-v-Kremnievuyu-do...



Durov personally blocked Navalny channels in Telegram during 2021 elections - https://www.rferl.org/a/telegram-navalny-smart-voting/314662... even though "technically" as a foreign legal entity they had no obligation to follow orders of Russian censorship agencies. Also, if you look up the results of court decisions in Russia, Telegram leads by a significant margin among other messengers. Yes, of course, it is the most popular messenger in Russia, but it is designed from the ground up to tie and control the circle of communication to specific people as precisely as possible.


Dictatorship exists in varous forms. Russia has democracy though in bad shape. There various flavours of democracy. But what about total dictatorship in China has no opposition and many countries with theocratic monarchy.


It's really easy to tell the difference between a democracy and a fake democracy. Democracies are messy, people never agree. Anywhere that get's consistent landslides for one person or party is not a democracy.

Take for example France vs Russia. In the 2022 election, Macron managed to get just ~30% of the voters that wanted him as President. In the second round where only two options remained, only 58%.

Without any serious opposition (with the murder of Boris Nemtsov and jailing/deregistration of Alexei Navalny), the 2018 was again a landslide for Putin with 76.69% of the vote.

There are of course other easy ways to tell, but this serves as a pretty easy heuristic.

This is, of course, a gross simplification, of everything that makes up a democracy. For example, the US is at best a flawed democracy because of all the lobbying, money and gerrymandering (and things like the Electoral College).

Disclaimer: Not American, I'm a Kiwi, so outsiders view of US politics.



Bullshit. Russia has no democracy, even in the minds of its citizens, not to say in the government. It never had and it may never have democracy. At least, until Russia exists in its current shape of form.

My bet is that they have a chance for democracy only when Russia becomes a set of little independent states. As Russia in a nutshell, is just a Muscovy that occupied other sovereign states. It was exactly like they’re trying it with Ukraine currently, again. Again, as the previous one was in 1918, when Russia ‘incorporated’ other states, what we know as ussr.



Don’t worry, telegram is now gatekeeping certain privacy settings behind the premium subscription like it’s 2003.

They also make it difficult to hide your pseudo identity from your phone contacts. I’ve had all the “discover contacts” settings turned off, and simply reinstalling the app caused people to be given my username without my consent. Settings somehow magically switched themselves back on and I couldn’t turn them off until after the damage was done.

There was no confirmation prompt. Pretty sure this happened to me more than once.

Please don’t ever compare Telegram with Signal.



> telegram is now gatekeeping certain privacy settings behind the premium subscription

Such as?



For example, now you can’t restrict who can send you a message unless you have a premium. Also they added a “feature” that premium users can bypass non-premium users privacy setting “last seen and online” and TG will tell that info regardless of your choice unless you are premium too.


You're significantly misunderstanding the changes.

> now you can’t restrict who can send you a message unless you have a premium.

And before that you just weren't able to restrict that at all, there was no such feature. They didn't remove this feature for free users - it never existed. They just added it right now only for paid users.

> premium users can bypass non-premium users privacy setting “last seen and online”

That is absolutely not what the feature is. If you hide YOUR OWN last seen time, you won't be able to see last seen time of other users, even when they have it public. Now, premium users will be able to see public last seen times of other people if they hide their own. But they obviously still can't see last seen time of people who set it to private, that would've been very dumb.



Thanks for the clarification on last seen, I certainly misread it. About messages: hm, I was sure it existed before but maybe again my brain just lags.

As someone who for some time created and moderated fairly popular chat (200+ people) for anti-war Russians, I have very long and complicated history of relationship with this service and have a lot of different grey-zone stories where it is hard to understand whether it is a mistake from users and whether it is a leak from the service.

Hence I have a little low expectation and overreact on their recent changes



I have three Telegram channels with a few hundred subscribers each, and I also use the service daily, as I'm Russian as well.

I generally agree with you that Durov makes a lot of incredibly stupid decisions. I think pretty much everyone in the "Telegram community" (eg. channel administrators, bot/client developers, etc.) would agree that the changes Telegram is introducing are often bad.

The issue, though, is that there isn't any alternative right now - Telegram is the best messenger out there in terms of general usage. So while I do hate what they're doing sometimes, I still use the product and even pay for Telegram Premium. It's bad enough to be mildly annoying, but not bar enough to actually make people leave the platform.

Edit: just as I was writing this, Telegram introduced a new feature. I'm not sure if I love it or hate it to be honest, it's a smart way for them to save money, but it is pretty weird: https://t.me/tginfo/3942



If you consider Telegram as a product to be a logical continuation of the VK message system, then all of these "features" existed.

Restricting of incoming messages existed (cloned from Facebook as usual).

Restricting of "last seen and online" existed in third-party clients. Later on VK started to actively destroy this functionality, by moving manual "is online" management from designated API into all data-fetching APIs.

Not to mention that VK and Telegram are now actively fighting with third-party clients. In which world they would not fight Ninjagram/AyuGram/Plus Messenger/other forks, which allow to add multiple accounts, hide online/reading (to some extent), show message editing history and so on?



If you consider technology to be a logical continuation of earlier technology, then all features existed.


Last online status


i've been using Telegram on and off since 2015 or so, and i've never shared my contacts. never! re-installing Telegram has never changed that setting.

The real problem with cellphones is that a lot of privacy-threatening issues are literally one fat finger away. And clearly, that's a feature, not a bug. That's why I prefer to work and message on my laptop anyway.

but again, Telegram has been, in many practical ways, much more privacy-oriented than all the other messengers, exactly because you don't have to share your phone number to participate in groups and chats.



Come on signal until today had no way to keep the phone number private. Which is the topic here.


Because unlike Telegram they strive to do things in a privacy-respecting way, and that's hard to get right.


Wasn't the saying "perfect is the enemy of good"?

While waiting to have it perfect you don't have it good either.



I don't get why people who are so paranoid about someone associating their Telegram handle with their phone number simply don't go and grab a burner SIM at Tesco.

I mean I'm all down with the idea of tech companies respecting our privacy. But here we are, complaining that corporations that are at least trying (and that are operating at a loss since their conception for our convenience) aren't giving us "Snowden hiding in Russia" level of security out of the box, for free, just because we deserve it. All while we could easily implement it ourselves for like $8 and with no online trace whatsoever.

It's like, Tails Linux exists, but FUCK GOOGLE for forcing me to Ctrl+Shift+Delete in Chrome if I want to erase a cookie. I'm so significant and certainly not a criminal, why do they hate me so much??



It's not always that simple. In many countries, like Brazil, you need a valid ID document to buy a SIM card, and the number is then and always linked to your government ID. This is the case for quite a few relatively free countries as a means to fraud prevention (not that it's particularly effective though).


Specifically for telegram there's a (rather expensive) crypto-based no-sim option: https://telegram.org/blog/ultimate-privacy-topics-2-0/ru?set...


I've tried 4 different sim cards in telegram. None of them seem to work. Not sure why a "privacy" app is asking for a phone number in the first place.


Ah, the good ol “just get a burner sim bro” argument. Tried that once, they did KYC.


I hadn’t used a burner in years, last year my phone broke on a trip and I just wanted to grab a phone, to get me through the week. I can say it’s not like it used to be! Can’t just grab one at the gas station and pop it in a phone. Gotta give ID, sign up for accounts, etc.


It depends of the country. You can buy a sim card at an Oxxo in Mexico like you would buy a bag of doritos. I did it precisely last year.

Having said that if you leave the country I am pretty sure that sim card and number would be deactivated after a few months if not connected. I am not sure how fast a number can be reused.



Telegram isn't a messaging service. It's a social network with a messenger UI. Quite ingenious, if you'd ask me, but a social network and a private messenger can't really be reconciled into a single product.


What would you classify Signal as, with its stickers, cryptocurrency (MobileCoin), etc.?


I think "social" in this context refers to frictionless friend finding, not stickers. Good privacy involves a certain level of friction, with PGP verification being a classic example of the UX problem space.


You're in luck because Signal had a whole blog post about long term financing a couple months ago.

https://signal.org/blog/signal-is-expensive/



Good reminder that need to make a new donation.


I kick in $5 a month because that's about what I figure self-hosting a messaging service would cost me. I don't want the hassle of self-hosting and I trust Signal more than the other remote hosted options.


Why do you say that Telegram isn't as secure as signal?


I’m not who you replied to, but I agree with his sentiment about signal being superior to telegram in terms of security (or more specifically, privacy).

For me, there’s two big reasons for this:

Signal chats are E2E at all times, while Telegram is only E2E when you explicitly create a “secret chat” with whoever you’re conversing with. I don’t fault Telegram too much for this, because they still provide the option to use E2E for everything, but Signal gets brownie points in my book because they just do it by default without getting in the way of the User.

Secondly, as far as I know, Telegram uses their own in house encryption techniques as opposed to industry standards. I am not at all knowledgeable about encryption or cryptography— I only know what’s required of me in my job (basically the bare minimum), and so I don’t actually know whether this is anything of serious concern. It could very well be that Telegram’s encryption techniques are just as effective as the established norms, but I do see the general consensus trending towards “roll your own encryption = bad, use established norms = good”, which is primarily what I am basing my opinion on here.

To further detract from my own point, it actually seems like Telegram might be using “established norms” for encryption nowadays anyways [1], although I couldn’t really tell from the brief description I read on Wikipedia.

Overall, I think Telegram is perceived as being less secure than Signal primarily because of the reputation Telegram has for implementing their own in house encryption techniques, even if they don’t use those techniques anymore— their name has become associated with their known history of using ad hoc encryption.

[1]: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telegram_(software)#Architec...



Chats are not e2e encrypted by default, they are just encrypted in transit. However this allows chats to be synced across many devices, so it is very very convenient.

Telegram has e2e encrypted chats but only on mobile and not on desktop for some reason.



telegram is e2ee only for secret chats, all other chats & group chats are not e2ee (which means telegram can access their content at will on the servers) Synced chats across devices is possible with e2ee, even signal has this, it's just one edge that's poorly implemented: initial sync of the chat history and afaik they haven't fixed this yet, but all messages after setting up a new device are in sync as far as i know


> However this allows chats to be synced across many devices

I use Matrix with e2e encryption, and my chats are synced just fine.



Matrix might interest you, but it doesnt solve telephone numbers (i think)


I don't want to be too dismissive of Matrix, but I also see these types of comments as understanding what problem Signal is actually addressing: security for the masses. There's no way I'm getting my grandma on Matrix and you're delusional if you think she can setup a server. But it isn't hard to get my grandma on Signal and that's a much better security feature than federation or even not having phone numbers. If I want extreme security, you're right that there are better tools. But my threat model isn't trying to avoid nation state actors, it's mostly about avoiding mass surveillance, surveillance capitalism, and probably most importantly: sending a message to the gov to fuck off with all this spying. At the end of the day, there's no other app that's even close to fulfilling those needs.

I didn't realize my comment rose to the top. When I had written this I had also written this comment[0] which was the grandchild of the top comment at the time. It has a bit more details on my thoughts/reservations of federation. tldr is mostly about avoiding centralization. This remains an open problem and I think it is far too easily dismissed. But federation isn't solving the problems people want it to if it's federated like email and web browsers. That's just mostly centralization with all the headaches of federation.

And to anyone complaining about lack of federation, what's stopping you from running your own Signal server? Sure, it won't connect to the official channel, but is that a roadblock? Even Matrix started with one server. This is a serious question, is there something preventing this? Because if the major problem with Signal is lack of federation, I don't see why this is not solvable building off of Signal and not needing to create a completely different program. Who knows, if it becomes successful why wouldn't Signal allow a bridge or why can't apps like Molly allow access to both the official and federated networks?

[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39446183



Oh, I agree completely with everything in the top paragraph, and I certainly have seen a natural trend towards central nodes/relays in all the federated networks I can think of. I think the appeal is that for the average user its about as good security as anything else available, and it has the option to work off the centralized network.


> There's no way I'm getting my grandma on Matrix

Why ? Have you tried ?



lol I can barely get my grandma to text. My parents don't even get Signal. Most of it is will power though, no one gives a fuck. In fact, most of the people in my CS grad program think both are too hard to use and don't see the point of using encrypted messengers. Even people studying security aren't using Signal. Yes, I think its odd too.


Indeed, my grandma is on Martix (I did help her set it up though)


I like the idea, but they should have called it something else instead of ‚usename‘. Maybe ‚connection string‘ or ‚discovery phrase‘. Right now they have to explain at length in what ways it’s different from regular usernames.


> they have to explain at length

My reaction to the article was that they're using a lot of words to explain this change. That suggested to me that maybe they aren't being completely candid.

I've never used Signal, because (a) I don't want to rely on a smartphone, and (b) I don't want to use my phone-number as my ID, because it's traceable. I can't work out from the TFA verbiage whether this change addresses my concerns or not. That in itself is concerning, to me.



They also missed the opportunity, like many times they have done over the years, to actually make it something rather like 'Hide My Number' in true sense, after spending years sitting on this feature. That would have been the true case of "caring for privacy". This is just a lazy (too lazy!) copy from Telegram (however, with one good thing -- getting rid of username vanity)


Is ,comma-backtick` some personal quirk of yours, or is it some standard I'm not aware of?


To give a definite answer to the discussion below - it seems Czech, Slovak, German, Slovenian and Croatian sometimes use this format. Here an authoritative source: the EU publications office:

https://op.europa.eu/en/web/eu-vocabularies/formex/physical-...



European quotation marks commonly have the left one down low and the right one up high. The same applies for single quotes. But using comma-backtick is deeply unorthodox.


Germany != Europe.

The French use « », Italians use ‘regular’ “quotes”, etc.

Strangely enough, this is the first time I see your style of quote, in two decades on the Internet.





Yeah I’m surprised at how rare this is to see. I guess that means all Germans don’t follow this convention?


I believe it should be double, „like this“, not single quotes.


Interestingly, the author does not follow this convention on his personal site (first link in profile) … instead option for the ‘single quote’ form instead.


> European quotation marks commonly have the left one down low and the right one up high

Wouldn't say it's "common", because IIRC that's only the case in Germany and Austria.



Also in Polish, actually.




It‘s what my phone made out of two presses of the same (single quote) button.


It's ‚comma-apostrophe‘, actually.


,comma-apostrophe'? Only place I've see the backtick used for apostrophe is latex. And even then half the people don't know about it.


Sure, but there's no backtick in the GP's comment. Only an apostrophe.


Wait what? I see

,comma-backtick` whereas I wrote ,comma-apostrophe'

I copy pasted both btw. You see them both as '? I see GP as having ` and me having '

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backtick



tcmb used ‚comma-apostrophe‘. nsxwolf asked "Is ,comma-backtick` some personal quirk of yours, or is it some standard I'm not aware of?"

I'm pointing out that nsxwolf was wrong to ask about comma-backtick, because tcmb used comma-apostrophe.



Both are wrong. tcmb didn’t use ‚comma-apostrophe’ – they opened with , U+201A SINGLE LOW-9 QUOTATION MARK (not U+002C COMMA) and closed with ‘ U+2018 LEFT SINGLE QUOTATION MARK (otherwise known as an open single quotation mark).

This matches the German convention described on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quotation_mark#German.



Sorry I was quoting nsxwolf. But now that you point it out, I can see the difference. It's subtle so I'll copy paste so others can see.

tcmb: ‚usename‘

nsxwolf: ,comma-backtick`

stavros: ‚comma-apostrophe‘

godelski: ,comma-apostrophe'

Though while copy pasting I see tcmb and stavros as having the same character which is different from the longer character you pasted. Seems my clipboard doesn't like that character. I also seem to have crashed OSX's emoji and symbol tray. No longer pops up if I press the button (bottom left) or select from firefox but got it back by opening safari.

Fuck man, I do not envy you people working on ligatures. Or timezones. I'm always impressed by these random rabbitholes and complexities in things that always look very simple. It's beautiful in a weird way.



Wow this is like the most HN thread I've ever seen, I love it! It's almost like a punctuation version of "Who's on first?"

Everybody's arguing, then finally all is revealed, and I learned a ton of stuff along the way about German quotation marks and the subtle difference between backticks and opening curly quotes, and low quotation marks and commas, in the Verdana font!

(If this had been a serif font with actual curly quotes the differences would have been much more obvious...)



"friendcode" seems to be pretty standard in multiplayer video games


Maybe "contactcode" would be better in this situation, as it doesn't imply any specific relationship between participants.


Yeah that seems to be the standard and very descriptive.


Not everyone I connect to on signal is a friend. same for e.g. journalists or government people who use Signal.


HellDivers 2 LFG rn is all about sharing Friendcodes... you can get a ton of them on discord or reddit... but then you end up haveing a "friendcode" cybermentally-distributed DNS system for them over time.

Six degrees will still exist.

(funny weird thing is that with HD2's server issues due too demand, one way to harvest this would be to create a fake LFG host game and have tons and tons of accounts bang against your HellDiver-Pot - and get whatever you can scrape from that?

---

OK - I actually went down this hole the other daty... you look at the reddit thread on helldrivers for LFG - or the discord...

So on reddit, you just put .json at end of thread - DL the entire thread as json, now you have reddit id, location, play style, etc, details AND their friendcode on HD2... but since they can individually generate random friend codes on any game/system that allows such... you have a breadcrump (with enough attention span to just correlate all the shared info between these friend codes and data received...

still - even with random friend codes - six degrees is still available, easily.??

---

I deeply hope they do a Tech Talk on the post-mortem of this lauch success spiral - its fascinating....

But one thing I am really interested in, this is based on the Autodesk Engine, I know they co-dev-dog-fooded, but I hadnt really known of this engine at all... what little I do know, is that - its amazing...

But I'd really like to know more about the arch and overall traffic flows etc of this game.

Its beautiful see "problems" like this explode in like ~2 weeks.

What do internet traffic graphs look like since growth, per carrier?



Does it not have built-in public matchmaking?


The developers last game had an all time peak of 7,000 users. They planned worst case scenario of 250,000 users for the sequel expecting more realistically 50,000 users.

They're currently at 394,686 players on steam alone - not including Playstation players. The servers are doing their best right now.



Sorry, I don't quite understand this in the context of "friend code" vs "matchmaking". Are you saying that friend codes bypass their servers, allowing peer-to-peer play even when the servers are overloaded (the way direct IP addresses used to do in old PC games)?

I apologize for not asking a clearer question. I was actually just interested in buying the game, but only if it has public matchmaking built-in for finding anonymous pick-up groups, instead of needing an external Discord server to swap friend codes on.



Friendcode is basically a token: lets have a game - call me on this burner number. we have game.

.>..x###.////3~~E`~,~X>>----- XXNXN x0x

then I know that youre solardev.. and we can be friends in future

(but this model is exploitable in ways, which is premise of many threads here)



"Connection string" already means something else. I'm partial to "Identifier", myself.


But identifier already means something else (i'm used to identifiers being unique, constant, and useful for actually identifying someone).


Good point!

The former C++ programmer in me wants to call them "user pointers" but that would just confuse people who haven't learned pointers.



There is old-now-unused "nickname".


I like “handle”. It’s short and conveys some mutability.


> Note that even once these features reach everyone, both you and the people you are chatting with on Signal will need to be using the most updated version of the app to take advantage of them.

> Each version of the Signal app expires after about 90 days, after which people on the older version will need to update to the latest version of Signal. This means that in about 90 days, your phone number privacy settings will be honored by everyone using an official Signal app.

Which is also an example of a challenge for open ecosystems where everyone can create apps.

I understand that it doesn't outweigh the benefits to everyone, but it is a valid reason.



Is Signal considered to be (or attempting to be) an open ecosystem?

My understanding is that Signal (the app) is private, not anonymous, centralized, and closed.

The underlying protocol is open and could be used for an open ecosystem, but I didn't think Signal aspired to do that.



The apps and most of the backend are open source too, not just the protocol.

The important distinction is that it's not decentralized like XMPP or email, which is a conscious decision: it would become very difficult to change it to add new features and they'd be left behind by closed-source competitors (see: XMPP).



I see that it is a ton of wishful thinking and FUD on the side of Signal to claim that: XMPP is alive and kicking, has all the features one needs, runs everywhere, at scale, offers the same or better crypto, better privacy, better resilience and is more sustainable. When Signal will inevitably fail/turn against its users/enshittify itself or get acquired, all federated and P2P protocols will keep on going. For decades. That's the kind of communications systems we should be demanding in the present era, nothing less.


Yet I'd wager most HN readers have a grand total of zero XMPP contacts. Myself included. Proving the GPs point.


Because of what Google did with Google Talk. https://ploum.net/2023-06-23-how-to-kill-decentralised-netwo...

XMPP is underrated. A lot of people are imagining Pidgen in 2011, but the protocol has been extended, the actively developed clients are good, and it avoids the heavier parts of Matrix (both client and server side.) I wouldn't be surprised if Slack's replacement when Salesforce inevitably fucks it up will be XMPP based rather than Matrix.



Slack's replacement is going to be Teams. No corporation chooses internal chat clients based on interoperability or openness of source code.


I kicked out all the walled-garden apps like Signal and went standard XMPP only. I have a lot of XMPP contacts now. You just need to commit to it.


And have friends who are all willing to commit to it, too


Not really, my friends are still using proprietary apps besides their XMPP client.


Both the app and the server is open source

https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server

There are forks like Session which doesn't require a phone number to sign up

https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android



I understand this, but Signal doesn't attempt to tolerate third-party apps on their servers as far as I know. They don't support interoperability.


You can run Signal app forks on the Signal server. Molly is a popular one. You just can't create new servers. I wish you could, but I get the reasoning of not wanting honeypots. But that doesn't stop you from running your own network of Signal servers. So I don't see anything stopping anyone. I mean Mullvad runs their own stuff and I don't see half the complaints about them. I've always been curious why Signal is so unique here. If 1/100th the people that made these concerns developed a open community of signal servers, I'm sure we'd have a viable alternative network. What's stopping everyone?


One of the big lessons from Twitter and Reddit was third party apps are tolerated or even encouraged until they are not. Unlike, for example Discord, I haven't see any indication that third party clients are causing account bans, yet.

The status of open source, privacy respecting messaging apps looks really healthy to me, compared to where we've been over the past 30+ years (thinking starting with ICQ.) Signal was a big leap toward getting average people using much more secure messaging, although it is pretty clear even most 'tech' people don't grasp what is going on or why it is important to be able to use e2ee separate from a combined client+server provider.



Yes, but my argument is more in the realms of "why are there no projects to create an open network using the existing architecture" not "we shouldn't have an open network and completely rely on Signal forever."


They've described what they're attempting to be here: https://signal.org/blog/the-ecosystem-is-moving/


Moxie's post looks solid, but there is a counter example: bitcoin nodes. They are a very loose federation of nodes that go through regular upgrades in the protocol. So it is possible.

But yes, it's also very hard. The bitcoin protocol didn't start out that way. It took a lot of knocks and bruises to get to the point they could upgrade all the servers in the federation.

Interestingly, the method bitcoin came up with allows protocol changes to fail, meaning the bulk of the federation never takes them up. Everyone gets a vote, and it only succeeds if the bulk of the federation upgrades. Perhaps from Moxie's point of view that's unacceptable, as it means he is no longer the dictator of the protocol.

Nonetheless, it is possible to design a protocol so it can be upgraded relatively quickly. Even if you don't do add "quick transition" features to a protocol transitions can still haven. IPv6 will replace IPv4. But as Moxie says, it's painfully slow.



The author is no longer CEO, though, and there are a lot of "I" statements in the post. Is it still accurate? Has the current CEO made any comment on it?


It's a great encapsulation of why Signal is not federated, and, unless you find the current CEO stating otherwise, is unlikely to change. Changes like the one detailed in the link simply wouldn't be possible to roll out efficiently in a federated ecosystem.

Signal has consistently focused on helping /most/ users do what they want with the app without sacrificing security. This change - away from requiring phone numbers - helps plug one of the biggest criticisms, both on the security and product side. Nothing about their mission requires federation, so I respect that they haven't sacrificed their mission in order to do it.





Protocol ratcheting, but 90 days would be quick if there’s a lot of apps.


I wish it were more obvious that Signal expires its apps every 90 days.

My mom couldn't receive signal calls on the backup phone I gave her. I had disabled auto-updates since apps break UI sometimes and she gets confused by things moving around.

When I visited, I opened the signal app and was told I had to update.



I have been bitten by this in the past. At least now they give warnings in-app that the app will expire soon. But if you don't use the app regularly, you wouldn't even know. Also, I'm not aware of any other apps that die in this way, so it's not like people are in the habit of periodically checking the app to make sure they're still on a version that can receive incoming messages.


This has more sinister implications in some places. For example, Apple app store in Russia can get banned at any time. So if I understand this correctly, if that happens, Signal will stop working for all iPhone owners in Russia in 6 months. And guess where you really need something like Signal?


It's patently unforgivable that a message would not be delivered because the client is out of date.

The Signal team is incredibly clueless and arrogant toward its userbase. It seems to simply not have occurred to them that many people rarely/never have wifi, may not be on AC power when they are on wifi which means the phone may not check for / apply updates, etc.

In the US, cellular is often expensive and slow.

In underdeveloped countries where software like Signal could be really important, all this is even more true.

We get shit crammed down our throats to protect the most obscure edge cases for the smallest percentage of the most vulnerable users - such as not being able to sync messages between devices - but then they pull shit like this which has a huge impact for people in rural areas and underdeveloped countries?



Delivering a message to a client which is known to be less secure than the sender expected it to be is unforgivable.

Refusing to deliver is inconvenient.



> Delivering a message to a client which is known to be less secure than the sender expected it to be is unforgivable.

That is inconsistent with the threat model of a messaging system!

Inherently, a messaging system will deliver a plaintext copy of the message to the recipient(s). Wouldn't be much of a messaging system otherwise.

Once you sent something and it was delivered in plaintext to the recipient, the information disclosure risk is completely out of your control (and out of control of the application in use). The recipient is free to leak it however they wish.

If you don't trust the recipient to keep it private, don't send it.



Just curious, since I'm not really active in this space, but wouldn't the threat model of most concern be that an external actor breaks (maybe an outdated version of) the app or protocol? This would leak data without you or the recipient being any the wiser. It seems like that's the threat the app-expiry policy is intended to address.


You could update the protocol version if and when a protocol weakness is discovered and then stop talking the previous protocol version after a transition period.

No need to continuously expire apps in the absence of a protocol breach.



What if there's a vulnerability in the app itself?

I have no idea if that's what they're concerned about - they may just be being arseholes in this case - but from the outside it seems like a legit reason to build in the capability for app expiration.



But you don't know, at the time of sending, which version of the client will show up to retrieve it. Otherwise both clients would need to be connected at the same time before you were allowed to send.


> That is inconsistent with the threat model of a messaging system!

I disagree, the worst thing that a messaging system that aims to be "private" can do is to actually not be private. Sending to a known-insecure client is a violation of, like, the one thing signal claims to do.

> If you don't trust the recipient to keep it private, don't send it.

My threat model is some combination of "third party actors who I don't trust" and "second parties who I trust but who are non-experts"[1]. I would like Signal to protect me from the first (by not delivering things to known-insecure clients that can be middlemanned or otherwise discovered) and the second, by having privacy-respecting and mistake-preventing defaults. Things like disappearing messages and such. Keeping my trusted-but-nonexpert peers from making mistakes that can harm either of us in the future is a key part of my threat model.

For example, disappearing messages prevent me from being harmed by my friend, who I trust to discuss things with, not having a lockscreen password and getting warrented by the police. An outdated or third party client that lets you keep them forever, even if well intentioned, can break that aspect of the threat model. And yes, a peer who is actually nefarious can still do that, but that's not my threat model. I think my friends aren't privacy-experts, I don't think they're feds.

[1]: This is, for example, the reason that I think PGP is not a good tool. Even if I do everything right, a well meaning peer who is using the PGP application can unintentionally leak my plaintext when they don't mean to, because of the tool's sharp edges.



I think this is the tradeoff that Signal makes versus the messenger most similar to it, WhatsApp. Though of course everyone in a group chat must pick one or the other, so it's not much of a free choice. (My friend group in the bay area is entirely on Signal, for example, though I also have a WhatsApp account.)


> In the US, cellular is often expensive and slow.

Mint will sell you a plan for 5GB of data for $15/mo. Its not that expensive to have a basic cellular plan. And that's assuming you're not poor enough to have your cellular plan almost entirely subsidized. And also assuming you're pretty much never anywhere with wifi.

In the vast majority of markets in the US it'll take a minute or less to download, it'll probably take more time unpacking on your device and installing.



5gb for $15USD/mo is expensive relative to other areas of the world. in aus, for example, my phone plan is $30AUD/mo for 55gb


Sure, but the thing I was responding to was "in the US".

There's cheaper per-gig plans in the US. Visible has unlimited plans for $30/mo which is cheaper per-gig if you use a lot but more if you're using less than 5GB anyways. And if 200MB/yr currently seems like an expensive amount of data to you, you're probably already using less than 5GB a month.



We are talking about 85 MB four times a year to keep the application up to date and running smoothly. Don't be ridiculous.


Hackers can always create apps.


This is a common, but terrible argument. Anyone can (mis)use, make, or weaponise technology given enough time and funding. Following this reasoning to its logical extreme, nobody should ever do anything.

The problem something like this solves is to raise the bar somewhat and discourage a fraction of those who would.

Done right, that fraction will be significant.



It's not a big expensive task to look at what data an app is sending/receiving. Anyone with minimal reverse-engineering skill will know how to intercept HTTPS to/from their own phone in 5 minutes. Signal uses some other protocol, but it's also doable, also it's open source anyway.

The conclusion isn't that Signal should be closed-source, it's that Signal's servers should not trust the clients not to be tampered with. So after 90 days, they will remove phone numbers from the protocol for users who have hidden them, breaking old clients, which is fine. What is the alternative solution you're thinking of?



I mean, if WhatsApp said this about the privacy of messages, Signal would be running billboard ads about how they don't care about privacy and look at how much better Signal is, right? This is the company that goes out of their way to pile on advanced encryption and insists on using dangerous secure enclaves to get this kind of thing right... until they are asked the hide phone numbers, at which point they are selling people a false bill of goods that WILL confuse someone into giving their phone number to someone who they really shouldn't have. It isn't as if it is somehow impossible to hide anyone's number at the protocol level: hell... even Snapchat does this, right?


Does this mean the protocol still exposes your phone number and it's hidden only by the client side?


The answer is almost certainly no. It means the old APIs that expose phone numbers will stop working in 90 days. And old clients along with them.

I have not investigated this at all, but I have enough faith in Signal/Whisper Systems to be optimistic.



Found out the hard way that the old versions do stop working. You don't even get message notifications if your app is out of date.


Yup, I was on an international trip with hardly any data allowance when all of a sudden my messages stopped sending, and I couldn't receive any new ones... That'll never happen with SMS. I love Signal, but some of their product decisions have been questionable.


Their decisions seem right for the use case of a secure messaging app, but I don't care about that use case and would rather use a non-e2ee app that'll be reliable, not lock me out, and work seamlessly across devices. Also, for those who truly care about e2ee, it's pointless if you aren't checking all the safety numbers out-of-band.


Yes, this is a compromise on the CIA triad. It prefers integrity and confidentiality over availability.

That is a fine decision to make for a security-minded app, but signal has always presented themselves as a full alternative to SMS and other messaging systems where availability is prioritized over confidentiality and integrity. It should really be made more clear so that users are making an informed decision. They could also do wonders for the user experience by having the app inform the user of the problem and how to remedy it.



Yeah, but I wouldn't call SMS super available either since it relies a lot on the ends too. Had a lot of those drop when I traveled. Something like Facebook Messenger has a whole server storing messages, so it's solid, you'll receive them later even if your phone breaks.


The way they say "privacy settings will be honored by everyone using an official Signal app." kinda suggests they're gonna let third parties keep getting this info...


They won't. It'll be similar to message timers or delete for everyone. You can revoke sharing your number and it will be hidden in official apps but third party apps won't magically forget the number that was previously shared. However if you choose not to share your number from the start, no one will be able to see your number.


I've been a Signal beta tester on iOS for as long as I remember, knowing that they were going to introduce usernames, and I wanted to get my (relatively common) name as my username. Now they finally introduced it, but they require it to end in at least 2 digits "a choice intended to help keep usernames egalitarian and minimize spoofing".

Edit: this is not actually a serious problem for me, don't worry! Rather, I think it's funny. And honestly I kind of like having the numbers required, it's a good idea. It does remove a lot of the vanity from usernames.



It’s an excellent design choice, it more or less completely eliminates “vanity names” and the “value” of shorter names.


It's a brilliant design choice. At first I was like "What?" and now the more I think about it, the more I realize it is an absolute genius move.

People need to get trained out of (even informally) assuming they can identify someone because their username looks familiar, and this is a great way to do it.



As you may already know, getting a commonly used username is also somewhat of a curse (do you like getting "forgot your password" emails every hour?)

Or tons of (mistaken) conversation requests?



Usernames are only used for the initial connection, so "getting" a username doesn't really gain you anything other than the "username" you give to people who don't already have you as a contact: "a username is not the profile name that’s displayed in chats, it’s not a permanent handle, and not visible to the people you are chatting with in Signal"


I’m politely putting it away into the not-a-problem drawer.


Well, I got stavros.01, if anyone wants to chat.


Could have gotten stavr.05


I thought of that, but it's much harder to say. "stavr dot zero five" is going to confuse people.


I don’t think this is necessarily something to lose sleep over.


> require it to end in at least 2 digits

... notes HN user jenny91



At least 8675309 ends in two digits!


I can't wait to talk to elonmusk420! I'm sure it'll be the real Elon. His online antics are such anyone with that username will instantly trigger Poe's Law. Getting rid of phone numbers as identifiers is a good idea but I think it would be better to just assign user IDs or generate hashes based on user inputs or something.


> generate hashes based on user inputs or something.

Because friend codes were so popular on Nintendo.

Hey add me real quick, my id is 12716472-83647281746-8172649! Or use the hash code, 0x28A56ED9! Super easy to remember, way better than giantrobot22 or vel0city66.



Given nintendo's user base includes a LOT of children who are very young, the long codes may have been a feature, not a bug - the equivalent of a child latch - to slow down/discourage young users from adding people themselves so their parents have a better idea of who they are interacting with.


I expect it's more a combination of several factors:

- if we don't have usernames we don't have to deal with obscene usernames, trademarked usernames, impersonation claims, and similar

- if we don't have usernames and our generated friend codes aren't guessable, we don't have to worry about people getting random unexpected friend requests from people they don't know



Don't get me wrong I get there were intentional reasons for it in regard to friend codes and I don't necessarily fully mind with that in mind in that use case. I do kind of wish there was an "I'm 13/18+, let's take the training wheels off" feature though.


The issue there is "veI0city66". Depending on the font that capital "I" might look identical to a lower case "l". A hash with an alphabet that doesn't include homoglyphs would reduce ambiguity.

There's also the "weedlordbonerhitler69" issue. A user name that seemed hilarious at 16 likely seems less hilarious at 26.

If users were identified with a hash derived from an input user name you could type in "weedlordbonerhitler69" and what would be displayed is a hash on the client side. The contact add UI could simply return the UID for the input username. So you could give out the UID or username and another user could still add you.



> The issue there is "veI0city66". Depending on the font that capital "I" might look identical to a lower case "l". A hash with an alphabet that doesn't include homoglyphs would reduce ambiguity.

They're not going to get mixed up typing it in from me verbally telling me the name. They're not going to get confused typing it in. And even then, validate the user after, that's another feature of signal is in person/out of band validation of the ends. So start the convo the verify through a channel you otherwise trust.

> There's also the "weedlordbonerhitler69" issue. A user name that seemed hilarious at 16 likely seems less hilarious at 26.

And with their setup you can change it at any time, so once again not really an issue.



Glad to see them using a name + some numbers scheme here. I immediately rushed to reserve my username but found out I didn't need to. Oh well now have the .01 suffix


> Now, you can connect on Signal without needing to hand out your phone number. (You will still need a phone number to register for Signal.)

Why is it so hard for Signal and Telegram to not require a phone number as an account identifier?

I don't need to verify anything by phone or even email. If I lose the password, the account is lost, so be it. I'll create a new one.

If I really want to, then I'll set up email/phone.



Unfortunately, spam exists and phone verification is one of the least-bad-way to ensure that the user is a real person (there are other options, but it really is one that has many advantages).

Given that Signal does not have access (by design) to much information about their users when they use the service, they can't really fight spam once accounts are created. You could do spam detection on the client and privacy-preserving voting in order to ban spammers, but the UX would be very poor and that opens a whole new can of worms.



Because it’s resilient against spam, and extremely easy to recover.


Nice. Now please finally give us iOS cloud backups before i break or loose my phone and years of conversations get evaporated.


I'd settle for full sync of chats between my own devices. If I can sync between my laptop and my phone, that's sufficient, since I already back up my laptop.


Counterpoint:

I don't want backups for IM. I don't want my counter-parties to have backups for e2e encrypted IM. I don't want IM to last. Why record every conversation on your permanent record? It's nuts.

For me, having a searchable record of everything said defeats the whole purpose if IM and e2e encryption. I'm sure the NSA like it.

Reasonable people may differ on it.



> I don't want my counter-parties to have backups for e2e encrypted IM.

That's not your choice to make.



Are you happy with anyone you talk to secretly bugging the conversation and transcribing it?

I don't want to be randomly assaulted on the street, also not my choice to make. Doesn't make it ok imho.



They can do that in any case if they want to, just by taking photos of their phone screen.


what's stopping someone from just showing another person their phone screen with your messages?


Ok but I can already do it on desktop (and it's even easier on Android), it's only missing on iOS. So this point is kinda moot...

The encryption key is in cleartext on desktop and the SQLite db is right next to it: ~/Library/Application Support/Signal/config.json



The lack of any kind of backup/export for iOS is the main thing keeping me from recommending Signal.

Sadly, from what I’ve seen in similar threads online, it seems the devs are opposed to backups in principle (they believe that chats should be ephemeral and backing up is antithetical to this).



> The lack of any kind of backup/export for iOS is the main thing keeping me from recommending Signal.

"No one can read your chats, including you." — Signal



Run a windows VM, install signal desktop, bob's your auntie.


This is basically what I do, just replace Windows vs Mac.

Still, I feel it's much more inconvenient than it really needs to be; the correct UX is a button press.



Why iOS cloud backup? Why not a universal backup way, OS / cloud vendor independent?


Just happened to me a couple of months ago. Cannot agree with you more.


You may be able to install something like https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android in the EU ... eventually.


If I understand correctly it’ll still not be possible to create an account without entering a phone number?

For me this is a requirement to call a service a private service because in Germany at least every phone number is connected with a persons identity. To get a phone number you need to connect it to an identity using a identity card



Here in Thailand it's the same but phone numbers get recycled and expire very aggressively. I just got a new phone number and I can login to many platforms of some 20 year old guy who really likes pc gaming.

Phone numbers should have NEVER became an ID. Incredibly hypocritical of Signal to claim "privacy focus" when the lowest layer of the system is literally the least secure identification method we have.



same in my country.

I had two SIM cards dedicated to online crap - one for important stuff like banking, another for social media and such.

both have expired after ≈ 3 months of inactivity, when my 2 week trip unexpectedly took 4 months. those SIM cards weren't physically inserted into my phone - I used to do that once a month to call someone and get billed a few cents so it would remain active, until that trip.

there's no way to get those phone numbers back and it's been an enormous pain the dick. I hate this fucking system, but I hate the fact that fucking everything requires a phone number even more.



This is a fundamentally different problem for a fundamentally different audience.

If we take privacy issue, it can be divided into 3 segments:

* Privacy of user data. The basic level. When you use Google or Apple, they collect data. Even if you minimize all settings — data is still collected. This data is used to train models and models is used to sell ads, target you or do anything else you have no clue about (like reselling it to hundred of “partners”).

* Privacy against undesired identification. Next layer of privacy. When you want to have some personal life online without sharing much about you. Like Reddit, anonymous forums, or Telegram (to some degree).

* Privacy against governments. The ultimate boss of privacy. When you want to hide from all governments in the world your identity.

Signal was perfect at first layer strong but not perfect at 3rd layer (e2e encryption, no data collection to share nothing with governments who seek for data, good privacy settings, always tell you if your peer logged to new device to protect from cases when government operates with telecom companies and use sms password to make a new login), and almost non present at 2nd because they have no public features except group chats where you share your number.

Now they in one move close gaps at 2nd layer — you can hide phone number and stay fully anonymous, and strength their positions in 3rd layer, leaving the last piece open: government still will know that you have some Signal account.

As for me, this setup solves 99,999% cases for regular people in democratic and semi-democratic countries and address the most fundamental one: privacy of data and actions online.

Yes it is not perfect but barrier for government to spy on me is that high that I reasonably can believe that in most cases you should never be worried about being spied, especially if you live in some places which are named not as Iran or Russia.

The only scenario, in my perspective, you can want to have a login without phone (with all sacrifices to spam accounts, quality of peers and usual troll fiesta in such places) is when you want to do something you don’t want ever be found in your current country.

But in this case, IMO, Signal is the last worry you usually have on your mind and there are a lot of specialized services and protocols to address your need.



1,2 and in part 3 were already fixed with the Signal FOSS fork back then, but Moxie and his army of lawyers decided to send out multiple cease and desist letters against those projects. Which, in return, makes Signal not open source, no matter what the claims are. If they don't hold up their end of the license and argue with their proprietary (and closed to use) infrastructure then I'd argue they are no better than Telegram or WhatsApp. Signal's backup problem is another story which might blow up my comment too much.

Because of your mentioned points I would never recommend Signal, and rather point to Briar as a messenger and group/broadcast platform. Currently, it's still a little painful to use and e.g. QR Codes would already help so much with easing up the connection and discovery/handshake process.

But it has huge potential as both a messenger and a federated and decentralized platform.



I just don't want my metadata (contact graph) hoovered because I send a (encrypted) message to someone that may be an over sharer on FB, etc.

I use Signal because I am a "nothing to hide and I like to own my privacy as much as possible" type online person.

Signal == more peace of mind just generally in this online world we have.



> no data collection to share nothing with governments who seek for data,

That isn't true anymore and hasn't been for years. Signal collects your data and keeps it forever in the cloud.



citation needed. care to elaborate on this?




Signal is not a VPN. How is this relevant? Or did you link to the wrong comment?


Yeah, not sure how that happened, but that link wasn't exactly what I was going for. If you scroll down far enough from there you'd find the parts I tried to point you to, but try this link instead: https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=autoexec&next=394457...

Just to be safe here's a copy/paste with the details:

This has been true for many years now. At the time it caused a major uproar among the userbase (myself included) whose concerns were almost entirely ignored. Their misleading communication at the time caused a lot of confusion, but if you didn't know that Signal was collecting this data that should tell you everything you need to know about how trustworthy they are.

Here's some reading from the time of the change:

https://community.signalusers.org/t/proper-secure-value-secu...

https://community.signalusers.org/t/dont-want-pin-dont-want-...

https://old.reddit.com/r/signal/comments/htmzrr/psa_disablin...

https://www.vice.com/en/article/pkyzek/signal-new-pin-featur...

Note that the "solution" of disabling pins mentioned at the end of that last article was later shown to not prevent the collection and storage of user data. It was just giving users a false sense of security. To this day there is no way to opt out of the data collection.

My personal feeling is that Signal is compromised and the fact that the very first sentence of their privacy policy is a lie and they refuse to update it to detail their new data collection is a big fat dead canary warning people to find a new solution for secured communication. Other very questionable Signal moves that make me wonder if it wasn't an effort to drive people away from the platform as loudly as they were allowed to include the killing off of one of the most popular features (the ability to get both secured messages and insecure SMS/MMS in the same app) and the introduction of weird crypto shit nobody was asking for.



Not exactly that but looks relevant unless you trust Amazon: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39414322


If we take privacy issue, it can be divided into 3 segments:

This sounds like a bunch of bullshit.



Sounds like your username.


in Germany at least every phone number is connected with a persons identity. To get a phone number you need to connect it to an identity using a identity card

Personally, I am totally baffled by this.

Due in large part to C3's positive influence, Germany is at the forefront of privacy issues and legislation on so many areas, except for this one, which ends up turning into a massive backdoor in the whole edifice. Okay, we can't ask for a copy of your identification card... we'll just use a telephone number or SIM code or something trivially tied back to your IMSI (like an app store account or IMEI) instead. Because of the absurd 2017 law, these are equivalent to your government ID card.

I really don't understand why Germans put up with this while simultaneously pushing so hard for positive changes in every other aspect of online privacy. Especially when so many other developed Western countries do not tie SIM cards to identities: Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, US, UK, Canada, and many many others.

It's like a giant `sudo gimme-your-identity` backdoor in all the other data collection protections. And nobody seems to care about closing the backdoor.



It wasn't always like this - the requirement to give your ID to get a SIM card, as you noted, was only introduced in 2017 (though it certainly feels way longer ago for me).

Anyways - why does nobody care?

Simple: most don't feel this being an issue.

Some may even say that they "don't have anything to hide" and there goes the erosion of privacy, bit by bit - by the time someone notices "ok, this may become a problem" - it'll be too late :(



On the flip side, SMS fraud is almost nonexistent from German mobile numbers, which is why scammers just send from other countries to German mobile phone owners. Mostly from France.


SMS fraud is almost nonexistent from German mobile numbers

Even if this is true, how does that benefit Germans?

Nobody's seriously talking about blocking all SMSes at the national border.



Why do you need a German phone number? Many countries let anyone have a phone number, with no proof of address or other identifying information. Just use one of those numbers instead. One example service is https://jmp.chat/ but there are many others.


I think it is a holdover from the Text Secure days. And like others say, it's a different problem.

But for solutions, can't you just buy a voip number? You just need it for registration and then can dump it. I'm sure you can buy one with cash or zcash if you're really paranoid.

While in the US I don't have to show my gov ID to get a phone number, I don't know anyone who buys a phone with cash except international students. So practically everyone is identifiable anyways. But I'm not sure this is a deal breaker since all I'm leaking is that I have registered a Signal account. AFAIK Signal only has logs of an account existing and last online with 24hr resolution (which avoids many collision deanonymization methods). Even paying with cash is hard as I'm probably caught on camera (but these usually get flushed).

So I'm legitimately curious, why is this a dealbreaker? It doesn't seem like a concern for the vast majority of people, and the problem Signal is solving is secure communication for the masses, not the most secure method possible with unbounded complexity. It's being as secure as possible while being similar in complexity to the average messenger.



> But for solutions, can't you just buy a voip number?

No, how would my uncle in the countryside of Vietnam do that? He doesn't have a credit card -- not many here do. He doesn't speak English -- can you find a website that sells voip numbers in Vietnamese? Buying a voip number from a provider in Vietnam has the same exact KYC requirements as buying a SIM, so it is still tied to your government ID and registered forever.

Also buying a VOIP for 1 month costs something like $10 from a quick Google. Average salaries are like $1.50/hour. Nobody is going to pay an entire day's salary to buy an VOIP number they throw for a month just so they can register anonymously for chat.

So, not you can't "just" buy a voip number unless you're a rich Westerner. But who needs privacy more? People in liberal democracies or people in places like Vietnam (literally an authoritarian country where people are routinely imprisoned for speaking against the government)?

> I don't know anyone who buys a phone with cash except international students.

Everyone buys a phone with cash here because few people have credit cards, since there is no such thing as "credit ratings" and it is easy for people to disappear from their debts. There are more people in Vietnam than any country in Europe. We all use smartphones and messenger apps here, too.



He’d ask you to do it then like every non technical older person. It’s a non issue.


None of my non technical older relatives in Vietnam have asked for anyone's help signing up for the chat accounts they use.


Indeed. Even most technical people don't have experience setting up VOIP stuff. And needing some techie's intervention just to create an account is not beneficial for a company's user base. Calling this a non-issue is being ignorant about how usability works and influences user engagement.


If they needed signal it be because someone like you told them to get it. Non issue for the billions that use WhatsApp and Facebook.

Your uncle in Vietnam has a smartphone, no internet, no number, and NEEDS the signal app? He might need solar, electricity and internet first.



Just use Wire (wire.com). True end to end encrypted multi device messenger, open source, federated and based on MLS. All you need is an email address, no phone number required. And based in Europe. They allow building your own clients (with some stipulations) and seem to solve everyone’s issues with signal here


This is not correct. Go to a phone booth, get Signal, never need the phone number again. Any phone will do. Get a phone number from a different country online and without identity check, who cares, you will never need it again.


I haven't seen a phone booth in Europe for the last 7 years.


Just use the wonderful openstreetmap to find the nearest one, it will be closer than you think.


wouldn't the next bloke using the booth for same cause get the whole account?


Not if you set a PIN no. But I think the next bloke can't use the booth to create a signal account anymore. I don't think we'll run out of booth though considering how rare the use case is ;)


It's still preferable to use a burner number for signal/telegram if you want privacy.


There are many countries where it's completely impossible to get a burner phone.


Same in Spain since 2004 Madrid train bombings IIRC.


This is the case in most countries these days. There are very few places left where you can get a mobile phone number without identifying yourself at some point.


I used to care, but at this point it’s obvious that taking a phone number is by far the most effective anti spam and anti trolling method in existence.


There was a forum that used to have as a requirement a non-free email account and seemed to have no issues with spam accounts with tens of thousands of members for more than 10 years. In that use case it seemed the non-free account aspect to sign-up was the threshold which seemed to keep spammers out vs the fact such an email account could be (with relevant authority) traced back to a real identity.

I'd be curious if there is a study that has looked into the thresholds for different use cases at which spam account creation drops to negligible amounts and how much price vs anonymity vs difficulty factors into it.



Which is great when databases leak. Absolutely brilliant.


... but then Signal wouldn't have your phone number either. What they need it for is ... dubious if you ask me.


> ... but then Signal wouldn't have your phone number either. What they need it for is ... dubious if you ask me.

The reasons they need it aren't really that dubious to me: they want to create a service that actual people will actually use, not just weird privacy geeks who never gave up on PGP. Using phone numbers allows for the kind of user discovery that most people expect in 2024, and requiring them inserts a barrier to mass account creation that can keep spam accounts down to a manageable level (especially given the whole point is they can't do content-based spam-filtering in the way that makes email managable).

Personally, my understanding is they've always been trying to develop the maximally private usable chat app, which requires some compromises from the theoretically maximally private chat app.



Yeah, privacy is weird and cringe! Let's call 'em "privacy-bros" or maybe "encryption-bros" to signify that they are low status (I don't want to be like them, ew!)


If you need privacy without usability just exchange pubkeys with your friends?


I think the remark is more about these sort of rhetorical tactics which permeate every topic. It is a fair remark.


> I think the remark is more about these sort of rhetorical tactics which permeate every topic. It is a fair remark.

It's not a fair remark though, all it did was twist what I said into a inflammatory derailment.

The point is there are a lot of (usually technical) people who are too focused one aspect, but are missing the bigger picture. If you follow them, you'll probably get a communication app that only those people can/will use, which has deal breakers for mass-market adoption. And once that happens, those people probably won't use it either, since they want to communicate outside their group.



Both his and your comments come off as inflammatory derailment to me. That's how it reads, I'm not ascribing malintent. People didn't use to talk like this, I hope you reconsider.

"not just weird privacy geeks who never gave up on PGP." is simply not conducive towards making your point. You can make your (otherwise solid) point and even win the argument on merit without this sort of thing.



I try to figure out another shorthand which communicates as effectively. "Privacy minded geeks with a deep understanding of E2E encryption"?


> Using phone numbers allows for the kind of user discovery that most people expect in 2024

Do people really expect to still exchange phone numbers ?

Fundamentally I don't want people to call me nor SMS me (that's for spam only), most messaging services will allow contact exchange through a QR code inside the app, and if everything else fail an email address will be the most stable fallback.



> Do people really expect to still exchange phone numbers

Yes. This is the norm in the US.



And everywhere else on earth.


Not really, for better or worse.

In many countries SMS was either crazy expensive, unreliable, wall gardened to death (can't message people on other carriers...) and had no traction in the first place.

Then phone calls are also crazy expensive: I'm looking at the phone plans right now and the main focus is the data amount. Phone call options are either to only allow for super short conversations for a flat fee (less than 5min per call, for a 25% increase in the monthly plan) or 30 min to an hour of phone call for double to triple the price of the plans.

Moving to an alternative is just the normal course given these incentives, and that's what people did in droves (looking at Japan for instance)



In how many countries do people not exchange phone numbers as the primary means of contact?


> not just weird privacy geeks who never gave up on PGP

Looks like you're thinking about key exchanges as opposed to phone number exchanges.

Ever heard of user nicknames?



But then it's not private. It's linked to your phone number.


You can now hide you phone number, according to the blog post.

[...] Selecting “Nobody” means that if someone enters your phone number on Signal, they will not be able to message or call you, or even see that you’re on Signal. And anyone you’re chatting with on Signal will not see your phone number as part of your Profile Details page – this is true even if your number is saved in their phone’s contacts. Keep in mind that selecting “Nobody” can make it harder for people to find you on Signal.



I can only hide my phone number from other people, and even for that it should have been hidden by default from the start.

Can't hide it from some thought police which may or may not need a court order.



But it’s irrelevant, as the chats are end to end encrypted regardless. So sure, they’d know you had a Signal account, but not the contents thereof.


Well, to link with recent news, do you think talking with the late Alexey Navalni over Signal would protect you from russian police? They'd still be able to see that you talked to him.

And then what's the point of the super duper encryption?



In Signal, probably no. Signal has this sealed sender functionality hiding significant amount of metadata from passive observer and active examination post-communication: https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/

What Russian police would be able to see, that in a given time period of certificate rotation at most X people communicated to Navalny.



Signal does not know who you correspond with. The only information they keep is the account creation timestamp, and the date that the account last connected to the Signal service.

You may have confused this information with WhatsApp which indeed keeps a lot of metadata on each user.



Signal absolutely knows who you correspond with. How could they otherwise route your chat messages?

They promise to throw this information away, which is nice but not possible to verify.

They also employ a roundabout way of encrypting this data, but as they rightly point out in their article that describes the scheme, encrypting or hashing phone numbers is not safe from a malicious attacker. The space of all possible phone numbers is so small that it could be brute forced in the blink of an eye.

You place all your trust in Signal (and Google/Apple) when you use them. That may be better than the alternatives, but it's still something we should be honest about.

That said, keep in mind that Signal and Google/Apple can also trivially backdoor your software, so unless you take specific precautions against that, the details of their middleman protection isn't terribly important.



I guess you are right. It's trust-based. For an actual obfuscation Signal would need to implement something like onion routing, right? I think Session does it.




Well, TIL. That does not refute my comment, though. Signal still does not know who you chat with. It's the cloud provider who might log the IP address of the sender. Identifying the person based on that information alone would be non-trivial if not simply impossible.


> Signal still does not know who you chat with. It's the cloud provider

To me, it's much worse. A non-profit doesn't have my data but Amazon (and NSA) does. With Amazon's scale, it must be trivial to identify everyone.

See also: https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=autoexec&next=394457...



> They'd still be able to see that you talked to him.

Signal has no access to metadata, including participants in a conversation. All they know is the date of account creation and the date of the last connection.

However, if they got access to Navalni's phone, then they of course can see everything Navalni can.



> However, if they got access to Navalni's phone, then they of course can see everything Navalni can.

Aha :)

Do you people also want the relevant xkcd? The one about the wrench...



Even encrypted data is not irrelevant. The frequency of messages is relevant, as is how many messages are sent how quickly, the total package size can be revealing if they arent hella padding the data, there is a lot you can learn just from the data. Total obfuscation is ideal.


If you are worried of an adversary that is using numerical analysis on the frequency of messages to somehow undermine you, I’d recommend not using a smartphone or internet connected device. And perhaps medication.


Good to hear that you have nothing to hide, comrade.


It's not irrelevant, but the exposure is reduced.

If a person is a member of a terrorist network - or friends with someone who is - the fact that a warrant could force Signal to expose that link could mean that a court is then more likely to approve increased surveillance of your (non-Signal) communications because of that link.

On the other hand if you are a woman on Tinder and using Signal to communicate with matches, this doesn't expose you to the person you have just matched with adding your number to their phone book, uploading it to LinkedIn and then finding where you work (which is what you can do with a phone number).

My feeling is this is a reasonable compromise, but it is important people understand what it does and doesn't protect you from.



Luckily there are other messaging services that are private if you’re going to be that pedantic about it.


But none will be as private as Signal.


Matrix is more private, depending on your threat model.


>and requiring them inserts a barrier to mass account creation that can keep spam accounts

Well, an even better barrier to reduce spam would be Signal to require some official ID of people...



But that's also a barrier to actual users, which would be counter-productive.


I mean, a phone number is an arbtrary sequence of digits. I'm very happy to use a chat app where I say to someone 'what's your username?'.

I'm not giving a chat app free access to all my contacts - and that includes things like Whatsapp



The claim (which generally I'm inclined to believe) is that requiring a phone number drastically increases the cost to sending spam. That in turn drastically reduces the spam amount.


To me Signal is in the business of collecting metadata and nothing else (for whom, that is a good question: probably some three letter agency).


Perhaps you need a refresher in Signal Protocol.

Do not be sprouting on about things that you do not understand.

https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/1013.pdf





What they need it for is simply that it's the way the system has always worked, because Signal started life as an encrypted replacement for SMS. The point was that you could switch from the standard SMS app you were already using over to Signal (which was called "TextSecure" at the time) without having to change your habits, because sending messages to people's phone numbers was simply what people did then. There's nothing nefarious about it.


Yes, this is just Apple level bullshit - trust us with your private data even though no law prevents us from exploiting it ...


Damn, people will never be satisfied, will they. It's not meant to be an anonymous messenger, because those have spam issues.


Signal has spam issues even with the phone number requirement, as I've experienced lately (though nothing on the scale of Twitter). I dread to think what the spam would be like without the requirement of a phone number.


At least now you can solve the existing spam problem if you want by disallowing people from using your number to message you in the privacy settings and randomizing your username after anyone new adds you - that way your username is like a one time password to add you, kind of like what lots of people here wish existed for phone calls.


Not true I don't have spam on Tox or Briar.

But sadly I don't have contacts either!



They could collect a small amount in cryptocurrency to prove user is not a spammer. Telegram tried this but the price for not providing a phone number was too high. Does it mean knowing user's number is so valuable?


It strikes me as hopelessly naive to think that keeping a personal phone number private is the only reason a user would want to be able to sign up for a service completely anonymously. The question is not whether knowing a user's number is worth $X, the question is whether _anonymous access to your platform_ is worth $X; a question that applies equally to both innocent good-faith users and to spammers/phishers/etc. If your platform is actually worth anything, $X is not going to be a small amount.

And yet many people seem to earnestly believe that a tiny token fee will be enough to deter spam, despite clear evidence to the contrary (see for instance how Twitter's "verification" fee has completely failed to stop bots from overrunning the platform, many of which proudly display their blue checks).



I never received any spam in Matrix.


That's like saying you've never seen any advertisements in the desert.




Just like you haven’t received any communication from anyone about any topic other than talking about Matrix. It’s not that Matrix has a magic formula, it’s that a fraction of a fraction a percent of people care even an iota about it.


I could certainly point out the differences, but the fact that you yourself aren’t acknowledging them indicates to me that you’re throwing intellectual integrity out the window because this product doesn’t work in the way that you want it to work. Engineering is about tradeoffs, and not every company serves to build something that does exactly what YOU want it to. I prefer Signal the way it is. I understand the tradeoffs.


Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact



Search:
联系我们 contact @ memedata.com